

THE WORLD'S EPOCH-MAKERS

Hegel and Hegelianism

By

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PREFACE

To write shortly upon Hegelianism has proved even more extraordinarily difficult in accomplishment than it seemed in prospect; and much that had been set down for discussion, especially towards the end, has been crowded out. It was necessary for this series and for this writer to discuss Hegel from a point of view accessible to all who are interested in "the world's epoch-makers"; yet in breaking off the author feels with regret that many a matter has been left unexplained which must prove a stone of stumbling to the beginner. Within this little book such a reader may find some measure of help from the Index. He may further be recommended to study the notes upon Hegel's phraseology at the end of the prolegomena to Dr. Wallace's translation of the *Logic*. Among many other serviceable books, Dr. E. Caird's short volume, *Hegel*—by a master in philosophy and especially in Hegelianism—stands pre-eminent. Half of it is biographical. The other half confines itself to stating and enforcing, with much sympathy, Hegel's

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central point of view. For that among other reasons it seemed best that the present handbook should attempt an outline of the various portions of the system. The Chicago handbooks edited by Dr. Morris will be found of great service in pursuing further study of Hegel's detail. But no magic can make Hegel an easy author; and no helps, however efficient, ought to be used as substitutes for personal knowledge of the master mind.¹

¹ In the literature at the head of several chapters, it will be observed that (A) stands for translations; (B) for untranslated and relevant portions of Hegel's writings; (C) for helpful works in English on the subjects under discussion, or works influenced strongly by Hegel.

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HEGEL AND HEGELIANISM

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

PHILOSOPHY is often described as a doctrine of the Absolute. It is not indeed specially characteristic of Hegel to use such a definition. He prefers to speak of the Idea. For Hegel is upon his own showing an idealist, and an absolute idealist. When we have dealt with his system in detail, particularly with what he calls Logic, we shall find ourselves, or ought to find ourselves, better able to appreciate the motives of his terminology. Still, the difference in words does not imply a difference in subject or topic. Like other philosophies, Hegel's might also be called a doctrine of the Absolute. He ends his expositions in the region of "absolute knowledge" or "the absolute idea."

This sounds somewhat abstract and aloof from everyday life. It may be said at the outset that Hegel's philosophy less than any other stands aloof from reality or aspires to a construction *in vacuo*. We may very possibly blame him for being unduly entangled in the realities of ordinary experience; we cannot fairly charge

him with disparaging them. And if we are allowed to translate the word Absolute by a less pretentious equivalent, we may be helped to repel the unfair suspicions spoken of. The doctrine of the Absolute is a doctrine of *reality*. Whatever is real—in or below the half-deceptive appearances of things—through or behind the “phenomena” of ordinary experience or of the physical universe—that is the object of the philosopher’s quest.

He is not the only teacher of mankind who seeks reality. Every teacher who deserves respect has the same high ambition somehow ruling in him. Yet in certain respects the philosopher stands alone. He is pledged to thoroughness, and tries to push inquiry further than it is carried by others, e.g. by the physical sciences. Properly, of course, the word “science” simply means knowledge; it is by a conventional use of language that we restrict the word, as we ordinarily do, to specialised knowledge in a single department. When Hegel uses the German word for science—*Wissenschaft*—there is no corresponding restriction. And is not Hegel justified? If partial knowledge ought to be studied, is there not room for one who shall cultivate knowledge as a whole? Knowledge as a whole, or reality as a whole—we may use either form of words without change of meaning; or are we prepared to fall back upon the despised groping of the Platonic dialogues, and suppose that one kind of knowledge deals not with reality but with the unreal? It is more fashionable nowadays to suppose that a reality exists with which knowledge cannot enter into any relation. Whether this is wiser than the other onesidedness may be questioned. Hegel will vigorously deny its wisdom.

INTRODUCTORY

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The philosopher, then, studying knowledge or reality as a whole, will inquire whether there are assumptions made by the special sciences—what these are—within what limits they hold good. This is no part of the work of special science. So long as in practice it respects its proper limits—and it usually though not always succeeds in doing that—a special science may live and do good service without ever being distinctly conscious of the qualifications which ought to be understood when its results are stated. Knowledge is like a sum in arithmetic worked out to several points of decimals. The special science is a schoolboy who usually is content to get two or three decimal figures and then stop. If he is in an ambitious mood, however, he will work to twenty or thirty figures—going far beyond what his data warrant. Philosophy claims to be an expert, carrying the sum exactly as far as it ought to go, and knowing precisely why the calculation has to stop at a particular figure.

It may still be doubted whether we shall gain anything by discussing the absolute reality in abstract terms. Are there not many kinds of reality which have nothing to do with each other? Here we notice another of the peculiarities of Hegel. He is a monist. He does not believe in different kinds of reality, so distinct that we cannot bring them together. Being an idealist, he affirms that the nature of thought or of knowledge gives us our most reliable clue to the nature of reality; and his friends may further argue that two wholly distinct realities, if they came to be known, would rend the unity of consciousness. For good or for evil, Hegel defines reality (and thought) in the abstract. And the conceptions of the Real which he

builds up in his *Logic* he carries with him when he proposes to expound special aspects of the known Reality, as in nature, or as in Aesthetics or Ethics or Religion. Dualism is repudiated and protested against; at the same time, duality—in subordination to unity, and as a means of manifesting or realising unity—is asserted everywhere.

The great man who presented these thoughts on the boldest scale to the modern world—or indeed to any period of the world's history, ancient or modern—has little purely biographical interest attaching to his life and character. Even when he is caught up in the current of notable and tragic events even when Napoleon wins a battle within sight of the philosopher's study and within earshot of his lecture room—the thing is accidental and external to him. Its effects cannot modify though they may perplex or delay his true development. In the history of a thinker the landmarks are ideas; his boldest and most thrilling deeds are books or lectures. What is true of thinkers in contrast to men of action is pre-eminently true of Hegel among all the race of thinkers. He seeks to reduce reality not merely to the form of subjectivity as thought, but to the form of intellect as logical thought. Knowledge on his view grasps the Absolute; nothing eludes knowledge. Goodness and beauty are existences to which the principles of knowledge or of thought afford a clue; and the supreme interest of beauty and goodness is to afford help in the development of intelligence. We believe, therefore, that we shall do most justice to our subject by dealing mainly with Hegelianism, mentioning as regards Hegel only what may afford a chronology of his works and make his position intel-

legible—so far as one can do this in a compend—when we compare him with his predecessors and with his principal British disciples. Even during his life his idiosyncrasy counted for little. Other men have swayed their time by the charm or the force of their personality; Hegel's overmastering desire was to be an impersonal servant of the Idea—in more familiar language, a servant of [abstract] truth. It was indeed Hegel's belief that no one in effect achieves more or achieves less than what his thoughts entitle him to. Form on ultimate analysis appears to be part of the content; that favourite distinction melts, like all others, in the Hegelian laboratory. When the same thoughts are held to move society differently as interpreted by a different character, Hegel judges that they are not the same, but modified in exact proportion to the difference in their effects. An "edifying" philosophy was his pet aversion; and we may safely say that no man ever handled such lofty themes in so consistently and coldly scientific a spirit. We never feel the beat of a heart in his writings—only the pulse of thought. A manual of the Differential Calculus will appear a warm and sentimental treatise when compared with the merciless pages in which Hegel anatomises the soul of man or the nature of the Blessed God. Nothing that he has said will, by the manner of his saying it, make any one the braver for reading it or the better for remembering it. The philosopher has almost if not altogether eaten out the man. Thus, if much of what we say seems to deal with philosophy rather than with Hegelianism or with Hegel, let us remember that Hegel is the philosopher *par excellence*—the man interested in truth, in all truth, in nothing but truth, or

interested in other experiences simply as phases in the intellectual search for truth. Moreover, Hegelianism is certainly not yet a dead doctrine or a spent force. We are not building a cenotaph in honour of one great man. We are introducing the reader to a fortress of thought, now perhaps somewhat decayed, or at least reported to be so, but still inhabited by living men and hard fighters.

CHAPTER II

PRELIMINARY OUTLINE

WHAT is stated here must be regarded as purely provisional. It does not follow the line of any of Hegel's own statements, and, if accepted, must be taken upon trust. It is an effort to express the leading thoughts of Hegel so as to make them, if not intelligible, yet somewhat less unintelligible to the beginner.

We shall treat his main positions as a progressively unfolded doctrine of the Absolute. Or, to use less alarming language, we shall regard them as progressive definitions of the nature of what is real. We throw to the front a belief which we regard as deeply characteristic of Hegel, namely,

I. Reality is a system. We might approach the same thought by saying that reality is conceived as a unity—or that there is a unity divined in all existence. That is indeed a belief characteristic of Hegel, but it seems well from the very first to emphasise his opposition to Pantheism of the ordinary type. Ordinary pantheists hold unity to be important and difference trivial; they regard unity as an objective fact, but difference as a mere human fiction. It is not so with Hegel. To him, existence is necessarily revealed not simply as a unity, but as a unity of distinguished and

related parts—in short, as a system. We may add that reality is interpreted as a system of the highest kind—an organism and more than an organism. The whole is believed to imply every part, and every part is believed to imply the whole. Or, again—more briefly, if less significantly—every part implies every other part.

"Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is."

This is very far from our ordinary common sense way of conceiving reality, and it may be asked how Hegel dares to make such an assumption. He is not greatly concerned to justify himself to the startled beginner. He lived in an age of proud idealist speculations, and was more interested in comparing his own type of philosophy with rival systems, than in laying bare to the plain man the approaches to wisdom. One answer indeed he offers, but a formidable one; he tells us that the final justification of his system is to be found by working through it as a whole. If you will (and can) follow him, he will show you a place for everything, and everything in its place, and he will show you that each pigeonhole *must* be added in its turn to round off those which have gone before. And surely this answer is sufficient, if it be true; but it is not available for a preliminary survey. In anticipation of fuller epitomes yet to be given, we may say that it is unquestionably from the nature of *Thought* Hegel derives his belief in the systematic character of the Real. "To think," said Sir William Hamilton, "is to condition, to relate"—a

description of thought which Hamilton seemed to regard as seriously damaging the pretensions of thought to represent reality. But why? Why must we assume that reality is a contingent plurality rather than a systematic unity? Above all, why should we do so when our own thought forces us in the opposite direction? Its relating activity, if finished, must give us a system of absolute and complete determination, such as Hegel affirms that we already can recognise in the nature of reality. If our minds necessarily evolve certain beliefs when engaged in their task of thinking—if, *e.g.*, they compel us to regard reality as a system, or else to abandon cognition altogether—is not that a full proof of the validity of such belief? Do not considerations like these establish the thesis with which we are dealing?

Even physical science drops hints of a similar bearing. Has not the spectroscope proved that in distant stars—where Mill thought it highly questionable whether two and two would not make five—the same chemical elements are at work which we know in our laboratories? Thus already *a posteriori* science verifies the assumption of unity and reason even in the material cosmos.

A favourite example with Hegel himself is that of the magnet. If we approach its study with mechanical prejudices in our minds, we shall assume that the magnet is due to composition, and we may propose to break it in two and divide it, one of us keeping the north pole and one the south. But the magnet, material as it is, refuses to be thus divided into constituent fragments. Each portion is a whole; each turns out to possess both a north pole and a south

The question between Hegel and his adversaries may be formulated thus—which is the truer type of the constitution of the real universe, a heap of stones or a magnet?¹ Or—to go one step further—a heap of stones, or a living organism? Or—again a step further—matter, or thought?

For it is not to be supposed that Hegel is mainly occupied with the material universe. His *Encyclopedia* is, or seems to be, divided into three regions—a world of thought (Logic); a world of reality, in some sense or other estranged from thought (Nature), and a world of reality consciously penetrated by thought (Spirit). That division, however, is characteristically hard and obscure, and a learner will be wise to postpone his study of it until a later stage. It is more important now to understand in general terms that the system of reality to which Hegel points us is absolute and all-inclusive. God, if He exists, must be placed in it, or, better perhaps, must be revealed through it. To be aloof from it would be to fall out of reality altogether. Hegel might have adopted the phrase with which the Agnostic young lady once startled the author of *The Epic of Hades*—"There is nowhere else." Positively, this all-inclusive sweep of the system of reality implies that Hegel must find a place within it for the spiritual interests of mankind. Morality and religion must be parts of reality, no less than matter or force. This is the moving interest in the case of the more earnest minds who adhere to

¹This is not the only nor the main reason why Hegel's "Notion" has sometimes been rendered "Polarity." The opposition (in unity) of pole and pole is a still more precious parable in the opinion of Hegel's disciples.

the Hegelian system—men like the late T. H. Green. They believe that, in defending the reality of ordinary knowledge, or the trustworthiness of thought, they are helping to fight the one great battle of belief against the spirit of denial. In the English-speaking world, we are accustomed to alliances between an Agnostic philosophy and a religious faith. It is important to have the opposite view thrust even sharply on our notice. It is well to remind ourselves that there are capable thinkers who regard any such alliance as a piece of intellectual cowardice, or a covert treason.

In the sense in which we have explained it, and as understood by Hegel, reality is not something aloof from thought, but (to say no more) includes in itself the great determinations or categories by which the human mind grasps its knowledge—these also are realities. Hence we may profitably regard Hegel's view of reality as an extension of Kant's view of thought. So far as Kant furnished a positive refutation of Hume's positions, we may say that it consisted in one special point. Hume had practically affirmed that sequence was a reality, while causation was nothing but a subjective fiction, the fruit of association. Kant showed—by a new mode of treatment involving a deeper analysis of subjectivity—that it was impossible to explain the *consciousness* of sequence without implying a *consciousness* (explicit or implicit) of that ideal bond of union between sequent phenomena which we know as the law of causation. Apart from that, Kant showed, human knowledge would be a rope of sand. A conscious series must be more than a series. It rests on a unity—subjectively, the unity of the

conscious Self; objectively, the unity of causal processes reciprocally determining each other. (Thus, be it noted, the unity, even according to Kant, develops into a sort of system.) Accordingly, human knowledge is revealed as a web of necessary relations. Sequence and necessary causal connexion, things which treated objectively seem to be totally different assertions, turn out to be nothing else than different sides of the same set of facts when we study them by the new methods of the Critical Philosophy. The natural result is that, if we believe in sequence, we must also believe in causation. In Kant this position is evacuated of meaning by the deeper and subtler agnosticism which he puts in the place of Hume's; but Hegel bids us be in earnest with Kant's result. The difference between Kant's and Hegel's ideas of system appears further when we pass on to higher determinations of outward reality than *mechanism*. According to Kant, we cannot study *organisms* without conceiving them as unities moulded by [purpose, or] "final cause." Every plant or animal is an end to itself. It persists as a unity through changes—seeking its own continuance and the continuance of its species. It is something quite different from a mechanical compound of parts. But Kant thinks we must bear in mind that we have not such support for our ideas of teleological nature as for our ideas of mechanism.¹ The mechanical sequence of natural phenomena is the *alter ego* of human self-consciousness; teleological nature is an

¹ It is incomprehensible that Tennyson's "Flower in the crannied wall" should ever be found quoted in relation to Kant's limited world of mechanisms. Dr. E. Caird quotes it as we have done (*Hegel*, p. 180).

PRELIMINARY OUTLINE

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unverified shadow of mind somehow projected into the world of mechanism.

“God might have made the earth bring forth
Enough for great and small,
[The oak tree and the cedar tree,]
Without a flower at all!”

It lies in the very nature of things that, if we are to be conscious of sequence, we must recognise causation. It does not lie in the nature of things that, if we are ourselves to be conscious or self-conscious beings, we should discover organisms as well as mechanisms around us. They are, as Mr. Gladstone styled Parnell's contribution to the Kilmainham treaty, a *hors d'œuvre*. They are a fifth wheel to nature's coach. In contrast with these views of Kant's, Hegel seeks (by methods which we shall presently indicate) to verify *all* the principal categories of human thought as being bound up with the simplest exercise of self-consciousness. Meantime let us notice some features of this idea of system.

First, the idea, if it can be vindicated, offers the highest kind of verification for each particular thought. Empiricism rests every truth on the authority of some one fact of experience or some collection of such facts. Intuitionism appeals to the sense of subjective necessity—strong for those in whom it exists—powerless to convince others, and attaching to hallucinations as strongly as to the axioms of mathematics or the elementary truths of morals. Idealism, on the contrary, appeals to the coherence of the whole. Every part supports every other part. If you think at all, you must accept whatever is shown to be involved in the connected system of the great thought of reality.

Secondly, the idea is not overfavourable to belief in Free Will. The case is not perfectly clear. We shall argue hereafter that Hegel's thoughts leave room for Libertarianism; but his British followers have gone strongly against it; and we cannot deny that, in support of their choice, they may plausibly appeal to this master thought or deep foundation of the Hegelian philosophy, the thought of a connected system.

Thirdly, the idea is favourable to optimism. All is of one piece, and "the whole is good," as the author of *Graveyard* used to insist.¹ It perplexes one to observe how effortless the optimism of a good Hegelian appears. He might say with an optimist of a very different school, Walt Whitman, "No array of terms can say how much I am at peace about God and about death." To the strength of his logic—his mere logic—tears and blood and sins are negligible quantities.

Fourthly, the idea if strictly interpreted is fatal to the idea of Supernatural Revelation;—*there is nowhere else*. We do not assert that it is fatal to belief in Divine personality. On that great question as on many others, Hegel himself seems to be ambiguous, and his followers may plausibly claim support from him for opposite conclusions. But he is more plainly hostile to the idea of revelation or redemption. The idea of system, as he states it and works it out, seems to involve a colossal and remorseless naturalism (of reason, not of matter), which is totally incompatible with any form of the Christian Church's faith in Jesus Christ. Hegel himself perhaps veils this conclusion, at least for the most part; but we agree with his distinguished student, Dr. E. Caird, in holding that

¹ The phrase is at least as old as Rousseau.

Hegel's principles in regard to religion involve conclusions beyond those generally recognised, or—perhaps—generally contained, in his utterances. But to this point we return later.

Having said so much, it may be well to add that the present writer regards this conception of system as the deepest, the most suggestive, and probably the most solid thing in Hegel. All metaphysics—i.e. all sustained thinking in its ultimate phases—brings us face to face with some such conception of reality. If there are limits to the possibility of maintaining or developing the thought in question, these are limits to human reason. Instead of asking whether such an affirmation be true to fact, we must rather ask, In what sense it is true? or, under what limits?

II. Reality is a graded system.

So far we have learned that, in the system of reality, as conceived by Hegel, all parts are justified. For all are needed; they are all integral, organic. We must now add that all are not equally important. While they are *alike* justified, they are not perhaps justified *in equal measure*. They stand to each other in relation of superiority and inferiority. In the *Logic*, this grouping refers to different thoughts;—though we must remember that, even in the *Logic*, the thoughts refer to reality; they are definitions of the Real (constituting together somehow one great definition). In the *Philosophy of Nature* and *Philosophy of Spirit*, the grouping refers explicitly to different phases of objective reality. In the two latter, the meaning *seems*—perhaps only from custom—more readily intelligible. It is the grouping of the *Logic*, however, which Professor Andrew Seth seems to have

in view when he praises the grading of categories as Hegel's greatest achievement. Dr. Seth's able pupil, Dr. Mellone, concurring with him. Primarily, such grading seems to imply that the earlier definitions of reality vanish as false or inadequate, while the later ones—or possibly only the very latest of all—hold the field as adequate to the facts. Reality is not bare being in the abstract; reality is "the Notion" or "the Idea"—i.e. reality is a grand coherent system of unity preserved in and fulfilled through differences. We are confirmed in supposing that Hegel takes this view, according to which lower "categories," once seen to be lower, are done with, when we learn that the earlier categories are represented by their successors. Their life-blood passes into their conquerors; they live on, transmuted into higher forms of life. Why then secure them a separate existence at all, even at an inferior grade? Plainly, they may apply in a special sense to a *part* of the real. There may be a section or department of reality within which they are peculiarly appropriate. We find, accordingly, that in the world of our knowledge and experience, mechanism survives alongside of teleology, and the chemical substance alongside of the psychical or ideal subject. Part of Hegel's wisdom is to point out that we ought to apply mechanical or chemical categories to appropriate phenomena, while passing to higher categories for teleological or spiritual facts. Concurrently with this, however, we must keep in mind that, according to Hegel, not the smallest fragment of reality can be finally or fully explained except by the highest categories ("Flower in the crannied wall"). If anything in the universe were mere mechanism or mere dead

matter, Hegel would despair of God and of the spiritual life of man. The plain working category of the lower ranges of thought leads *somewhere* to contradiction; and the contradiction pushes us onwards and upwards. This grading of categories permits Hegel and Hegelians to treat much current opinion as "true in a sense," or "true from a certain point of view," but "in a deeper sense false." It provides further that we should arrange all categories in a certain orderly sequence. We do not pass directly to the highest, when a lower form of thought reveals its limitations; we try the next in order—the limitation detected is supposed to force us precisely into the next phase of thought.

If coexistent parts of the system of reality are successive stages in our conception of the whole, still we must not think that this succession has primarily anything to do with *time*. When the philosophy of Spirit introduces us to the study of history, we find the categories taken up one after another at successive periods—partly in the history of mankind as a race, more clearly in the history of philosophies, or—the two statements have the same meaning for Hegel—of *philosophy*. In themselves, or in the *Logic*, thoughts cannot be temporally prior and posterior. As well inquire whether the north pole of a magnet is cause of its south pole! One thought ideally implies the other—makes room for it—passes into it—always ideally.

A special source of perplexity is Hegel's habit of returning upon a lower category whenever he finds it convenient to do so. If the categories are successive definitions of the universe of reality, we expect that we shall be done with the lower category (*at least as*

applied to the whole of things) when we reach the higher—the higher, which *ex hypothesi* includes in itself all that was true in the lower. But Hegel pays no respect to any such inference. His point of view is briefly defined in his writings (against Spinoza or equally against Schelling) as a belief that reality is "not [a] substance but [a] subject." Yet he astonishes his reader by treating reality again and again as "substance," even after the definition "subject" has been announced and argued for. It is as if he defined reality as "substance" *qua* real, natural, material, and as "subject" *qua* ideal. Instead of "not substance but subject," he seems to allow himself now to affirm "not only substance but also subject." He seems to perceive no distinction between these two formulas. This is a specimen of the extraordinary and licentious logical laxity which we find in Hegel side by side with much delicate and even hair-splitting work. What do we gain by arranging the categories in a fixed order (as definitions of the real whole) if they not merely survive in their children but walk as ghosts? The precedence is not much more serious than that observed in walking out of a drawing-room at a dinner party. Some go sooner, others later; but all go to the same table. Successive phases in Hegel are co-ordinate aspects, and co-ordinate aspects are successive phases. He who supersedes another is before very long himself superseded. Does the mere *order* in which the phases occur matter very much? Taking everything together—remembering that (1) the lower category does not fully explain even its own department, and that (2) the lower category may be called on when convenient to explain features in the highest department—one doubts whether

Hegel's apparatus of grading is much better than sleight-of-hand. He may not have tricked us over it, but he has secured to himself every facility for doing so. Hegel imperils his profound conception of reality as a system when he seeks to justify it in this fashion. And yet we shall need some such grading—we may say, if we like, some such evolution; but we must remember that the Hegelian evolution is not an evolution in time.

Hegel shows us therefore different thoughts passing into each other in a bewildering procession. "At last they heard the fairy say 'Attention, children. Are you never going to look at me again?' . . . They looked,—and both of them cried out at once, 'Oh, who are you after all?' 'You are our dear Mrs. Doasyou-wouldbedoneby'—'No, you are good Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid; but you are grown quite beautiful now.' 'To you,' said the fairy, 'but look again.' 'You are Mother Cary,' said Tom, in a very low, solemn voice; for he had found out something which made him very happy, and yet frightened him more than all he had ever seen. 'But you are grown quite young again.' 'To you,' said the fairy. 'Look again.' . . . And when they looked she was neither of them, and yet all of them at once." Hegel, too, has a magic show; and he is the fairy who says from time to time, *Look again*.¹ Or Hegel is like a crystal gazer. The ordinary eye can see nothing where he looks; but he reports to us the whole universe in miniature. Or Hegel is like Hamlet studying the

¹ Kingsley's *Water Babies*.—This parable must not be taken in the sense of ordinary Pantheism. The various thoughts (for Hegel) are not merely identical but different, and their differences require us to take them in a certain fixed order.

clouds. "Do you see yonder cloud, that's almost in shape of a camel? By the mass, and 'tis like a camel indeed.—Methinks it is like a weasel.—It is backed like a weasel.—Or, like a whale?—Very like a whale . . . (They fool me to the top of my bent)." The seer compels one to recognise the shapes that he reports. He forces upon us each identification that his nimbler fancy arrives at. Till he told us of them, we should never have framed any such thoughts. Or Hegel's system is like a kaleidoscope—a very colourless kaleidoscope, peopled by the living atoms of pure thought. A turn and another turn and another turn give us unexpected rearrangements. According to Hegel, there is no one who turns the machine—Hegel himself would be shocked at the thought of doing so—how dare he thrust his own subjective opinions into such high and holy company? The machine is self-moved; there is a spirit in it; its name is Thought or the Universe. By their own necessity—and in a definite sequence—the patterns rearrange themselves and melt into each other.

A further consequence of Hegel's method is that, while we affirm the different phases as coexistent aspects, we are never able to bring them together. Thus, *e.g.*, he cannot tell us what we derive respectively from ethics and from æsthetics. Each has its place; each yields its place. The monotonous alternation of praise and blame never pauses. There are no results in any department which are not at the mercy of a slightly deeper analysis.

Or, if there is any qualification to be attached to this statement, it must refer to the highest stage in philosophy—that "absolute knowledge" which closes alike the *Phenomenology* and the *Encyclopædia*. So far, Hegel

has introduced us to nothing definitive. For a moment it might seem that we had a rock to build on; the next moment Hegel had proved that our supposed rock was the usual old quicksand. But where does Hegel himself stand? From what point of view can he work, if no point of view has more than evanescent validity? It is like the endeavour to apply the historic method to one's self. Even the most convinced advocate of relativity and limitation in man's moral outlook must hesitate to handle his own beliefs and principles upon historic methods. For himself, his beliefs must be ultimate. He knows that they are only an approximation; but, being a limited and finite mind, he is compelled ordinarily to suppress that consideration. *Absolute knowledge* is the one portion of Hegel's system which does not pass away. While other parts seem to be stages in "appearance," this, which has no master over it, looks like "reality." Here we find one of the gravest arguments in support of the opinion that Hegel's position is Pantheistic. Other things *are* and *are not*; this *is* and *abides*—this vision of perfected logical insight, without beauty or love or goodness—this unclothed skeleton of abstract system.

Probably Hegel takes pleasure in regarding reality as a sequence of phases because in this way he seems better able to vindicate its unity. As long as one is dealing with co-ordinate aspects, the unity of the Real seems little more than a name. Like the thing-with-many-qualities, like the Substance which, according to Agnosticism, is unknown, though every one of its many attributes may be known, reality is left ununified when we affirm *many* aspects in *one* Real. We have done nothing more than contradict ourselves, or render ex-

plicit the antinomy which is implicitly present everywhere. If, on the other hand, aspect yields to aspect or passes into aspect, then unity is safe. The transformations of the Notion,¹ in the course of its ideal evolution, provide equally for unity and for difference. If we reject this ingenious suggestion and fall back upon co-ordinate aspects, we ought to recognise what we are doing. We are setting limits to the human mind. We are recognising that for us it is impossible fully to solve the problems constituted by the nature of our thought. Our thought relates to each other a group of aspects which we *know* or *believe* to be unified in the Absolute; but—unless by some trick like Hegel's—we cannot expound this unity from our standing-ground as finite intelligences.

This idea of successive phases really involves the next point, namely, Hegel's principle of progress by contradiction. For the phases exclude each other. When one comes, another goes. Those at two removes may resemble each other (though of course they likewise differ); exclusion—sharp exclusion—is the only relation conceived or permitted between adjacent phases.

III. Reality is a system, or a union, or a unity of *opposites*. Sometimes this is proved by showing one phase *pass into* its contradictory; at other times proof is offered that the thing as it stands is *self-contradictory*. The latter is the more formidable argument; the former is Hegel's favourite method of statement. In discovering this alleged law, Hegel thinks that he has put his finger upon the very pulse of reality. It is in the light of this supposed law that he

¹ See below.

feels able to reconstruct the universe in a system of "*a priori*" [*i.e.* necessary] thought—he uses the phrase at times. Once again we must recognise that even here Hegel is not the solemn trifier whom the vulgar take him to be. Most of us are ignorant of the contradictions that lurk in our thought—as ignorant as the men of Athens were in the days of Socrates. Kant has taught us that, wherever Time and Space are ruling "forms" of perception, there we shall encounter contradictions. Every part refers us for an explanation of it to other parts; and the process is endless; we can never reach a whole, and, until we do, we seem to have reached nothing. Hegel proposes not merely to generalise contradiction as significant of the *finite*—a conception possibly wider than the *material* world of Time and Space,—he takes contradiction to be the movement of the Absolute. If science as ordinarily studied under conditions of Time and Space fails to satisfy the mind—if finite explanations fail us—must we not supplement them by the "speculative"¹ explanations which philosophy supplies? We must grasp both explanations as one system or one process. We must conceive finite nature, with all its contradictions, as the expression of absolute thought or reason, yet as the opposite of absolute reason; and we must conceive that absolute thought fulfils itself by constantly passing into the finite and constantly rising above it. To Hegel, therefore, contradiction is not merely the law of the finite but the law of the absolute. The latter contradicts itself by producing the finite, and the finite, urged by the burden of its own contradictions, ultimately

¹ Almost entirely a term of praise. It does not imply among Hegelians less certainty in the result, but more capacity in the method.

returns in thought [i.e. in man, or—in Hegel this is almost an equivalent— in philosophy] to the repose of the Absolute. The contradiction, if never healed, is always healing—it is not Hegel who believes in the "inbecility" of a "reason" which makes opposite assertions and then sits down in despair and cries out for "faith." If always with us, but yet always healing, contradiction upon a large view (it is claimed) may be described as always healed.

"For an ye heard a music like snow
They are building still, seeing the city is built
To music, therefore never built at all,
And therefore built for ever."¹

When you paint a figure portrait, you give it a background—perhaps a conventional red curtain or a vaguer grey cloud; or perhaps a little bit of pre-Raphaelite landscape. Ideally, the whole earth and indeed the whole boundless universe lies in the background; but you ignore that. The most realistic of artists must select and conventionalise; he is painting one man—not the universe. Kant's method is to bring into clearer consciousness the shrouded background of knowledge. We live in moments, do we? But every moment is a focus of all eternity and all immensity. Knowledge is a connectedness between the fragmentary "now" and the whole of existence. Hegel more boldly—and surely also more paradoxically—tries to show that "the instant grows eternity." The part is more than a part—it is a phase or embodiment of the whole. In the successive transformations which it undergoes in the laboratory of thought, it becomes *its background*. Indeed, it becomes everything. It generates the whole

¹ This is precisely the idealist gospel—*valent quantum*.

universe of the possible and the actual. For you treat it (being a part) as if it were the whole; and then you strike upon limits and upon self-contradictions which give you no rest till you know "what God and what man is." The part involves the whole; this is proved since, if you take the part by itself, you treat as a [or as the] whole.

The contradictory nature attributed to thought (or to reality) may be elucidated by the law that the knowledge of opposites is the same,¹ or by the principle of reaction in the historical development of thought. But in Hegel it stands above such helps. We may think it a doubtful way of defending the idea of system or the idea of gradation. Hegel thinks it a luminous certainty, precious for itself independently of its applications. He thinks it gives him a *living* universe in contrast to a universe of fossil forms. It is merely sensuous thought, or merely subjective thinking, he tells us, which confronts things with each other in hard isolation. Speculative thought sees the differences vanish in a higher synthesis as fast as they emerge. Everything is a stage—and a fleeting stage; nothing is more than a stage. Each flashes or flickers into sight for a moment, and then is gone. Everything is true, in a sense, and everything is false from a higher point of view; and there is no possible way of reaching the higher truth except by the mediation of lower and false beliefs. Truth is the synthesis of all possible half-truths. Truth is the result reached when we have been tossed from aspect to aspect until we are thrust into the very heart of things. If you try to go straight

¹ "The relation to its opposite or negative is the one essential relation out of which a thought cannot be forced,"—Dr. E. Caird, *Hegel*, p. 162.

to the centre, it evades you. Second thoughts—or possibly rather “third, which are a riper first”—are the best. First thoughts, simply because they come first, cannot possibly be more than a rough one-sided sketch of the reality of things. The aspects of truth come to us in a definite sequence; but finality is impossible, unless in absolute philosophy, or perhaps in the totality of the progress of the universe; and the latter Hegel himself might admit is not accessible to human reason—only (if God is personal) to the Divine.

Hegel thinks that he establishes the *necessary connection* of things by following this rule, or that, by means of it, things develop their own inner nature in the Hegelian philosophy, which thus fulfils the ideal of science strictly so called. Few moderns will admit this bold claim. It was Hegel's great resource against the subjectivity of Schelling, and if we distrust it we regard Hegel himself as subjective and arbitrary. In fact, if we reject the dialectic, we might describe Hegel as an essayist. The essayist is one who, without much inductive gathering of materials, exhibits an unusual degree of insight in dealing with commonly known facts. When Mr. Bosanquet tells us that “Hegel's writing” is “attractive chiefly by the force and freshness of its detail,”¹ he is praising Hegel as an essayist. The distinctive quality of science is a rigorous method. Hegel's dialectic claims to be “scientific” in the highest sense; if we reject the claim, we do not necessarily reject everything in Hegel, but we reduce his merits to those of one who says various “foreible” and “fresh” things “in detail,” as good essayists do.

And it is hard for us to trust Hegel's “science.” We

¹ *Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art*, Translator's Preface, p. vi.

feel sure that so great a master of thought can produce plausible and impressive reasons *ad libitum* for identifying any A with any B—or again for regarding any A as the contradictory of any B. There seems intolerable laxity in Hegel's view of what constitutes one term the negative of its fellow. Just when scientific rigour was most essential—just when Hegel, in criticising Schelling, felt the need of rigour—he has flung us a brilliant literary paradox. One is tempted to transfer to Hegel his own parable of the painter who has only two colours on his palette. From all the infinitely varied and delicately graded relations of the Real, Hegel picks out merely two—bare identity and absolute contrast. He does not simply refer existence to these two co-ordinates, but *treats diagonal movement alternately as horizontal and as perpendicular*. The law of negativity is surely *Vorstellung* and not *Begriff* at all. Each negative in Hegel is supposed to be a definite negative and therefore to involve progress onwards. The logical statement does not fairly imply this. It could yield nothing but a barren alternation of + and — signs. Some other force than that of logic must have fixed the definite direction which thought follows. We must indeed remember a further point. Hegel does not propose to dispense us from the trouble of studying his transitions in detail, although he names a general law. On the contrary, he insists that a system is not a system or a science except in its detail. And in developing his details he reveals an embarrassing fertility of mind; his method never shrinks into a schematic formalism as does the method of many of his expounders. We may restate then his position as affirming objective necessity, based on the contents of

any thought, for passing from it to another and a more satisfying thought.

The working out of the alleged principle of contradiction in Hegel is singular. The old logic of consistency assumes that whatever is self-contradictory is self-refuted or self-condemned. This position seems to be enthroned once more in the recent writings of thinkers who are or have been Hegelians—Mr. Bradley and Professor Royce. Mr. M'Taggart, again, with his usual effort to rationalise Hegel [for the "understanding"?] insists that even Hegel himself is faithful to the test. There *would be* contradiction, if no "higher unity" emerged as the deeper truth, reconciling seeming opposition; it emerges, however, and staves off the deadlock. Popular opinion goes to the opposite extreme from Mr. M'Taggart, thinking of Hegel as the man who legitimated contradiction, and hailed it as the native law of thought. Here, as so often both views seem to be right. Here, as in so many other cases, Hegel meets the "Either—or of the ordinary consciousness" with a supercilious "Both, if you please." "Yes, or No?" they ask of him; he answers *Yes, and No*. Things including contradictions do exist. Everything includes contradictions. But the contradictions are not unrelieved; for everything gives rise to a higher thing, where that which at a lower stage was contradictory is shown to us merged in unity. Accordingly, Hegel's attitude towards the logical test of non-contradiction is rather complex. He does not simply defy it, as is generally supposed. He is not frankly faithful to it, as Mr. M'Taggart boldly contends. What Hegel really holds is that, when you discover a contradiction, you are forced to regard that in which it inheres as an

inferior phase of reality, and that you must discover its proximate neighbour in a phase of reality where the contradiction in question disappears. Having made that discovery, however, you have legitimated both phases—they are co-ordinate aspects of the real; provided always you subordinate A to B as lower to higher. If Hegel, *e.g.*, subordinates morality to religion, he does not deny morality. He only—as he supposes—*sees past it*.

IV. For completeness of statement we should be bound to introduce a fourth definition—*Reality is the work of Thought*. It is undesirable, however, to attempt here any dealing with this doctrine of Hegel's. The position may even be held that it does not add anything fresh to the three affirmations already reviewed—Reality is a system; Reality is a system of various grades; Reality is a system which unites opposites. The new position—the idealist definition—undoubtedly affects *the way in which Hegel conceives* all his affirmations. For example, it is in the light of Hegel's idealist view of the real that our second point—reality as a graded system—has come under our notice in a different and perplexing form—reality as serial. While there are precedents in antiquity for a doctrine of Idealism, the emphasis laid upon *thought* as a guide to the nature of reality is very modern. From Kant in particular Hegel inherits the assertion fully developed, yet burdened with a sceptical gloss. Kant holds that the world of our knowledge is a creation of thought; yet he thinks it the unreal construction of the thought of individual men, all working similarly, but none of them attaining truth. Hegel seeks to dismiss this sceptical interpretation, and to state reality as being

(necessarily) that which thought produces, conceives, or apprehends.

After we have glanced at the teachings of Hegel's idealist forerunners, and after we have given a short sketch of his external life and of the doctrines of his British followers, we must proceed to study in detail the way in which Hegel seeks to make good his view of [the Absolute, or] Reality. Last of all we must seek to deal with the difficulties inherent in the subject. Did Hegel's idealism mean that *nothing but thought exists*? Did it mean simply that *nothing exists except what is in accordance with thought*? ("The real is the rational"; "reality is rational and righteous") Did it mean that *nothing exists except thinkers*? Or did Hegel attempt in some way to combine two or all of these views? These and kindred questions must for the present be postponed. They will engage our attention later.

CHAPTER III

REMOTER ANTECEDENTS.—PLATO, ARISTOTLE, SPINOZA

THE name Idealism carries us back beyond modern philosophy, by its suggestions and affinities, if not in strictness by its personal history. Plato, to whom it points, is the father of all idealists, and Hegel more than any other modern takes up the task of speculation on the grand lines upon which Plato and Aristotle worked. The very word *idea* was introduced into philosophy by Plato; and for centuries it was used in tolerably strict adherence to his lead. Descartes, according to Sir William Hamilton,¹ broke down that usage for the first time, and Locke soon after was criticised in England because of the novelty attaching both to language and thought in his "new way of ideas." Hence it came about that ideas, from being eternal and lofty archetypes of all reality, were degraded in Hume's philosophy to the rank of decaying sensations, faintly surviving in memory. Hence, too, it has come about that moderns are accustomed to associate idealism² with

¹ Reid, pp. 923, 924.

² The derivative terms are late of appearing in our language. The Oxford Dictionary quotes Norris of Benetton for "idealist"—in the Platonic sense—but gives "idealism" as an almost modern importation from the French.

doctrines like Berkeley's and in a lesser degree like Malebranche's (if hardly like Fichte's genuine teaching)—with subjective idealisms that assert the reality of minds and deny the reality of matter. Kant himself, the father of a new and subtle type of idealism, called by him "critical" or "transcendental," propounds something which he regards as a "refutation of idealism"¹ in the subjective or Berkeleyan sense; but Kant in his turn is marked with the same nickname by Hegel, and has subjective idealism imputed to him.² It follows that opposite types of thought have been described by the same name, and that we may well find ourselves at the mercy of perverse associations if we study Hegel's "absolute idealism" expecting to find in it some modification of Berkeley. We may fare better if we look for some further unfolding of the thought of Plato.

Plato's master, Socrates, is praised by Aristotle as having introduced the arts of "induction and definition." These methods, however, were applied by Socrates in a narrowly if deeply practical spirit; and even in ethics he, the first to call himself "philosopher," was conscious of being a "seeker of truth" rather than its possessor.³ Thus "philosopher," like "essay," though it soon became an ambitious and aspiring title, was

¹ In the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

² Wallace's translation of *Logic*, ed. 1, pp. 76, 77—in contrast with "absolute idealism"—is that the first coinage of the latter term! Dr. Harris (*Hegel's Logic*, p. 57) tells us that the phrases "subjective idealist" and "objective idealist" were used by Hegel in a review article in 1801.

³ Contrast the Preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology* (p. vi), which calls on us to "advance to science or actual knowledge and lay aside the old name of love for knowledge" [the amateurishness of such an attitude!].

modestly intended on its first introduction; nor should we rightly interpret Socrates' modesty as part of his irony. Still, face to face with the blindness of traditional custom and the bewilderment caused by its decay, Socrates, with all his self-distrust, endeavoured to find some clear guiding light of principle. And, over-against the arbitrariness and selfishness which he and Plato traced in the methods of the Sophists, he set up the thought of binding rules for the art of human life.

What Socrates recognised as man's hope and his need in practical affairs, Plato carried into all the regions of speculation. He adopted at the same time a more positive tone. To trace rationality in the world around was not with him a mere postulate or duty of the human mind; it was the natural, necessary, trustworthy working of thought. Things could be classified and defined. It was necessary to classify them. Things were nothing at all if they did not embody in themselves thoughts—or ideas. One escaped from error to truth, from non-being to reality, when one grasped the idea behind the phenomenon. Sense, no doubt, was as shifting and baffling as Heraclitus could assert; but sense was not everything. Even in things of sense there were ideas, and we could reach them. The thesis of the first idealism was very much what Mr. McTaggart regards as the thesis of Hegel's idealism, that "reality is" both "rational and righteous."¹ The proof of Plato's idealism, we may say, is simply this, that things will fall naturally into classes; but the ancient world did not ask for proof so hungrily as does the modern world. It asked for a satisfactory answer to the question, *Where or what is the Real?*

¹ *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 129.

This philosophy, so roughly indicated, is only a beginning of speculative thought; and Plato left it vaguer than he need have done, because the artist in him tended to encroach upon the philosopher. More strictly, a shortcoming on the speculative field itself is the dualistic element in the system. Plato's ideas explain much—but not everything. There is an irrational element blended with them somehow in the constitution of reality. By necessity the real always falls short of the ideal type. The Platonic doctrine of immortality shows us this dualistic element with startling plainness. The dualistic strain stands in contrast with Hegel's Monism, and perhaps also with the character of Hegel's idealism as absolute.¹ It may be held, however, that Hegel's own doctrine of material "contingency" has close affinity with Plato's Heraclitean view of sense.² Again, Plato's ideas are practically left standing side by side without manifest interconnexion. It is not that Plato failed to see that they ought to be connected. As visionary or poet, he believed they were related; as thinker, he could not carry out his programme in detail. One thing he never tried. Being an ancient and not a modern, he did not group the ideas as contents of a divine consciousness. This was not done until Neo-Platonism adopted the Logos doctrine and passed into contact with Jewish and Christian thought; since then it has been a commonplace of ancient and modern Christian Platonism. When Plato himself connects the ideas with one an-

¹ *Logic*, 1st ed. of Translation, p. 79; compare Mr. M'Taggart, *as above*, p. 69.

² I find this view advanced by Professor Ritchie, *Darwin and Hegel*, p. 57.

other, or with Theism, it is one of the number, the mysterious "Idea of the Good," which is appealed to as somehow explaining the rest, and probably also as identical with Deity.¹ Moreover, it seems to have been a doubtful point with Plato, as afterwards in his school, whether there are ideas of artificial and mean things, or of those only which are natural and worthy. Plainly the whole doctrine is stated in an imperfect and half-poetical form. What it means essentially is the ascription of a real, permanent, or rational element in things. Details of statement are lacking, or, if present, are fanciful and suggestive rather than precise.

Besides his work in formulating a theory of ideas, Plato has often been regarded as Hegel's forerunner in some of his details too—particularly in the dialogues which contain abstruse discussions upon abstract terms of thought, such as the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*.² The second part of the *Parmenides*, however—discussing the difficulties involved in viewing reality either as *one* or as *many*—seems merely to offer sceptical and negative conclusions. That at least is the lesson which lies upon its surface; and one is confirmed in this impression by observing that, in the first part of the dialogue, Plato seems to be exposing the weaknesses of his own theory of ideas. The ideas were to stand for the permanent element in phenomena; but the *Parmenides* argues that, if the phenomena partake of mutability, the ideas contained in them must also be affected with mutability. Accordingly it is possible to regard the dialogue as a mere demurrer, "What shall we say to

¹ It is hardly necessary to observe that *moral* goodness is at any rate far from prominent in this Platonic idea.

² So Hegel himself in the *Logic*, Trans., 1st ed., p. 127.

all these difficulties? Must we not say that hitherto philosophy has failed?" In the *Sophist*, however, we find something like Hegel's *Logic* in the discussion of not-being. *Not-being exists*—that is the conclusion, explaining the possibility of error. Not-being is the *other* of Being and therefore involved in it. Here there seems to be something of that positive and constructive albeit paradoxical development of "dialectic" which distinguishes Hegel from the merely negative or sceptical dialectic of Kant. The analysis of the most abstract terms of thought, even though it seems to lead in contradictions, is supposed none the less to demonstrate a connexion binding together different forms. Possibly Hegel is right in supposing that the *Parmenides* also shows Plato advancing along this track. The ordinary student will hardly discover that in the *Parmenides*; but keener vision may read it between the lines.

Another feature of interest in the *Sophist* is the construction of a provisional list of categories—Being, Not-being, Rest, Motion, Some and Other. An element of not-being (as the other of Being) enters into all. To that extent, the different ideas or categories in question are here connected; one can hardly say that they are arranged in a system. This list and inter-connexion of categories is of interest rather as a prophecy of what is to come than as an actual achievement.

When we pass from Plato to Aristotle, we seem to pass from poetry to prose, and from idealism to empiricism. The one fact regarding Aristotle which has worked its way into the general consciousness is

his critical attitude towards Plato, and especially towards Plato's ideal theory. The ideas (in their lack of connexion) do not explain but reduplicate reality—or rather reduplicate some of its aspects; change, movement, life are unthinkable in that frozen world. Things of sense are first substances, and things of thought are second substances. This, however, is only one side of Aristotle; and, with all that is true and pungent here, it is yet his lower side. A different view is opened up when we find that, in his own *Metaphysics*, Aristotle conceives reality as matter *becoming* real by acquiring or passing into form. This is an evolutionary philosophy; it may be said to find the real in the process of things. And the dualism of form and matter, which dominated Plato and dogged Greek thought, is at least in part broken down when we learn that, if not abolished, mere matter is always on its way to abolition or to transformation into a higher type of being. Nor is the dualism absolute even under existing conditions. What from one point of view is matter, from another is form. Only at the foot of the evolutionary scale have we *mere* matter, just as at the top, in the Divine mind, we have pure form. If this seems to modern minds terribly in the air, it may suggest to us that there was a speculative if not even a poetical element in Aristotle as well as in his master. It is not a reasoned system, but it is full of suggestions impossible to merely empiricist thought. Add Aristotle's conception of movement to Plato's conception of ideas as constituting reality, and you have something very like Hegel's *Logic*. This is the highest side of Aristotle's speculative thought. Midway we may place his list

of categories. This discussion, though it recurs again in his "First Philosophy" or Metaphysics, is conceived by Aristotle as a part of Logic, the science peculiarly of his own creation. His ten predicaments—Substance, Quality, Quantity, Relation, Place, Time, Situation, Condition, Action, Passion—are simply arranged alongside each other in a business-like way at the dictation of experience. They rise in importance when we consider their influence on Kant and through him on Hegel.

When free speculation revived, or began to revive, with Descartes, a change was instantly manifest. Christianity had given the *subject* in experience a place from which he cannot be dislodged; and therefore the subjective note, in one way or other, rings through the whole of our epoch. The Ego is thrown to the front; *ego cogito, ergo ego sum*. Dualism is now not a lurking element somehow qualifying the real, but the most notable feature of reality. Reality is substance; but two substances exist—the purely active and the purely passive,—mind and matter. If this sounds to modern ears more simple and intelligible than the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle, that is merely because Cartesianism states the modern problem, and moves upon the lines which popular opinion still follows. In other words, we ourselves still in a sense belong to the Cartesian period, and must confess our sensitiveness to the thought of Descartes. All ages, indeed, must recognise a duality—unless they should prefer to say a triplicity—in existence. Being and thought, nature and spirit, the one and the many, stand over-against each other, whether we study the

philosophy of ancients or of moderns. What is peculiarly Cartesian is to define the contrast by the names mind and matter, and to regard the contrast as absolute. Even in Descartes himself, however, there is the suggestion of a triplicity, softening his fundamental dualism. For God is a higher substance than either mind or matter; and in one passage Descartes even lets fall the pregnant observation that in a sense God is the only substance. Still, his main line of thought is that which sets up the "natural dualism" of mind and matter, still recognised by "common sense."

When thought is left confronted by a dualistic opposite one or the other element must give way; and it is not thought that will yield. Through all hindrances, in spite of all kinds of difficulties, thought unweariedly seeks in some sense for unity. Out of Descartes therefore proceeds Spinoza. There may be other "streams of tendency" in the great Jewish Pantheist, going back to the speculations of his own race, or to fore-runners in the Pantheistic creed like Vico; but the main influence revealed in him is surely Cartesian. The filiation is plain enough. Distinguish and antagonise them as you like, still mind and matter are obviously *connected* as well as contrasted in the one system of absolute reality; and the question forces itself—how can they be connected? Paradox may be heaped upon paradox. Animal mind, one of nature's awkward intermediate links, may be ruthlessly denied, if not by Descartes, by his followers. God may be called in to bridge by special machinery the gulf which a dualistic type of mind has dug for itself. After a time, the strain proves too great; and unity, even abstract and exaggerated unity, follows on the assertion

of an unresolved dualism. In Spinoza accordingly we have a mind intoxicated with the thought of unity.

And yet in Spinoza the unity is little more than a name. He asserts it, but, as Hegel would say, does not *think* it. There is one substance, we are told, but it breaks up into an infinite number of parallel and unconnected attributes, while we know only two, extension and thought. But the difference which sundered Descartes' world into two warring hemispheres is not conjured away by calling the two enemies "attributes" of a single inscrutable substance, nor by appealing as constables of the peace to a ghastly band of additional attributes, unknown and unknowable, and so practically unreal. Further, when we are told that each attribute exhibits the whole nature of substance, and corresponds in parallelism to all the rest, Spinoza is saying what is quite true of thought, but quite untrue of anything else. Thought knows extension—yes indeed; but that simply implies that thought and extension are not on the same level, and are not random samples from a crowd. When one criticises Spinoza in the light of both Kant and Hegel, one sees that his two attributes are the two which make up the world of human reality. They are not warring hemispheres; they interlock. They are not hemispheres at all; thought, as Hegel would say, "overlaps"¹ the world of extended matter, and holds it in its own grasp. Thought is first and last. It is both Logic and Philosophy of Spirit. Only the middle layer of the sandwich contains Philosophy of Nature. Thus, with help from Kant, we see how the ground

¹ Often translated for greater dignity "overreaches"—a somewhat odd phrase in English, while extremely literal.

of Hegel's philosophy emerges as a reform of
 iozism. "Not substance but subject" is Hegel's
 e and characteristically difficult way of expressing
 modification of Spinoza's standpoint. When you
 : thought as your clue, you find that reality
 : not break up into an indefinite number of attri-
 s,—partly known, mostly unknown, and therefore
 verifiably connected with each other,—but into
 ite, knowable, and related aspects. Hegel believes
 unity as strongly as Spinoza. But he insists, as it
 been wittily expressed by Erdmann, that the unity
 l not be a lion's den, with all the tracks leading
 rd and none outward. You must not only show
 differences presuppose a unity, as of substance.
 must also show that the unity (as a subject)
 ks up necessarily into those differences which
 titute the main outlines of known reality—an
 itious but a noble programme for philosophical
 ght.

may further be explained that, when writers
 : the Hegelian tinge repudiate Pantheism, they
 l not be taken to imply a doctrine of divine per-
 lity, or to touch that problem at all. What they
 n is to repudiate the conception of a substance
 lling all predicates or attributes, a unity excluding
 manifoldness, a being with no definite quality.
 : a view had again and again been put forward
 he Pantheistic schools of the past as the deepest
 ' of reality. Hegelian critics rightly consider
 a view not deep but blank.

CHAPTER IV

PROXIMATE ANTECEDENTS—KANT, ETC.

LITERATURE.—At large, Dr. E. Caird's *Critical Philosophy of Kant*; in brief, Professor A. Seth's *Lessons from Kant's Philosophy* [not of print]. Compare also Hegel's *Logic*, Eng. Trans., chaps. iii-v.

WHEN we turn to consider the closer antecedents of Hegel's speculation, there can be no doubt that the head-waters of the stream are to be found in Kant. This may well appear strange to us. Kant desired to "prove all things." He hoped to perfect the work of criticism, and to preclude what he called—if in a somewhat special sense—metaphysical "dogmatism." His aim was to define the limits and boundaries of possible knowledge. Hegel, on the contrary, does not admit the existence of any such limits, and has at least the appearance of being bent upon exposition more than upon proof. Still, the filiation is no great mystery. It was not mere recoil or reaction that urged thought out of the narrow limits of the Kantian groove into the vast ambitions of the Hegelian system. Kant himself believed that human thought had a native and irrepressible tendency to embody itself in great speculative "ideas of reason." No other agnostic system has ever grappled with the whence and the why of metaphysical conceptions as Kant has done. No other agnostic

system has been so many-sided, so plausible, indeed, so reasonable. But, great as he is, Kant is very delicately poised. Thought necessarily forces certain conceptions upon us; yet we may be sure, on grounds of thought, that these conceptions fail to correspond with reality. The union of two such propositions is surely a forced one. Remove the second, and Kant's position carries you nine-tenths of the way towards Hegel's.

Kant's own antecedents are not found in Descartes or Spinoza so much as in Locke and in Leibniz. The working of the critical spirit which tests all things is indeed discernible in Descartes' appeal at the outset to universal doubt; but his transition from universal doubt to universal certainty is all too hurried, and the dogmatic deductions of Spinoza are wholly alien to Kant. Like Leibniz and Locke, Kant begins with the individual mind, the tradition of Leibniz being the first to influence him. To Leibniz knowledge was an evolution of the contents of the individual mind or monad, free from outside interference. It was never in touch with a reality beyond itself, though it was so adjusted as to mirror or rather to mimic the phases of the universe. These beliefs afflicted Kant chiefly in the abraded and popularised shape which they assumed in the philosophy of Leibniz's disciple Wolf—"the celebrated Wolf," as Kant calls him. *Thought* (the thought of an individual thinker) *produces knowledge out of its own resources*—this doctrine Kant accepted from the Wolffians in youth; and he never quite forsook it. The four "attitudes of thought towards the objective world," which Hegel surveys by way of introduction to his lesser *Logic*,¹ are—three-fourths of them—the

¹ Hegel counts three, subdividing the second.

attitudes through which Kant's mind historically passed. Here as so often we find great illumination, when we can identify some of the ideal necessities traced out by Hegel with historical actualities. The "first attitude" of naïf confidence in the power of thought, which we may identify with Wolf, was given up by Kant. It is the natural attitude for an early period. No one when he begins thinking is hampered with doubts as to the reliableness of his own thoughts. In time, however, Kant became the merciless critic of Wolf's dry-as-dust doctrines "of God, of the world, of the soul." And yet he continued to believe in their subjective necessity. The attitude of confident belief [in their *contents*] dropped off, but not the persuasion that mind necessarily works in us to these results. From one point of view the Ideas of Reason may be described as the ghost of the Wolfian philosophy surviving in Kant's maturer system.

At first, however, the negative result came uppermost. Kant saw plainly that it was impossible to regard the empty formal process of thought conducted by Wolf as leading to material truth; and to a large extent he threw himself into the arms of Lockian empiricism. In Locke himself we can observe that empiricism is not quite thorough-going; and Dr. E. Caird has shown that Kant was never so thoroughly at ease in empiricism, or so completely wrapped in "dogmatic slumber," as his own words might have led us to suppose. The decisive impulse to a new development was given by Hume. Hume exhibits the bankruptcy of empiricism. Far from explaining the attainment of knowledge in a better way than Wolf's philosophy, empiricism, which refers everything to

sensation, cannot account for any one fragment of knowledge. All is illusion, and the sceptics are right: that is the last word of empiricism. Curiously enough, Kant does not seem to have been touched by the full breadth or depth of Hume's negations. It was at one point, the analysis of cause and effect, that Hume's reasoning pricked him. He perceived that Hume's view of causation as customary sequence — while logically arrived at on the principles of empiricism — was fatal to the reality of causal connexion. Accordingly, Kant felt the necessity of trying some deeper philosophy. He makes the rather odd remark that, if Hume had perceived the destructive bearing of his views upon all knowledge, he must have reconsidered them. The Kantian philosophy might itself have been built upon less sceptical lines if Kant had penetrated the full extent and realised the secret relish and delight of Hume's scepticism. As it was, Hume's influence induced Kant to throw up empiricism, while the ghost of empiricism remained with him in his *second* and lower doctrine of noumena — those things-in-themselves which are not Ideas of Reason but assumed causes of sensations. Thus Kant's "attitude towards the" external "world" was largely empiricist. The individual mind, he thought, was not merely in the presence of an alien reality, but under influences proceeding from it. Only, this alien reality could not reach through into knowledge. In view of this remaining tinge of empiricism, Hegel ranks Kant — contemptuously enough — as offering merely a modification of the "second attitude of thought towards the objective world."

Two standpoints had been tried and had failed, and Kant's great treatises, from the *Critique of Pure*

Reason onwards, represent the effort to formulate a *tertium quid*—holding of both, different from either. Speaking roughly, we may say that the *Critique of Pure Reason* deals with the True, the *Practical Reason* with the Good, and the *Judgment* with the Beautiful. Rightly or wrongly—or perhaps with partial but not with entire justification—subsequent philosophy, and especially that stream of thought which ends in Hegel, is very much more interested in the *Pure Reason* than in the other books. We may say that Hegel's task is to rewrite the *Critique of Pure Reason* from different presuppositions. We may say, indeed, that something very similar is incumbent as a preliminary task in philosophy upon every modern mind. No one who has not passed by that road can be considered to-day as an educated thinker in any part of the field of philosophy. Positions established in the region of the True must affect our conclusions everywhere. Truth is not merely one part of the field of knowledge; it is a name, and an august name, for the whole. And so the book which deals in memorable and original fashion with first principles of truth deals with first principles of all things. Such a book is the *Critique of Pure Reason*.¹ Although Kant had designed to write a *Metaphysic of Nature*, summing up in systematic form the results of his critical survey, the whole apparatus of proof and definition is contained in the *Critique*.

Kant's statement of his problem concentrates attention on principles such as the law of cause and effect.

¹ Kant himself opposes "Pure Reason" to "Mixed Reason," i.e. reason mixed with *a posteriori* elements in experience. Practical Reason is not the opposite but one of the forms of Pure Reason.

In his technical language, these are called "Synthetic judgments *a priori*." They are necessary to intellectual experience; and therefore he thinks that even Hume must upon fuller reflection have admitted that they were valid *in some sense*. They are *a priori*, for Hume has shown that experience can yield nothing but what is customary and casual—nothing universally or necessarily true. And they are synthetic—they are *knowledge*, not platitudes; but thought, as Logic teaches, and as the failure of Wolf's effort, to extract positive knowledge out of abstract thought, strongly confirms—thought is analytic or self-identical. Whence then comes knowledge? True or false, whence comes this world of coherent useful experiences? Kant's answer is, From the meeting of the inner and the outer. Thought—somehow—forgets its native character and becomes synthetic at the touch or influence of external reality. Sense—somehow—ceases to be blind and futile when it is taken up into rational thought. Hence results human knowledge—the strange operation of human thought upon an unknown *datum*. We may call this experimental knowledge a morbid product of the mind, but we must admit that it is as beautiful and wonderful as that other morbid product, a pearl.

Kant is thus no less completely sceptical than Hume regarding the objective truth of man's knowledge, though he deals in a more serious spirit with its relative validity and subjective usefulness. So far as we have seen, there are two reasons for this scepticism. One is the conception of the nature of thought which Kant inherited from Wolf. If thought is formal, knowledge must come to thought from without (Locke), or else must imply some abnormal development within

(Kant). This is the point upon which Dr. E. Caird fastens. He argues that, if we regard Wolf's view of thought as ill founded, there is no reason why Kant's positions should involve the rejection of the *objective truth* of any necessary development of thought. Kant has, however, a second reason for scepticism, in the belief that two or more heterogeneous elements come together in all human consciousness. It may of course be held that this ground for scepticism is removed when we recast our views of the essential nature of thought. But it will be well to consider Kant's positions a little more fully.

Kant recognises four elements in human experience and knowledge. There is matter of sense, due to things-in-themselves outside us; there are subjective *a priori* forms of sense, namely, time and space; there are categories or principles of the understanding; and there are principles in a higher sense, the Ideas—ideas which are Platonic in dignity, if not in reliableness—of Reason (as contrasted with mere understanding). These last "things-in-themselves" necessarily start to view within the mind, and, having done so, urge forward the whole process of knowledge, although from the nature of the case they never can find embodiment in phenomenal reality.

The first assumed factor, the (more familiar) thing-in-itself, is logically the weakest and least defensible element in Kant's epistemology. It is a survival of empiricism. And what makes empiricism plausible to half-trained thinkers makes the thing-in-itself (of this definition) credible even to Kant—namely, the difficulty of supposing that mind, conceived as individual, should attain to knowledge of what is around it

unless by means of a contribution from without. Logically, however, we never can prove from Kant's own premises the existence of such things-in-themselves. The utmost he could claim to say is that something unknown and unknowable happens to start the mind upon its new career (of experimental knowledge). To call that vague Something an influence from a thing-in-itself is unproved assertion, or dogmatism, the antipodes of a truly Critical Philosophy.

Secondly, there are the forms of Time and Space—*a priori* endowments of the mind, which as a matter of fact accompany all our experiences. We are compelled to attribute them to mind. No chemistry of blending sensations will ever explain a *first experience* in time; the conception is as self-contradictory as (taken literally) a First Cause. We cannot, however, logically explain *why* Time and Space should always be with us. Logic suggests as at least a possible form of reality or phase of experience one "where space and time are not." Thus it is not a mere question of names when Kant contrasts his *Æsthetic* (doctrine of the *a priori* contributions to *sense knowledge*) with the transcendental *Logic*, which deals with the contributions of understanding and the influences of reason. Might Kant not suppose that Time and Space are both subjective and objective, both *a priori* and *a posteriori*? He could not, and that for two reasons. First, the hypothesis is superfluous, and to be rejected on the law of parsimony. If I am looking through yellow glasses, it is needless to suppose that by a miraculous coincidence, the landscape on which I am looking happens to be yellow in itself. But, secondly, the supposition that Time and Space are objectively real is shown (in the

second part of the *Logic*; the *Dialectic*) to give rise to *Antinomies* (e.g., Has the world a beginning in time? It cannot have. Had the world never a beginning? That is inconceivable). This is one of the most important novel contributions made by Kant to agnosticism—the emphasis upon contradiction, not in a casual or random mood of mockery, but as part of a sober theory. If mind transgresses its fixed limits, and tries to define noumena, then, says Kant, it necessarily falls into self-contradictions. This is a formidable addition to the armoury of doubt. If agnosticism is not to lead us forward from this point to pure scepticism, we must admit that Time and Space, which clamour for contradictory verdicts from the mind, are not part of the seen fact but part of the defective human apparatus of seeing. Such is Kant's finding. We may modify it; but it will be difficult to set it altogether aside.

The remainder of the great *Critique* follows the guidance of Aristotelian or formal logic, which Kant regarded as the pattern of a perfect science, finished at one stroke. Most interpreters, however, think that his debt was less than he supposed, and that the logician's list of judgments had not very much to do in guiding Kant's thought to his list of twelve categories. While he tells us that his list—arrived at, as he believes, by this appeal to formal logic—is alone systematic and exhaustive, yet he holds that his task is the same which Aristotle undertook when he drew up, in more empirical or less systematic fashion, a list of predicaments. Nor need Sir William Hamilton's protest against this identification distress us greatly. As Hamilton himself suggests, the contrast at its broadest is only one between *affirmations that may be made* (in Aristotle)

many more antinomies than Kant, so also he discovers many more categories—some of them, as we shall see, in a different part of Kant's own system and under other names. The treatment by which Kant's list is transformed into a Hegelian series is very clearly indicated by Dr. Caird. *Modality*¹ is struck out as irrelevant. *Relation*—if it is not rather a universal name for a category or thought-determination as such—is expanded threefold, and becomes the second part of the Hegelian Logic (the doctrine of *Essence*). The first part of the Logic (the doctrine of Being) is composed of Quantity and Quality taken in inverse order, the subdivisions of Quality being named anew, and a third heading, Measure, being added to Quality and Quantity. Finally, the pith of the Logic is found in part three, the doctrine of the *Notion*—a part of Logic wholly new in comparison with the categories of Kant, and new in its claim to entire logical strictness.

Kant repeats his version of this doctrine of rational connectedness in a second form, which he regards as complementary to the first. The first, the list of categories proper, is meant to apply to conceptions, or terms, or objects; the second, the principles of judgment, are meant for propositions judgments or relations between objects. We need not pause over this or over

¹ Kant's categories are as follows:—

Quantity.	Quality.	Relation.	Modality.
Unity.	Reality.	Substance and Accident.	Possibility.
Plurality.	Negation.	Cause and Effect.	Actuality.
Totality.	Limitation.	Reciprocity.	Necessity.



other details of Kant's statement, like the *schematism* of the categories, by which they are dovetailed into Time and so indirectly into Space. If Kant had had a less superstitious reverence for Aristotle's *Logic* as a doctrine of thought, he probably might have simplified his great *Critique* to a large extent. We do not meet with anything essentially new till we reach the *Dialectic*, with its *ideas of reason*. Two of these terms recall Plato, and the second at least suggests Hegel once more. In Kant's nomenclature, Dialectic stands in contrast to Analytic as the negative to the positive, the destructive to the constructive. The categories (with their aliases and companions) represent the legitimate employment of thought for purposes of human experience or knowledge. Mind defines objects as one, as many—as substances, as causes, etc. That activity of mind is held to be both natural and necessary. It is "transcendentally" justified, i.e. experience guarantees it in this sense, that, without such activity of mind, there would be no such thing as orderly experience. Experience cannot prove it, since it presupposes it; or experience proves it only, but most conclusively, by presupposing it,—that and nothing else is what Kant means by transcendentalism. But mind is not satisfied with determining objects side by side in Time and Space or with establishing definite universal "laws" of relation between such objects. Mind craves some fuller harmony in things, some deeper unity than is revealed in the most perfect mechanism. And just here, according to Kant, mind oversteps the narrow limits which "transcendental" necessity marks out for its use. Definite objects, with definite relations between them, mind *must* constitute

for itself (on the basis of sense) if it is to possess an orderly experience. A more coherent system, with more intimate relationships, is craved by the mind; but in vain; it cannot show its title-deeds to that coveted possession. The whole expanse of Time and Space affords no room for such a thought-knit system of hypothetical realities as man yearns for.

“That type of Perfect in his mind
In Nature can he nowhere find.”

Yet the “type of Perfect” haunts him, urging him, if such a thing were possible, to sum up infinite time and measure infinite space. The whole of human knowledge is due to the pricking of this spur within the mind; and that is well. Error begins when we suppose that we possess actual knowledge of that which is no more than a vague impulse moving us to the knowledge of lower things. Under such a belief, we interpret mind as a soul-substance—simple, undecomposable, and therefore immortal (Wolf’s Rational Psychology). Further, we interpret the world dogmatically, *either* as limited *or* as unlimited, both views being equally plausible at the first blush, and equally untenable when we weigh the counter-arguments—both, in fact, being empty, since the world which is *known* to us is nothing more than our subjective phenomenon [not a reality to which we may attach objective predicates—not a “thing in itself”]. Thus arises Rational Cosmology. Our final error is perpetrated when we interpret the ideal systematic unity of all things, the mind’s unreal and unrealisable aspiration, as a fact, a personal being, God (Rational Theology).

Very noticeable here is Kant’s inclination to a

Pantheistic conception of God. Elsewhere and pre-eminently in the *Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason* he falls back into a narrow individualistic Deism, of an unduly moralistic type. Hegel therefore, whose work is so largely a shaping of Kant's thought to new issues, draws but little from Kant's direct dealing with religion. But he owes very much to this conception of God as the absolute all inclusive unity of all things and all thought, and to the corresponding conception of religion—suggested though not affirmed by Kant—as a consciousness of this absolute Thought or absolute Whole. Noticeable also is Kant's criticism of the three traditional Theistic proofs. His reasonings are forestalled partly by his *Antinomies*—in which, *e.g.*, the conception of a First Cause, pointed to in the Cosmological argument, is discredited—partly by his view of the categories as limited to the (finite) objects of (ordinary) experience. The Ontological argument of Anselm and Descartes calls for a new pronouncement from him. Kant implies that this is the one real Theistic argument; both the others, he tells us, have to fall back upon it. Kant also frees it from the appearance of arbitrariness and extravagance which it presented in the statement of its original advocates. They did not make plain how any one individual idea could guarantee its objective existence; Kant shows that the idea in question is not one individual idea among a crowd of others, but is the background or complement of all the rest. If knowledge is valid—*i.e.* if we know reality—God is known, for God is the absolute reality; or, as Kant puts it, God is the Idea or the Ideal suggested by every thought we frame. There is an immense amount of

Hegelianism implied here, in spite of the neutralising dose of scepticism in which Kant contrives to wrap it up.

Summing up Kant's scepticism in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, from the Hegelian point of view, we ascribe it then, secondly, to dualism. Kant finds that knowledge contains two elements—thought and sense. He counts these two elements distinct and separate, because he cannot show how knowledge should come to us in the garb of space and time, while yet he knows that it does so come to us. This dualism takes on a darker colouring in view of Kant's (unproved and indemonstrable) assumption, that experimental knowledge, with its sense forms, is called into exercise by the *alien* influence of things-in-themselves. A duality of thought and sense *within* experience is wilfully regarded as an origin of experience out of two distinct elements. Kant also contrasts the Ideas of Reason with the more limited forms of understanding. Hence between these two regions there seems to be disclosed yet another bottomless gulf. Perhaps, however, we may regard this not as a fresh difficulty, but as a necessary result of the use of the same method which gave us the previous dualism—that method under which distinctions harden into absolute separation. The Ideas are indeed under a further condemnation. They *must* find their actualisation in the endlessness of time and space; and they *cannot*—there is no totality there. But this fresh criticism on the Ideas is somewhat discredited when we find Kant condemning the finite forms of understanding in their turn, because they do not conform to the “type of perfect in the mind.” Criticism which plays off each of two things against

the other is clever but baseless; and Kant is here guilty of playing off Ideas against categories and categories against Ideas.

Hegel tries in the *Philosophy of Nature* to show that we *can* explain the necessity for thinking existence under forms of time and space. That problem, formally at least, is discussed nowhere else in Hegel's works. On the other hand, to show that the categories and the Ideas are part of one great system of thought, is a task undertaken in the *Logic*. Its third part—the Notion—may be said to be obtained by treating Kant's (illusory, subjective) Ideas as another type of category, and the highest of all—not illusory but true; not merely subjective but profoundly objective. Reality is not to be defined simply as a mechanism, but as a self-contained Harmony or Whole. And Hegel's bent is to show that sense is not the exclusion but the fulfilment (or, the raw material) of thought; that mechanism is merely a stage in conceiving, a means towards realising, reality as organic and rational. Where Plato and Aristotle say Idea and Phenomenon, Kant says Thought and Sense. Hegel has the same solution for both alleged "dualisms."

Kant's other works do not contribute in equal measure to Hegel's stock-in-trade; but they introduce us to results which make it harder for Kant to maintain his delicately poised assertion of the necessity, usefulness, and unreality of the highest conceptions of human thought.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant breaks through the magical web of scepticism with which he had surrounded himself, for now he makes the as-

sumption that in the moral consciousness we know objective reality. This assertion exposed him to attack by one of the older English Kantians, that strange defender of Christianity, Dean Mansel, who was so zealous in proving religious doubt incompetent that he failed to perceive the danger of representing religious assertions as meaningless. Mansel holds that all human consciousness, even the consciousness of duty, is relative, subjective, unreal, and therefore that what is bad in man—*e.g.*, exterminating enemies in cold blood, or punishing the guiltless in order that the guilty should go free—may be good in God. Others may let it stand to Kant's credit that here at least, in its gravest moods, he trusted the human mind. Kant tried to justify this change of attitude by his analysis of the "Categorical Imperative of Duty." While he held that abstractly self-consistent *thought* could never generate *knowledge of an object*, he held that (knowledge, feelings, and conscience being given) abstractly self-consistent *conduct* was a test which led to real *knowledge of duty*. In the consciousness of duty (thus vindicated or explained) Kant found a Postulate of Freedom: "I can because I ought." Here, however, dualism returns upon us raised to the pitch of self-contradiction, when Kant asserts that man's conduct is phenomenally determined but noumenally free. This indeed is a new dualism. It is not sense *versus* thought, but sense knowledge (*i.e.* sense with thought) *versus* a higher form of thought. To do justice to his moral postulate, Kant must have treated the phenomenal determinateness of conduct as mere human seeming, freedom on the contrary as Divine and objective truth. But it is hard to maintain an attitude of distrust towards an orderly

fabric of knowledge which is a necessary result of human faculties; and thus Kant once more plays off the lower against the higher, and makes his moral "postulate" idle. The phenomenal determinateness proves to be the predominant partner. It makes the stronger impression on our thoughts and feelings. For phenomena are always with us, while noumena are mysterious and half-forgotten absentees.

The second moral postulate—Immortality—shows us this dualism in a more familiar shape. The law of reason in the conscience exacts obedience from man's lower nature. This latter is so alien to the law of reason that it never can perfectly be subject to it, but in infinite time it may indefinitely approximate to the unattainable goal. Hence man must be immortal. If the law is to be obeyed at all, it can only be obeyed when *endless* ages have run their course. We cannot wonder that Hegel poured contempt upon this way of proving immortality—not by what is actually or potentially good in man, but by alleged limits which eternally separate him from goodness.

The third postulate is God. God is not to help man to be good; from Kant's narrowly moralistic point of view, Divine grace would sully the purity of moral motives. Right must be done without help and without hope of reward. Nevertheless on a larger view it is a moral postulate that goodness should lead to happiness, and this cannot be a certainty unless God is over all, while if that be true virtue is unfailingly safe.

The metaphysical result of these postulates may be stated as follows—two Ideas (God and the Soul) out of three, which were all regarded formerly as simply helping to constitute experience in a useful way, are

now defined as being by moral necessity actual facts. We have listened patiently to Kant's paradoxes. We have learned that what we know, or necessarily think of, cannot exist, and that what exists cannot be known. Now we learn that what we necessarily think of necessarily (from moral considerations) exists, though its unknowableness is still asserted. Scepticism is wearing pretty thin when the soul, whose existence we might not affirm, turns out to be certainly immortal, and when the God who was to be a mere ideal is defined as a personal ruler. One should perhaps add that Kant does not formally identify the free and immortal moral soul with that soul-substance which he drove away with cries of contempt from the intellectual world. But what else can it be? The definition may be vastly improved, but the reference surely must be identical? There is more ground perhaps for questioning the identity of the *God* of the Pure Reason with Him of the Practical Reason. One is an ideal totality pantheistically conceived; the other is a personal and almost a limited Being, harmonising discrepancies *ab extra*. It is doubtful, therefore, whether Kant's postulates yield as much as they seem to promise. But, in some better form than Kant's, moral postulates may teach us lessons for which we shall search in vain throughout Hegel's great system. As they stand, they show us at least that Kant has directed many shrewd knocks against his own scepticism regarding knowledge.

In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant deals primarily with Beauty. And here the dualism of sense and spirit disappears altogether. The beautiful is not the ideal *apart from* sense or *in spite of* sense, but *in*

sense. More than this must be said. Kant, who finds teleology or "final cause" in beauty, finds the same category or conception embodied in organic life. All processes of life are *for the sake of* the organism or the species; they cannot be otherwise described. This is the last of the shocks which Kant's scepticism has to encounter from the development of the Kantian philosophy. The "type of perfect," no longer imprisoned in the "mind," takes to itself bodily form in material "nature." This is true as to beauty; and here accordingly light falls upon Hegel's highly respectful treatment of art as a phase in religion. But the actualisation of the "type of perfect" is also true of organic life. We may call life the Achilles' heel in a thoroughly naturalistic view of the universe. Life and thought are things which materialism has no room for. It does its best to ignore them, or ridiculously ascribes their origin to *accident*. But they are splendid realities; and therefore Philosophies of Nature, like Schelling's or Hegel's, when they trace out a rising scale of manifestations of the ideal in nature, have here at least a stronghold from which they will scarcely be dislodged. And if Schelling and Hegel are too fine spun for us, we may catch a glimpse of the same truth by an intelligent study of evolution. It is gratuitous to assume, with the naturalistic school, that the starting-point and the lowest stages in evolution are boundlessly significant, while its ideal goal and its higher stages have no significance at all for the ultimate definition of reality. The opposite is true.

A different use of Kant's material is made by Lotze—with influences from Leibniz—when he contrasts mechanism with teleology, the world of forms with the

world of values (according to Hegel, mechanism is teleology less completely defined). Lotze holds that mechanism is only seeming, while the *values* of Truth and Beauty make known to us the inner meaning of that Divine or objective reality conceived by us as the world-mechanism. Along a similar line of thought Ritschl's theology arrives at its perplexing doctrine of "judgments of value." That doctrine looks back to other elements in the *Critique of Judgment*, where we have certainly a more pleasing conception of the personal God than in the *Critique of Practical Reason*—not as the giver of blessedness to merit, but as the Being who overrules nature for moral ends, and makes the world of things subservient to persons, and who so far at least is thus the helper or even the fountainhead of human goodness.

Kant's scepticism is equal to all the attacks which his own thought makes upon it. Organisms, not being *necessary* parts of a world of definite-objects-under-definite-laws, are not "transcendentally" verified; therefore they are by one remove further still from reality than is the world of ordinary phenomena. The conception of an organism, like the Ideas of reason, is a guide to man's study, but not a revelation of the nature of reality. For the third time, therefore, in the third *Critique*, lower conceptions are played off against the higher. But let there be no mistake. The subject of the *Critique of Judgment*—final cause (in contrast to mechanism)—is the Ideal of Reason, or the philosophical definition of God, under another name.¹

¹ Hegel's fourth or, as he numbers it, third attitude of thought can only be regarded as a parenthesis in the development under review. It is the doctrine of Immediate Knowledge or Intuition, as represented by

The additions which Kant's later books made to the *Critique of Pure Reason* had their chief interest—at least to Hegel—in showing how hard it was for Kant to preserve the sceptical interpretation of his system. And the work of a distinguished link between Kant and Hegel—the work of Fichte—may be similarly regarded. Kant's analysis of the human mind left off with a plurality of elements, whose mutual connexion was unexplained—data of sense *a posteriori*, forms of sense *a priori*, categories *a priori*, and—at a further remove—Ideas *a priori*. This duality or plurality becomes in Kant's interpretation an actual dualism. The maximum Kant has proved or tried to prove is that *within experience we have elements which we cannot reduce to one or intelligibly connect together*. Or, more precisely, *we experience under forms of time and space, and it is impossible to say why we do so*. But what Kant asserts is *the composition of experience out of several alien elements*. Fichte accordingly tries to connect with each other by rational necessity those elements of mind which Kant had at best merely catalogued side by side—which at worst he had antagonised to each other. Fichte's undertaking is the next step in a rational or dogmatic reply to scepticism. Kant may have shown that we necessarily or uniformly develop certain beliefs in the process of knowledge. But this vindication does not carry us beyond sub-

Jacobi. We find a rough but sufficient analogy in the Scottish philosophy, *i.e.* in Reid's answer to Hume as contrasted with Kant's. Hegel is comparatively lenient to Jacobi—probably in order to make his condemnation of Kant more emphatic. Assertions even of immediate knowledge [all knowledge is mediation, and ultimately says Idealism, *self-mediation*] are a kind of counterpoise to sceptical denials of the power of thought.

jective necessity—the cloak in which every hallucination masquerades as a truth. It is only a statement of fact—if of fact on a very wide scale. If we can fill up the gaps—if we can detect necessary law in the facts of human consciousness—if we can show that what *is*, *must be*, the necessity becomes objective or rational, and scepticism is finally routed.

An important consequence depends on this change. Henceforth we are dealing—or are thought to be dealing—not with *mind as individual and human*, but with *mind as objective*. If it be said that mind which is not individual is an unknown quantity and unintelligible, we may define the objective mind provisionally as *all mind*. *Wherever mind is*, it will operate thus—let us be done with asserting “the relativity of human knowledge” when we simply mean that *knowledge is a relation*.

It is desirable that we should clearly mark Fichte's real position, since ordinary opinion, and even the dictionary makers, who are at the mercy of the popular compends and histories of philosophy, attribute to Fichte the paradox of solipsism. Nothing could be more false. When his fellow-philosophers—led, I presume, by Schelling and his school¹—branded Fichte as a “subjective idealist,” they meant nothing more than that Fichte describes reality too much in terms of mind, too little in terms of objective nature. Hence Schelling's contribution to philosophy takes the form of a philosophy of nature parallel to Fichte's philosophy of mind. The two need reconciling or unifying; and Schelling offers an ultimate metaphysic which tells of an “indifferent” mind-cum-natural existence to be

¹ Compare footnote ² on p. 32.

and (at least in regard to nature, says Professor Adamson) occupied a safer position than either Schelling or Hegel.

Other peculiarities of Fichte concern us little, unless we ought to mention his triple rhythm of Thesis, Anti-thesis, Synthesis, which—following up Kant's triads of categories and of Ideas of Reason—helped at least externally to pioneer the way for Hegel. We cannot dwell upon those points in which Fichte is the successor of Kant rather than the precursor of Hegel or Schelling. Nor need we dwell on his way of expounding the unity of mind. Hegel's way is different.

The place of Hegel may be roughly indicated by comparing him with Schelling and Fichte. All three interpret Kant's work constructively, as a body of positive truth regarding mind or thought as such. Fichte offers a kind of philosophy of Mind or Spirit. Schelling places alongside of that—Hegel would say prefixes to it—a philosophy of Nature. The roots of both philosophies are found by Hegel (when he reaches maturity), not in a region of feeling or half-conscious thought as Schelling supposed, but in a region of clear thought,—in a *Logic*.¹

¹ Dr. Baillie (*Hegel's Logic*) leads evidence to show that the direct influence of Fichte and Schelling upon Hegel was not great.

CHAPTER V

HEGEL'S LIFE AND WRITINGS

LITERATURE.—*German.*—"The main authorities for the life of Hegel are the biographies of Rosenkranz and Haym—the former a pupil and devoted disciple of Hegel, the latter a critic whose opposition to Hegel's philosophical principles has passed into a kind of personal bitterness, which misconstrues his simplest actions. Some additional details may be derived from Hotho ('Vorstudien für Leben und Kunst'), from Ruge ('Aus früherer Zeit'), and from Klüber ('Hölderlin, Hegel, und Schelling')."—Dr. E. Caird, *Hegel*, 1883. There is also a recent *Hegel's Leben und Werke* by a distinguished Hegelian, Dr. Kuno Fischer.

English.—Practically the English reader will find all he needs in Dr. Caird's sketch. A few biographical gleanings of later date are given in the fifth introductory Essay to Dr. William Wallace's translation of the *Philosophy of Mind*, 1894, and in the earlier chapters of Dr. Baillie's *Hegel's Logic*, 1901.

"THE history of a philosopher is the history of his thought—the history of the origination of his system." These words of Rosenkranz's may remind us once more that we must not look for dramatic interest in the life of Hegel. In this chapter, however, we are concerned with external circumstances rather than with internal development; and, recluse as he was, Hegel lived through one of the most striking periods in history.

George William Frederick Hegel was born at Stuttgart on the 27th of August 1770. In that old world,

before the cataclysm of the French Revolution, Württemberg, of which Stuttgart is the capital city, was not yet a kingdom but a grand duchy. Hegel's family had settled in the little State during the seventeenth century, fleeing from Austrian persecution of the Protestants in Carinthia—that remote region of which Goldsmith's *Traveller* brought up so evil a report.¹ Practically the Hegels were now Swabians by generations of residence and by numerous marriages. Like other geographical expressions which run back into the Middle Ages, the name Swabia is an uncertain magnitude; but we may roughly define it as equivalent to South-Western Germany, along with what are now the German cantons of Switzerland. It is mainly Protestant in confession; and there is a certain Swabian national or racial consciousness which may be compared with the singular national unity of Scotsmen, with whom, indeed, as Dr. Caird tells us, Seeley has compared the Swabians in respect to the contents of their character. Schiller the poet, Schelling the philosophical precursor of Hegel, Schwegler the theologian, his disciple in philosophy, were all Swabians, and indeed all Württembergers.

The father of Hegel, like many of his ancestors, served in the humbler ranks of government employment. His mother died when he was only twelve, but he held her in tender recollection, and, like not a few great men, seems to have inherited his higher qualities rather from the mother than the father.

¹ "Onward where the rude Carinthian boor
Against the houseless stranger shuts the door."

Quoted repeatedly in Gilbert and Churchill's classical book on *The Dolomite Mountains*.

He had one brother and one sister. Hegel's was a mind of slow development. At school he enjoyed a reputation for diligence rather than for brilliancy, though he was already drawn as few boys are to Greek poetry. He worked hard, extracting and epitomising all he read, and even translating twice over the *Antigone*. If genius is not "a faculty for taking pains," genius is very generally associated with that faculty, and the great writer like Carlyle, or the great thinker like Hegel, lays the foundation for his future career by patiently acquiring knowledge. Afterwards, if he is really great, he shows that he can wield and master the knowledge he has gained.

When he was eighteen years old, Hegel went to the beautiful quaint little town of Tübingen, the seat of the university of his State. It lies among hills clothed with vineyards and hop gardens; above these rise the upland pastures and woods of the Rauhe Alp; while the Neckar flows swiftly past to Stuttgart, only some twenty miles off by direct road. Hegel was destined for the Christian ministry, and entered the "Stift," then as now lodged in an old Augustinian monastery,¹ and then characterised by "a certain show of monastic discipline," including "a somewhat petty system of punishments, generally by deprivation of the portion of wine at dinner." It is on record that the young Hegel preached on Isa. lxi. 6, 7; on Matt. v. 1-16; and on the virtue of Placability; always "very rationalistically." In the old days of Lutheran orthodoxy, Tübingen and Giessen had fought the battle of Krupsis

¹ The arrangement by which the university includes a Roman Catholic as well as a Protestant Faculty of Theology is more recent than Hegel's time.

to unexpected issues, or gave more unreserved utterance to its suggestions. It was as a Tübingen lecturer that Strauss published his first *Life of Jesus*; while the leaders of the Tübingen School in N. T. criticism—Baur, Schweigler, Zeller—were all disciples of the Hegelian philosophy. The *Lernfreiheit* of a German student was of little service to Hegel. He made all his university studies at Tübingen. Probably his poverty compelled him thankfully to accept a sizar-like existence, with all its inconveniences, in order to make sure of a liberal education. He really owed more to his own exertions than to the lecturers, who were scarcely touched by the letter of Kant, the great revolutionary of the hour in thought, and not at all moved by his deeper spirit. It is amusing to be told that, on Hegel's departure in 1793, the authorities of the Stift certified him as moderately well equipped in theology and philology, but practically unacquainted with philosophy. In reality he had been a diligent student of Kant and Rousseau. We are further told that Hegel was among the most violently revolutionary of the students in his political sympathies. Schelling, younger but more precocious than Hegel, belonged to the same group, and showed the same spirit. The date reminds us that revolution was then not simply in the air, but reigning or raging in "its sacred seat of" Paris. Several of Hegel's writings seem to betray the indelible impression produced by *the Terror* upon its young contemporary.

Extracts from the papers he wrote for himself in the Berne years are printed in Rosenkranz's *Life*, and summarised by Dr. Caird. To a certain extent these reveal to us a Hegel who is still at the point of view of that eighteenth century rationalism with which he had been indoctrinated during boyhood and youth. He is occupied with the problem of Christianity; but he contrasts the Jewish world very unfavourably with Greece, and is disposed to write down even Jesus Christ as a "beautiful soul," who evaded rather than solved the problems of life. Not a little of this same attitude seems to survive in the views of the mature Hegel, as given in the *Philosophy of Right*. For, while the State is almost deified as the highest work of reason, organised in living detail, the Church is dismissed with a species of contempt, as an agency which teaches men to value the unity of all things, but cannot show them how to embody the principle of unity or apply it to facts. But, during the Berne days, even the Greek idea of Fate seemed to Hegel to stand higher than Judaism, with its hard and external law, or even than Christianity with its tragic brokenness. He was already, however, working his way to the positions which were characteristic of his after-teaching. This aims at being a synthesis of lessons learned, on the one hand, from Greek literature and philosophy; on the other hand, from the Gospels. Christianity comes to be placed higher than the somewhat superficial beauty and short-lived reasonableness of Greek life. But Christianity is regarded as the same in kind. The Reason which flashed

upon mankind from Athens shines upon them more steadily out of Galilee. It has learned a deeper truth. It makes room for

"each rebuff,
That stings earth's smoothness rough,
Each joy that bids nor sit nor stand but go";

and thus it attains to a fuller and richer unity. Thus it reaches a position which is believed to be invulnerable to the assaults of doubt. The intellectual essence of Christianity is believed to contain an advance upon Greek philosophy, needing only to be extricated and stated in terms of thought. Or, as Dr. Caird alternatively expresses it, Hegel's maturer system unifies the ideas of Freedom and of Organic System. It sees them to be, on a close enough analysis, mutually involved, if we might not even say that it finds them to be phases of one truth. Thus, without yielding himself to reaction, or to a simple-minded orthodoxy, Hegel believes he has discovered a Reason broader and more profound than that of eighteenth century rationalism—a Reason rising above the one-sidedness of Rousseau or even of Kant—vindicating the individual, with the aspirations of his conscience, but subordinating him to the great Reason of humanity, and to those moral institutions in which goodness is a realised and living fact.

It was not as a religious teacher but as a philosopher that Hegel ultimately felt himself called to serve his age. He had now completed his studies. He had waited in silence—unlike Schelling—until he had ripened. Henceforth he could speak boldly and show himself a hard fighter, confident of his thoughts. Hereafter he does not materially change; perhaps we may say that hereafter his thought does not grow. A

sketch of a system which dates from his Frankfort period includes three parts: 1st, a Logic and a Metaphysic ("not yet, however, completely identified by Hegel as they were at a later period"); 2nd, a Philosophy of Nature; 3rd ("not worked out in the Frankfort sketch"), a Philosophy of Spirit. One was hardly prepared to find the Philosophy of Nature so firmly outlined at this early time. Judging from Hegel's first great book, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* — whose thoughts, phrases, *bon-mots*¹ turn up again and again in later writings—we should have thought he did not continuously believe in the Philosophy of Nature. The *Phenomenology* states a twofold division of philosophy: 1st, Phenomenology, by way of introduction; 2nd, Logic, as a systematic exposition; and it adopts a bantering not to say jeering tone towards the weaknesses of Philosophy of Nature as found in Schelling.

But this was at most a passing recoil. Hegel's first appearance in philosophy had been as a comrade and fellow-worker of Schelling, whose great achievement was to supplement Fichte's *quasi* Philosophy of Spirit with a view of the presence of reason in objective nature. Schelling, an old fellow-student and correspondent, was the man to whom Hegel turned in 1799, when, on his father's death, he found himself set free for a time from the drudgery of tutorial work by a legacy of £300. Schelling was now at Jena, and Hegel thought that, after a short probationary residence in a Roman Catholic city like Bamberg, where he could study Roman Catholicism and plan out his future, he might join his friend, fight his battles, and

¹ *E.g.* Hero and valet; "the fear of the Lord the *beginning*"; "the feet of them which . . . shall carry thee out," etc.

Schelling. In 1802 they began jointly the issue of a "Critical Journal" of Philosophy, and in 1803 Schelling left Jena. This made it easier for the "little rift" which separated the thoughts of the two friends to widen into a visible breach. While Hegel agreed with Schelling as to the importance of asserting unity in all things, and of asserting the presence of reason in nature no less than in mind, he was opposed to any reliance on feeling, such as was more and more emphasised in Schelling's later thought upon abstruse themes. Already Hegel was prepared with his appeal to the "logical" principle of "the Notion." Schelling had never formulated his view of Reason in any such abstract or definite terms.

Jena is the university town of the little State of Saxe-Weimar. Successive Electors of Saxony, men of noble character, were the foremost of all the champions and protectors of the Protestant Reformation; and the University of Jena is a Protestant foundation, planned originally in the interests of a peculiarly rigorous Lutheran orthodoxy. One might have expected that the territory of such rulers would grow into a great Protestant State. But the family custom of dividing and subdividing the dominions among different heirs was fatal to any such hope. Prussia, not Saxony, holds that proud position. There is indeed a kingdom of Saxony which dates its royal rank from the Napoleonic period. But it stands third, not first, among the States of the new German empire; and the Dresden royal family have for generations

little States, into Saxe-Weimar of the neighbouring State, interesting to all good Britons, of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha.

Jena lies in a picturesque valley, faced with sharp-cut hills, which sink beyond into tableland in every direction. It is about fourteen miles from Weimar, the little capital, radiant in Hegel's time with the glories of Goethe and Schiller—with whom the philosopher enjoyed a somewhat distant intimacy—and interesting more recently as the home of Liszt's later years. Jena, indeed, is a beautiful place on the outskirts of a still more beautiful region. If Württemberg and neighbouring lands belong to mediæval Swabia, Jena lies either within or close to the borders of mediæval Thuringia, and memories of Luther and Goethe succeed each other curiously throughout the whole region. Jena itself is best known in history by its disastrous battle. The townspeople to-day are rather proud than ashamed of it, though Saxony and Saxe-Weimar shared with Prussia that calamitous shipwreck. After all, since 1871, German sensitiveness has had no reason to shrink from any of "the glories of France." Apparently the aim of the day's movements was to obtain a dominating position on the high ground. The Prussian commanders had allowed the highest points of all to be surprised and captured; the armies, French and Prussian, struggled up in detachments by different lateral valleys to the tableland, and Napoleon hurled his enemies down again in confused ruin. Thereafter Prussia lay at his feet.



the first of his major works, the *Phenomenology*. Even at the present day there is little centralisation and much *Particularismus* in the publication of German books. It need not much surprise us, therefore, to find that in 1807 the *Phenomenology* was issued to the world by a publisher doing business at Bamberg and Würzburg. Hegel was South German born, and these Bavarian towns, besides being nearer his native regions, were farther off from the disturbances of the campaign against Prussia. The book has been described as a philosophical Pilgrim's Progress. Hegel himself called it his voyage of discovery. Its appearance must have been a painful event to Schelling, who, in spite of old friendship and personal services, is treated with about as much respect as the showman's Punch manifests to his victims. Henceforth the friends of Jena days were in a state of open enmity. The *Phenomenology* tries to prove that, by a necessary progress, thought or consciousness, regarded as the activity of a thinker [this in contrast to the starting-point of the *Logie*], undergoes successive transformations until it reaches the level of absolute thought, where thought and the object of thought are adequate to each other in lucid identity or equivalence. On the way to this goal every possible phase of human thought is reviewed in turn, and put upon record.¹ Thus the *Phenomenology* contains all of Hegel's thinking on philosophical subjects, and expresses it with a

¹ See further on, note A, at end of Chapter XI.

difficult even among Hegel's writings. Once—at the end of the Jena period—it was delivered as class lectures.

Hegel felt no special grief at the defeat of Jena. Württemberg, his native land in the narrower sense, had fought on Napoleon's side at Austerlitz; Bavaria also, where he settled for a time, had enlarged its borders and sprung into the rank of royalties by the favour of the conqueror, who followed with success the traditional French policy of playing off the minor German States against Austria and Prussia. Even Electoral Saxony soon made peace with Napoleon, passed into his Rhenish confederacy, and secured the royal title by its subservience.¹ Nor had Prussia as yet done anything to attract to itself the hopes of German patriots. She had weakly lent herself for a time to Napoleon's plans, then at an ill-chosen moment had rushed upon her fate. Actuated partly by his early enthusiasm for the cause of liberty in France, partly by his lifelong attachment to the teaching of facts, Hegel like Goethe was disposed to acclaim rather than to denounce the tyrant, who now wielded all the extraordinary powers which the French Revolution had summoned into life. A letter tells of the emotion with which he saw Napoleon at Jena (which was occupied by the French *before* the battle); the world's master, that little figure on horseback! But

¹ The smaller Saxon State of Weimar had perforce to comply equally with Napoleon's wishes. There were many Germans in the Grand Army which Napoleon led to destruction in Russia.



facts proved themselves too strong for Hegel's comfort. He had to withdraw from Jena, his career suspended if not destroyed, and was thankful to find work temporarily as newspaper editor and bookseller at Bamberg. The task was not a very lofty one; Napoleon permitted no leading articles. In a year's time Hegel obtained a somewhat better position, when he was appointed headmaster of the Gymnasium at Nuremberg. Formerly a Free City of the Empire and a centre of Reformation zeal in the days of Albrecht Dürer and Hans Sachs, Nuremberg had joined the Rhenish confederation in 1802, and was annexed a few years later to Bavaria. Hegel's ideal at this period was the revival of the Empire; but in the issue that task fell in a different form and very much later to Prussia, not to Austria; while the Holy Roman Empire, having become "neither holy nor Roman nor an Empire," was dissolved, the Hapsburg dynasty annexing the Imperial title as a family possession, and so constituting the first "empire" of the modern upstart variety, while Bavaria and other of the minor German States were aggrandised by some fragmentary spoils. Bavaria above all had long traditions of selfish profit by alliance with France against other German powers; but it made a more honourable choice in 1870.

Even in a school, Hegel, though he did his work faithfully, was out of place. His superiors in a spirit of reform insisted on the teaching of philosophy by the Rector; and Dr. Caird confesses that his school-book on the subject "must have greatly puzzled the clever boys of Nuremberg." In 1811 he married a lady of family belonging to the city; the distinction between bourgeoisie and noble blood is of course more marked

in Germany than in Great Britain. Twice at least in his courtship Hegel broke into verses. Two sons were born of the marriage; one became well known as a Professor of History, the other as a politician. And at Nuremberg in 1812-16 Hegel produced his most elaborate and finished work, the [greater] "Logic," described by Dr. Caird as "with all its defects, the one work which the modern world has to put beside the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle." In 1816, as the third and last volume of the *Logic* passed through the press, Hegel received three offers of philosophical chairs—from Erlangen, from Heidelberg, and—with a certain degree of hesitation—from Berlin, the scene of his later labours. For the present he accepted the call to Heidelberg, another beautiful and romantic city, perhaps the fairest that Germany can boast. Its steep hills are clothed with forests; the Neckar, with wood rafts from Tübingen and Stuttgart, flowing past to join the neighbouring Rhine. Heidelberg was the home of an unhappy English or rather Scottish princess, mother of the Prince Rupert of our Civil Wars. Her husband, an unsuccessful champion of Protestantism on the field of battle, lost his own dominions while seeking to make good his election to the crown of Bohemia; and most of the Palatinate then passed to the Roman Catholic power of Baden. It might seem irrelevant to dwell on the beauty of several of Hegel's homes. When he was looking for a Roman Catholic city to spend a short time in, we are told that he stipulated for pleasant society and *ein gutes Bier*; but we hear nothing about scenery. In his *Æsthetics*, art is predominant and natural beauty is described as inferior. The "starry heavens above" offended him from their

lack of pattern; and the Swiss Alps left him unmoved, though he rejoiced in waterfalls—could it be as a material parable of the “fluidity” of the Notion, with their changlessness in constant change? But Heidelberg overcame the stolidity even of Hegel. He was delighted with it, and told his wife that she would learn at Heidelberg for the first time what the pleasures of walking were. It had other attractions from the presence of friends or fellow-workers. Even in the Jena period, Hegel had cast wistful glances at Heidelberg. His well-known phrase, according to which he desired to make philosophy “speak German,” was employed at that time in a letter bringing his claims under the notice of a high official in the State of Baden—an application which at least in the first instance produced no effect.

Restored to the more congenial work of a philosophical professorship, Hegel rose steadily in esteem during his short stay at Heidelberg. Here for the first time he lectured on *Æsthetics*; and here the first and shortest but in some respects the best sketch of his *Encyclopædia* took shape (the [lesser] “Logic”—the Philosophy of Nature—the Philosophy of Spirit). This was contributed to a collection of encyclopædias; whimsically enough, since it is scarcely possible that any one philosophical system should be of such general acceptance as to merit a place among the positive sciences. Henceforward Hegel frequently made use of his *Encyclopædia* as a basis for lectures—either (one presumes) dictating it, or referring to it in lieu of dictated paragraphs. Two other publications of this short but fertile period are mentioned by Dr. Caird. They were both contributed to the Heidelberg

Jahrbücher. One paper, on Jacobi, moderated the extreme criticism with which he and Fichte had been assailed during the Jena period. Something similar is found, as we have noted above, in the introduction to the *Encyclopædia Logic*. The second paper, Hegel's first published though not his first written disquisition on politics, supported the action of the reforming king of Württemberg, whose territory had been doubled by Napoleon, against the suspicious conservatism of the older part of his dominions, whose cry was for the "good old laws." Here we see Hegel's sympathy with liberal administration, and his not less characteristic admiration for a strong king. In his *Philosophy of History* he still tells us of "liberal institutions" which Napoleon gave to several countries, but the more conservative and older Hegel recognises that the gift was "premature" and therefore fruitless. Speaking of this incursion into political controversy, Dr. Caird admits that "in controversy Hegel if not unfair is at least ruthless." Matters were not settled in Württemberg till the able but unpopular king died, and was succeeded by a daring soldier who had gained the people's hearts.

In 1818 Hegel was again called to Berlin, and this time he accepted the invitation. The recently established university had become at a bound the greatest centre of culture and learning in all Germany. In this as in other respects regenerate Prussia was carefully earning its place of leadership, though its advance was fated to be slow and tortuous. After a war, whether ending in victory or defeat, every nation has to pass through a period of trial, while the disbanded soldiers are melting into the working population, and society is adjusting itself to the new conditions. Alike in

England and on the Continent, the economic and social distresses after Waterloo were aggravated by political reaction. Hegel, however, accepted the situation, and came to be regarded, at least by outsiders, as one of the bulldogs of the administration. He had given a pledge, men thought, that *a priori* philosophy should always come to the polls as a plumper for the government. "The real" was "the rational," and "subjective discontent" was wholly contemptible. Dr. Caird insists that Hegel was always interested in freedom. One can see, indeed, that he was interested in free *thought*, which includes or implies the personal freedom of the philosopher—a freedom not always respected, even in Hegel's case, on the part of the Prussian government, though Rosenkranz rather cruelly asserts that Hegel was incapable of admiring the more liberal features of Prussian rule. In no other sense, however, was Hegel attached to political freedom. He did not care for the "individual freedom" of which Tennyson sings—the freedom dear to Teutonic races and to the modern world. The Greek conception of freedom as a share in governing power had more attractions for him, and he never altogether renounced it; but even when it was lacking he found apologies for the rulers, praising "real freedom," i.e. substantial good government, in contrast with "formal freedom," i.e. constitutional self-government. His remorseless criticism of an old acquaintance, Fries, at the time when Fries was being harassed by petty government persecution, produced—and, one must say, still produces—an unpleasant impression. The English Reform Bill of 1831 filled Hegel with dismay. He thought our country was forsaking the only basis on which we were able to act—that of "positive right" [or historical

precedent?]. So limited were the sympathies of Hegel as a politician during later life. As a teacher, however, he rose and rose. It was believed that the problem of ages had been finally solved; men were afraid to differ from the great master, who dealt such heavy blows; and his influence was very great. His birthday nearly coinciding with that of Goethe—whose theory of colour, by the way, Hegel obstinately championed against Newton's—the two great men were celebrated together on several occasions. With Schleiermacher, a colleague at Berlin, he was on the stiffest terms. On one occasion they openly quarrelled at de Wette's table. Rosenkranz rather needlessly defends Hegel from the imputation of merely personal jealousy of Schleiermacher. The whole cast of his thinking made it inevitable that he should regard Schleiermacher's reliance upon feeling with extreme aversion; and whatever we think of the delicacy or courtesy of the expression, he was only true to his own position when he launched the sneer that, according to Schleiermacher's view of religion, the dog must be the pattern of devoutness.

The chief literary work of this period is the *Philosophy of Right*. There are also, besides Review articles, two more editions of the *Encyclopædia*, the last "with considerable alterations," and a new edition of the [greater] *Logic*, which Hegel did not live to complete. In later years he visited on holiday journeys the Netherlands, Vienna, Bohemia, and Paris. Victor Cousin, who afterwards criticised him and compared him unfavourably with Schelling, was in some measure his host at Paris, and was supposed to be popularising his views in France. Hegel, however, never crossed the Channel or the Alps. His death came

suddenly by cholera on November 14th, 1831—the anniversary of the death of Leibniz.

His writings, embodied in a monumental edition by admiring friends after his death, are of different classes. First of all there are finished books—the *Phenomenology* and the greater *Logic*. The former has not been published in any English version, nor is likely to be; portions of the latter are rendered and commented upon in Dr. H. Stirling's very strong and very strange book, the *Secret of Hegel*. To a second class may be assigned the books published in outline by Hegel—the *Encyclopædia*, the *Philosophy of Right*. These, when incorporated in the definitive edition, were expanded by the help of additions partly taken from the Professor's "Hefts" of various years, and partly from students' notes. Translators have hesitated how to deal with these additions. Dr. William Wallace, in translating the lesser *Logic*, gave everything, but in translating the *Philosophy of Mind* [he renders "Geist" by "mind," not "spirit"] he gave only the paragraphs.¹ We should add that the remaining and central third of the *Encyclopædia*, the *Philosophy of Nature*, is even less likely than the *Phenomenology* to find an English translator. Its science is out of date, and its philosophy is deprecatingly defended to-day by Hegel's warmest admirers. Dr. Dyde's translation of the *Philosophy of Right* includes everything, but carefully distinguishes three different degrees of authority or importance in the material which he uses. Finally, as a third class we have the Lectures published after Hegel's death—*Philosophy of Religion*, *Æsthetics*, *Philosophy of History*, *History of Philosophy*. All these have more

¹ The translator's prolegomena to this volume are somewhat copious.

or less found translators. It will be noticed that, according to Hegel's classification, they all belong to one part or another of the Philosophy of Spirit—the branch of philosophy for the sake of which Hegel did all his work. To a certain extent we must consider these remains as less authoritative, since Hegel had not prepared any part of them for a reader's eye; yet substantially they are of equal value with those books in which, along with Hegel's very words, we have additions from students' notes. The remaining treatises are of less consequence.

The death of Hegel did not imply the immediate loss of hegemony by his system, but the fall when it took place was decisive. First, the Hegelianism of the Left brought discredit on the whole, and the school was rent with fierce antagonisms. Idealism turned into Materialism; and the Defender of the Faith (in his own sense) became known as the father or forefather of dogmatic atheisms. And secondly, within a few years Hegelianism became as completely unfashionable in Germany as it had formerly been the vogue. A competent if somewhat exoteric reporter, the late Professor Max Müller, has recently told us in his *Autobiography* of the startling change. Hegel might seem to have prepared us for some such overthrow. In the *Phenomenology* he tells us that the break up of a victorious party is a proof of the completeness of its triumph. It occupies the whole field; both the alternative views, with which the future has to deal, proceed from within itself. This surely is one more proof of the invincible optimism of the school. What Hegel says may be true in some cases; but in other cases, much less

flattering reasons may cause a party to fall to pieces. It may not be undue strength that divides it, but weakness. It may not be young life we are witnessing, as it sends out new swarms to occupy fresh territory, but break-down, failure, disease. Dr. Caird, true to Hegel's optimism, quotes the words of Hegel as prophetic of the history of his school. That is correct, if Hegel has taught the modern world all that he had to teach, and if philosophical thought since his time has built upon his foundation, or advanced from the basis he established to new issues and further triumphs. Who will dare to say that this has been the case? If most of the philosophy of modern Germany belongs to a stadium antecedent to Kant and Hegel, great part of the responsibility for the relapse must be attributed to the omniscient airs of the younger master. "The Notion" did not long hold the field. Men had supposed that Hegel grasped in his hands the solution to every problem—they came to believe that he had done nothing, and threw themselves once again into the arms of empiricism. Speculative thought, banished from Germany, found a home—as Professor Ormond has pointed out—in Great Britain or in America. A large body of our thinkers have tried to "do over again" what Hegel's immediate pupils believed to have been done once for all. A substitute for "the Notion" has been offered us in a new reading of the significance of Kant's thought. Our historical survey is not complete till we have chronicled the leading stages in this revived Hegelianism, trying to mark its modifications and to estimate their value.

CHAPTER VI

BRITISH HEGELIANISM—EARLIER PHASES

LITERATURE.—“To English readers Hegel was first introduced in the powerful statement of his principles by Dr. Hutcheson Stirling. Mr. Wallace, in the introduction to his translation of the lesser *Logic*, and Mr. Harris, the editor of the American “*Speculative Journal*,” have since done much to illustrate various aspects of the Hegelian philosophy. Other English writers, such as the late Professor Green, Mr. Bradley, Professor Watson, and Professor Adamson, who have not directly treated of Hegel, have been greatly influenced by him. Mr. [Andrew] Seth [Professor Pringle-Pattison] has recently written an interesting account of the movement from Kant to Hegel.”—Dr. E. Caird, *Hegel*, Pref., p. vi (1883).

IN speaking of a Hegelian revival in our country,¹ we may seem to be disregarding protests, made by several of those named above, against expressions which identify them with any one great name in the past. The frankest admission of discipleship is probably that contained in the preface to Dr. John Caird's *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*: “The author desires to express his obligations to the following books . . . above all, Hegel's *Philosophie der Religion*,

¹ The author regrets that limits both of space and knowledge keep him from giving any account of the interesting work done in America in connexion with the Hegelian movement.

other hand (Hegel, 1869), that "the way of metaphysics is over"; and, more plainly, that Hegel failed to speak openly enough regarding the modifications in the theology of the Christian Church which his philosophy involves. Beyond that difference, however—and, as Dr. Caird himself conceives it, it is far from being a difference in principle—it does not appear what, if anything, in Hegel Dr. E. Caird will permit us to regard as obsolete. How then can we describe a movement inspired with reverence and enthusiasm for Hegel, unless we call it after the writer who is its fountainhead? A well-chosen class name is the first step to knowledge. It is not the whole of knowledge; and we fall into a too common error if we allow ourselves to treat mere knowledge of names as a knowledge of things. The right name is only a beginning, but it places us on the track which leads to further insight. And, while we disclaim the idea of imputing to Hegel's British advocates full technical discipleship, we feel that any other phrasology would mislead our readers more seriously than the usual terminology can do. We therefore continue to make use of the expression British Hegelianism.

An alternative name is offered for our acceptance, when we are asked to speak of a British Neo-Kantian movement.¹ That epithet, as we shall see, points to a fact of great importance—the close connexion which English and Scottish thought has instituted between

¹ So in Dr. E. Caird's preface to *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (see below, p. 114), in Professor A. Seth's *Hegelianism and Personality*, and in Mr. Fairbrother's *Philosophy of T. H. Green*.

"Hegelian" conclusions and the Kantian premises or point of view. But if we may propose so humble a test as the nature of beliefs or conclusions reached, the British "Neo-Kantians"—with the very doubtful exception of T. H. Green—agree with Hegel much more than they do with Kant. Moreover, in Germany, Neo-Kantianism is the name of a movement back from Hegel to the older master. Theologians who take their stand upon Neo-Kantian grounds—the school of Ritschl contribute most but by no means all of these—exhibit even an exaggerated distrust of Hegel, while the philosophical wing have reduced Kant to a species of empiricist agnosticism. However unfair we may think such a way of handling Kant, the German Neo-Kantians have acquired by pre-emption a right to explain their own name in their own sense, and it will create much confusion if we attach the same label to a very different movement of thought in our country.¹ Nevertheless, it is most true and noteworthy that *British Hegelianism is, in a sense of its own, Neo-Kantian*.

The only other preliminary remark we need make is, that British Hegelianism is not a statical thing, but a living movement of thought, and that several of its representatives exhibit a transformation, almost a dissolution, of their original Hegelian doctrines. This is particularly the case with one of the strongest, Mr. F. H. Bradley. Mr. Bradley has long protested against the assertion that a Hegelian "school" exists among us. In the sense now explained, it does exist, and Mr. Bradley used to be one of its champions;² but he is ceasing, if he

¹ There is also a Neo-Kantian movement in France, of which we may at least affirm that it is not Hegelian.

² *Ethical Studies* expounds ideas learned from "two or three" great

much more inclined to denounce Hegel than to study him, Professor Ferrier (as Dr. Hutchison Stirling points out) learned to sympathise at least in part with the sphinx of Berlin. Ferrier's own philosophy may be regarded as a sort of portal to a system of constructive idealism. Upon *epistemology*, the theory of knowledge, and *agnoiology*, the theory of ignorance, is reared the fabric of *ontology*. The most idealist portion is the agnoiology, which argues that we can only be termed *ignorant* of what it would be possible for us to *know*,—hence, that the fundamental assumption of idealism is justified, and that we must take for granted, in all our thinking, the trustworthiness of thought and the rationality of the real. Ferrier's ontology leaves us with subject *plus* object as the ultimate or minimum definition of reality. This sounds like an absolutely paradoxical dualism—as if one were to say, "The simplest conceivable element of articular sound, to be reached by analysis, is of the type CD"—where the very form of statement cries out for the simpler elements C and D. Yet Professor Andrew Seth¹ [Professor Pringle Pattison] appeals to the reasonableness of Ferrier from the alleged unreason-

German writers. There are quotations from Kant, Hegel, Vatke (a Hegelian theologian), and to a much less degree from Trendelenburg. In *Ethical Studies*, therefore, Mr. Bradley exhibited the very central characteristics of British Hegelianism.

¹ In *Hegelianism and Personality*, pp. 33, 34.

ableness of Hegel. To Ferrier also we owe the first discussion of epistemology in English, and apparently the framing of the word.¹ Word and conception play a great part in the more recent thinking of Professor Seth.

Another British thinker, of much practical importance, upon whom Hegel left his mark, was the late Benjamin Jowett, Master of Balliol College, Oxford. When Jowett's statements regarding Hegel first appeared—in his introduction to the translation of the *Sophist*, 2nd edit., 1875—the work of writers of the British Hegelian school had already done something towards familiarising English readers with the subject. Chronologically, however, Jowett's studies antedated most of the British movement towards Hegel, if not the whole of that movement as conducted by professed philosophers. Jowett is therefore one of the pioneers in a dark and intricate region of knowledge. His biography has made still plainer how deep an impression was produced by Hegel's thoughts upon this very shrewd and reality-loving mind. Owing to his studies in Plato, Jowett sympathises with that element in Hegel which is forbidding to many readers, and especially to those whose bent is towards practical wisdom. "The unity of Being and Nothing" might have been expected to repel Jowett; it did at least as much to attract him. When one first read his strictures, not very long after they had been made public, one was inclined—in one's hot young enthusiasm for the Hegelian philosophy—to regard Jowett as an outsider. That judgment is hardly confirmed on a reperusal of Jowett's remarks. Perhaps only one of his statements may be called distinctly erroneous—the statement that

¹ The great Oxford Dictionary quotes Ferrier for *epistemology*.

the categories of the second division of the *Logic*, those of Essence, describe "the essence of things for thought." All categories do that. It is no distinctive peculiarity of the categories of Essence. They may be said to do that work of thought which Jowett speaks of more fully than the categories of Being; but, on the other hand, "the Notion" in its varied forms outvies the categories of Essence as a description of "the essence of things for thought." Categories are progressive definitions of the real, and every one in its turn goes deeper than its predecessors. Except for a certain inaccuracy on this point, it is difficult to complain of anything in Jowett's remarks on Hegel. He puts forward mainly such objections as one might have expected from a practical mind which had relapsed into its most doggedly practical mood. He is half-ashamed of having coquetted with shadowy ideas. He has retreated into his castle of common sense. His objections are not to be described as unimportant, but we may perhaps fairly call them the difficulties of the practical mind and not of the speculative thinker. All Jowett's difficulties and objections, taken in their full sum, are less significant than the fact that he had offered a tribute, however temporary and partial, at the shrine of Hegel. On matters of religion, it is true, his moral realism and sober devoutness, coupled with his rationalistic jealousy of a historical faith, would find a good deal to sympathise with in the German idealist. It is in regard to Greek thought, however, that he bears the most splendid testimony to Hegel. "He has done more to explain Greek thought than all other writers put together."¹

¹ Introduction to his translation of the *Sophist*, *sub finem*.

The great starting-point in our national study of Hegel is found in a memorable book by a Scottish writer, Dr. Hutchison Stirling, who in 1865 published the first edition of the *Secret of Hegel*. The book is not easy reading; indeed, a popular pleasantry made complaint that the secret, whatever it was, had been only too faithfully kept. Dr. Stirling thought it best to print the record of his own first tentative approaches to an understanding of the Master—a sort of “rise and progress of philosophy in the soul”; but the reader has to be on his guard against taking provisional statements as if they were definitive. Some of the earlier sections of Hegel’s larger *Logic* are translated; the same portions are re-written in Dr. Stirling’s own words, and expounded or commented on; and the views of other interpreters are examined. Throughout, as has been well said, we have “the thought of Hegel in the style of Carlyle.”¹

The first noticeable feature in Dr. Stirling’s handling of Hegel is the strongly positive or conservative attitude. He points to a Hegel not so much (in Fichte’s phraseology) of “synthesis” or higher unity, as of reaction against the falsity of “antithesis.” If one may say so, Hegel is read from the point of view of conservative reaction. He is made to stand for a principle like that of St. Simon’s or Comte’s “organic” periods of history, in contrast with those “critical” periods when Dr. Stirling’s hated *Aufklärung* flourishes. Hegel is regarded as a big and brave brother, by whose help Faith and Duty may turn to flight all the armies of the aliens. Of course this in a sense is Hegel’s own position and the position of every Hegelian. But

¹ Prof. Sorley, in noticing the second edition of the *Secret* (1897).

us plainly how much alteration he conceives to be necessary. To be interested in the positive moral uses of philosophy is indeed creditable and more than creditable. To push that interest even into partisanship is a course of action to which Hegel himself has given some encouragement, for in later life he was willing to be regarded as the champion of all the orthodoxies. But if his system has any distinctive feature, we must not look for it on this side nor yet on that, but upon all sides. Hegel is all-inclusive. He is catholic to a fault; and he might have considered his Edinburgh advocate and interpreter rather too "edifying." The real Hegel seems rather to "sit as God, holding no form of creed, But contemplating all"; or, as one sometimes feels inclined to recast the quotation, "holding all forms of creed, and abrogating all." The formulæ which lend themselves so readily to Ultramontaniam sit awkwardly upon Hegel's detached and elusive wisdom. God, Freedom, Immortality—in technical language, the postulates of natural theology—are the truths for which Dr. Stirling pleads, and which—with some hesitation—he finds to be supported by Hegel. In a sense, too, he endorses Hegel's philosophical vindication of Christianity, or what Hegel offers as such. No other British Hegelian is so fully identified with the Hegelianism of the Right.¹ One more characteristic;

¹ Dr. Sterrett, an American writer on the Philosophy of Religion (see "literature" before Chap. XV.), goes at least as far in this direction.

never again reached quite so high a level. Logically (unless in critical comment; see, *e.g.*, his masterly little book on part of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy, or see again his attack on *Darwinianism*²) his later writings have been even less closely knit than the *Secret*. But Dr. Stirling had very high claims upon all who could appreciate philosophical eminence, and we must regret that the father of British Hegelianism was never called to occupy one of the philosophical chairs in the Scottish universities. Apart from this, Dr. Stirling has received all the honours which Scotland can give; and he has been a powerful agent in educating several generations of students of philosophy. Best of all, he has set the example of a life disinterestedly devoted to speculative thought.

A second and still more important feature noticeable in Dr. Stirling in his affiliation of Hegel to Kant. The very table of contents prescribes the "elimination of Fichte and Schelling"; and the "*Secret of Hegel*" *par excellence* consists of the following words—

Quality—Time and Space—Empirical Realities,

While repudiating the kind of *jus divinum* claimed by other members of his communion, he finds a full guarantee for the Historic Episcopate in its historic actuality. The real is the rational, and whatever is is right. Precisely because it has been evolved, episcopacy is marked out as divinely planned. Dr. W. T. Harris also stands for the Hegelianism of the Right (see below).

¹ See especially Dr. Stirling's notes to his translation of Schweigger's *History of Philosophy*.

² Perhaps the *Text-Book to Kant* should also be named as a particularly solid and well-finished work.



In the light of Dr. E. Caird's studies of Kant, we might fill out Dr. Stirling's scheme as follows:—"If it is credible that pure self-identical thought, under whatever impulse, can give rise to so 'concrete' a conception as that of quantity, there is no reason for attributing to any other source than pure thought the further so-called subjective conceptions or 'forms' of Time and Space, nor yet the existence of those Quanta in time and space of which we have experience, and which we regard as realities." Perhaps this statement goes beyond what is contained in *the Secret*. To follow his own lines, we might interpret Dr. Stirling's hints more simply, as follows:—"Kant himself suggests to us that Time and Space, and even those realities of which we have experience in time and space, are simply modes of Quantity, which is a pure *a priori* human thought. The same thing will therefore be true of other thoughts. They also will crave embodiment. Nature or reality in general, if we look at it hard enough, will turn out to be nothing else than thought. And the great correction which Hegel teaches us to make in Kant is that, instead of regarding this truth as one relating to human knowledge of *phenomena*, we ought to drop the illogical qualification, and affirm our position of [absolute] knowledge of *reality*."² In whichever way we take it, the passage plainly shows that Dr. Stirling

¹ I. pp. 125, 126.

² In the notes to *Schwegler*, Dr. Stirling names as "the Secret of Hegel" the discovery of a "Triple Nexus" in thought, and the interpretation of all things by this threefold rhythm (p. 231).

formulated the programme for a great mass of the best British Hegelian work—Hegel as the extricator and vindicator of deeper truths suggested by Kant, to which Kant's own insight was inadequate—Kant's list of categories the true historical introduction to the boldly soaring speculation of Hegel.

Soon after the publication of the *Secret of Hegel*, another deep student and powerful teacher of Idealism appeared in Scotland, when the chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow University was filled (in 1866) by the appointment of Mr. Edward Caird, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Best known at that time as the younger brother of Professor (afterwards Principal) John Caird, Dr. Edward Caird has lived to influence thought, and to enjoy public fame and personal gratitude, quite as largely as his distinguished brother. Although strikingly reserved as a man, and as a teacher always conversational, never oratorical, he yet fascinated the most unwilling minds in his class-room, compelling them to practice and gradually teaching them to love the unwonted labour of thinking. In most cases he was so irresistible, that his pupils accepted all his conclusions with scarcely a modification. He has done much by authorship as well as by academic teaching. His first considerable book, *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*, was published in 1877. It dealt with the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and was meant to be followed by a second volume; but though it was very well received, the author's severe self-criticism led him to re-write it. A good deal of the original draft survives, amid important changes, in *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*. The two volumes of this work

were published simultaneously in 1889, and give a very careful survey, from the "Hegelian" standpoint of constructive and positive idealism, over the whole field of Kant's writings. In his sketch of *Hegel* (1883; Philosophical Classics for English Readers) and in his *Evolution of Religion* (2 vols., 1893; Gifford Lectures in St. Andrew's University), Dr. Caird has spoken out more frankly regarding his personal beliefs in religion and theology.¹ By his appointment, on the death of Jowett, to the Mastership of Balliol College, a remarkable career reached a remarkable climax.

Dr. Caird—whether he owed the hint to Dr. Stirling, or was working independently on parallel lines—may be said to have carried out with greater elaboration in detail, and with a greater degree of literary finish, the programme announced by Dr. Stirling—Kant the true foundation of Hegel, Hegel the true interpreter of Kant. If to that programme we add as additional materials Hegel's rapid sketch (in the introduction to the *Encyclopædia Logie*) of Kant's successive treatises, it might seem that Dr. Caird had little more to do than fill in an outline drawn by others. But we must remember that he had to transform Hegel's coldly hostile examination of Kant into a sympathetic eliciting of the hints of constructive idealism from behind the prejudices or hostile principles with which Kant was hampered. How well this work was done, every student knows. While we read, we are "under the spell of the magician." Difficulties vanish, and the demonstration seems complete. It is only when we close the book that difficulties begin to return.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature in Dr. Caird's

¹ Gifford Lectures at Glasgow may shortly be expected in book form.

possibility of this identification; for, when he uses the word synthetic, he uses it in a depreccatory or contemptuous sense, applying it to a sort of connexion which holds thoughts together with an external clamp—not using them, and not grafting one into the other.¹ It cannot be denied that Kant's usage offers some justification for Hegel's; yet at least we may consider it characteristic that here again Hegel takes the lower view of Kant's work—and takes it with a perfect natural unconsciousness, scarcely favourable to Dr. Stirling's accusation that Hegel intentionally hid the amount of his debt to Kant. In Kant, synthetic thought is an artificial or morbid though useful phase of mind; to Hegel, as elucidated by Dr. Caird, analytic thought is worthless [or; is a mere subordinate aspect of the detailed process of thought, and unreal in itself], while thought everywhere in its own nature is “concrete” [or *many-sided*; yet always also *unified*]. This possible line of connexion between Kant and Hegel is, we believe, Dr. Caird's peculiar discovery.

But Dr. Caird's work is still more important to the British student as *a way into* Hegel's system. Hegel himself has no skill in making easy approaches to his thought. Both the *Phenomenology* and the later substitute for it, the introduction to the *Encyclopædia Logic*, bewilder rather than help the learner. If “a

¹ Perhaps the reader ought to be warned that neither of these material nages [“*Vorstellungen*”] answers to the subtlety of Hegel's doctrine of thought. He requires a fuller unity and a more vital difference.

ladder has been let down to us,"¹ we are not trained for such giddy ascents. Kant, on the contrary, stands squarely on experience, and we know where we are, or think we do, when we study Kant. Unfortunately, as we proceed under Dr. Caird's guidance from Kant's starting-point to Hegel's goal, we lose touch with the familiar world. Kant, Dr. Caird explains, shows that our thought constitutes reality; there is no reason for saying, with Kant, *phenomenal* reality; but *an individual* thought could not constitute objective reality; therefore we must take Kant to mean that *thought as such* constitutes *absolute* reality. The starting-point is therefore transformed or is knocked to pieces in the course of our further movements. That is quite in order, upon the principles of Hegelianism. But the appeal to Kant for a new way into Hegel was designed to help British minds too deeply immersed in common sense to be capable of receiving Hegel's Hegelianism. It is to be feared that the difficulties of the new road are almost as great as those of the old.

Much of Dr. Caird's success in argument—perhaps of Hegel's too—is due to the skill with which he states his case and introduces his assumptions. He always takes for granted the idealist claim, that some form of abstract metaphysical statement may be relied on with unbounded confidence. He then argues that Hegel's manysidedness shines forth in manifest superiority over all onesidedness—Hegel's intense faith in unity over all dualism. If we are to criticise such arguments, or perhaps any skilfully constructed arguments, with success, we must criticise, not what is argued for, but rather what is taken for granted. Is a formula drawn

¹ *Phenomenology*, p. 20.

particular, and of the Ego to the Non Ego? Assuming that we are, Dr. Caird shows with great skill that the subtle manysidedness of the Hegelian scheme out-matches all its rivals.

Slightly younger than Edward Caird, Thomas Hill Green was earlier on the field of letters with his very able and very difficult "Introduction" to Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (1874). At Oxford, where he spent his brief working life as tutor and professor, Green developed an influence which, while deeply intellectual, was still more profoundly personal and moral. He is the least Hegelian in tone or in character of all Hegelians, German or British. There was no shadow or suspicion of levity about Green's optimism. Whether from his peculiar development of the common thought, or from subtler qualities of nature and character—the choice between those alternatives is less a question of evidence than of interpretation—Green occupies a place by himself. We might say of him what Goethe said of the young Carlyle, that he was "an unusual moral force." If Hegel was a greater philosopher, Green was greater as a man. He served the Idea not merely in scholarly abstraction, but in the routine of the Oxford City Council and in the despised paths of temperance reform. "His heart the lowliest duties on itself did lay." His principal book was posthumous, bearing a title chosen by Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*. We shall rely mainly upon it, while referring also to republished articles and lectures, and

to Mr. Fairbrother's useful, if sometimes disputable, summary.¹

In Green the synthesis of Kant and Hegel almost becomes a return from Hegel upon Kant. Dr. E. Caird has told us that Green considered² Hegel's work must "all be done over again"; and the late Professor Sidgwick quotes similar remarks addressed in that (philosophically) less friendly quarter.³ On the other hand, it is noticeable how little Green troubles himself with the opinions of the historical Kant. "Kant" and "Kantianism" on Green's pages do not stand for what Kant believed and held, but for what he ought to have believed. They stand for a "Hegelianised" Kant—a Kant of constructive idealism. Moreover, the *Prolegomena to Ethics* constitutes the first and as yet the only systematic enunciation of the idealism of the English revival. We cannot tell how far Green's positions are to be imputed in detail to others; but they are significant as the results reached by a great mind placed in the full stream of the movement.

The *Prolegomena to Ethics* begins with a "Metaphysics of Knowledge"; and this recalls us at once to Hegelian first principles. The systematic unity of all things, grasped in thought, was placed first in our own preliminary analysis of Hegel; an intellectual issue like Hegel's suggests itself even in Green, when appeal is made for a basis of ethics to a metaphysics of know-

¹ A popular sketch of Green's religious position, along with a striking picture of the grief caused by "Mr. Gray's" death, is found in Mrs. H. Ward's novel, *Robert Elsmere*.

² Preface to *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, p. v.

³ He had said (in talk), "I looked into Hegel the other day, and found it a strange *Wirrwarr*."—*Mind* for 1900, p. 19.

Pure Reason, interpreting the Kantian analysis of course not sceptically, but positively and constructively. Experience would not be possible except the unity of consciousness held together the manifold. The world would be no world to us if we could not grasp it in synthesis by a principle of reason within, which is kindred to the rational order without. How then does Green deal with the ambiguity which we noted as stepping in between Dr. E. Caird's starting-point and his conclusions? Green boldly postulates an absolute reason in the objective order—God, demonstrated by the analysis of consciousness,—and regards progressive human experience of the Good and the True as the progressive self-imparting of this absolute consciousness to us. Here already one doubts whether Green's metaphysical foundations are adequate. Perhaps it is his devout soul rather than his industrious intellect which leads him so confidently to accept the positive or constructive type of Kantian transcendentalism as a demonstration of personality both human and Divine. The principle, "thought constitutes reality," is now interpreted as follows:—(1) Because the world of human experience is a thought-construction, it follows that (2) Divine thought constitutes the world, and that (3) human experience is not so much knowledge of the world as a finite transcript of Divine thought. The development appears singular.

When we pass to more strictly ethical ground, are we enlarging our foundations? Or are we only interpreting anew the results already reached? Mr. Fair-

brother affirms the first view. The present writer's impression is that the second would be a truer interpretation of Green's purpose. This self-centred unity in all things is *the* master-key in his philosophy. It is Hegel's key, but the guarantee is different. The guarantee in the case of Green, as in the case of other British Hegelians, is furnished by a positive reading of Kant. And the Logic of Hegel (or Logic with its applications) has attained in Green to a richer or a better certified ontological meaning. At each end it is hypostatized, and we find ourselves in the presence of a living God and a real soul; while the middle term [middle ontologically if hardly epistemologically; an objective—shall we say an *independent*?—world seems to function in knowledge as little with Green as with Berkeley], the world as a real existence, is necessarily or at least is actually bound up with God. When we proceed to study conduct, we learn that man is free in so far as man is identical with God.—Yes, God is free; but is man free upon this showing? Green's analysis of knowledge seems to preclude that Pantheistic identification of God and the Soul which is so tempting when we accept the Transcendental Self and reject its sceptical implications. (What self is free? Why, self *qua* self; any self; self as such—there is no distinction.) Green in his analysis of knowledge will have none of this. But when it comes to an analysis of conduct, he will have nothing else. It appears therefore to the present writer that Green not merely has precluded Freewill in any libertarian sense, but has identified himself—at this stage certainly, though perhaps not earlier—with Hegel's intellectualism. He does not inquire whether the moral consciousness shows us anything more

regarding the nature of the Real than we learn from the analysis of knowledge.

In yet another way we may show that Green's conclusions are of a serious nature for morality. Kant found room for freedom in a noumenal region; but there is no noumenal region of higher truth and deeper reality, unless the phenomenal is merely phenomenal, and unless its truth is the merely relative truth of appearance.¹ Green makes phenomenal reality *real* reality; *human* knowledge becomes *knowledge*. Soul and World are now two sides of the same shield. Soul asserts its unity, self-identity, and freedom by imposing law on the world—or by recognising law in the world. So far as man is a part of the world, he is therefore subjected to the hardest determinist necessity—and that in the sacred name of the freedom and spirituality of soul.

Hegel again had (if he cared to use it) his way of escape. His world did not contain merely the two regions of Kant's world—phenomenal and noumenal; it contained many regions. Thus it was easy for Hegel (if he liked) to say that, while from a *lower* point of view man's conduct is determined, yet from a higher (and truer) man's conduct is free. But Green cannot say this. He has not two regions—nor yet many regions—but only one region; it has two sides, but there is no actual or possible division between them. Green of course satisfied himself that his view of freedom met all the moral interests of the case; but no libertarian will concur in that estimate. And, as a matter of pure logic, it seems *either* that Green's

¹ Confessedly, Kant's way of working out his solution is unsatisfying. See above, p. 57.

metaphysics of knowledge ought to have been Pantheistic, or that his ethics ought to have provided some separate personal freedom for man.

A further consequence of this fact, that Green interprets the Kantian analysis of knowledge in a theistic sense, is that his whole philosophy becomes religious. To Green, duty is an absolute revelation; in the service of duty we act for and with God. On the other hand, Green regards this as the whole of religion. He is as resolute as Dr. Edward Caird to admit no supernatural revelation or redemptive act. The systematic unity of all things is revealed and grasped in knowledge. God is the presupposition of that unity, and it has no other presupposition or condition. At least, however, Green does not offer us any of the heady stuff which suggests a region of religious or of philosophical truth *jenseits des Guten und Bösen*. And again we feel that Green is the least Hegelian of all those who have been attracted and instructed by Hegel.

CHAPTER VII

BRITISH HEGELIANISM—LATER PHASES

LITERATURE.—There is no general history of the movement, whether in its earlier or in its later modes. Dr. Stirling's *As Regards Protoplasm*, Mr. Sandeman's *Problems of Biology*, Mr. F. H. Bradley's *Logic and Appearance and Reality*, the *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison's later writings, especially *Hegelianism and Personality*, Professor Ritchie's *Darwin and Hegel*, Mr. Fairbrother's brief statement of *The Philosophy of T. H. Green*, and last—not least—Mr. McTaggart's *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, are the works mainly relied on in what follows. Mr. McTaggart's *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology* and Dr. Baillie's *Hegel's Logic* are partially dealt with in other chapters.

HITHERTO we have studied the founding of the British Hegelian faith by three great teachers—Dr. Stirling, Dr. E. Caird, and T. H. Green—who all concur in seeking an entrance to Hegel by means of the teaching of Kant. In what follows we have to study some phases of change affecting the progress of British Hegelianism. All that we can here notice may be grouped in three sections. First, we have to study the effect produced on the Hegelian movement by contact with Darwinism. Secondly, we must say a very little regarding the progress or transformations of thought manifested in the writings of Mr. F. H. Bradley. Thirdly, we observe

Professor A. Seth from a disciple becoming a critic, and evoking various replies.

If the appeal to Kant is the first great peculiarity of British Hegelianism, a second great influence upon its development is found in the movement towards a fusion with that naturalistic philosophy of evolution, whose leading names are Darwin and Mr. Spencer. Instead of confining ourselves to the mysterious and ideal evolution traced out by Hegel, may we not amend the master's statement so far as to hold that evolution is *also* to be recognised as a process in time? All the "Hegelian" school now admit this. But may we further hold that this recognition—when we thoroughly understand what we are doing, and read the significance of the evolutionary process in the light of its results¹—is not merely compatible with but *equivalent* to the central truths of idealist philosophy? Here doubts arise within the Hegelian school. It is a still further question whether the special hypotheses of Darwin—or of Spencer—correctly interpret the time process of evolution. On the whole, Spencer has been noticeably less successful than Darwin in securing the attention of Hegelian writers or gaining the suffrages of some. Darwin ascribes evolution to struggle for existence. In this biologically true? Is it the whole or at least the main biological truth? Is it susceptible of enlarged application?—to universalise it appears strictly impossible.¹ These questions still remain for discussion. The present writer believes that he can date almost or absolutely to a year the change of attitude in Dr. E. Caird's class lectures, when that great

¹ See below, Chap. IX.

teacher ceased to regard Darwinism as a hypothesis, itself "struggling for existence" against formidable rivals, and made acknowledgment of it as—at least in measure—a plain statement of facts.¹ What was of chief significance then was the assertion of evolution as an actual process in time; but with this admission the subtle yet questionable Darwinian theory tended to gain acceptance, and to modify the currents of thought in the Hegelian school. From that time onwards the movement has been divided. With great scorn, and with keen critical power, Dr. Stirling repudiates Darwin as a mere charlatan in metaphysics and even in science. While not inclined, any more than his colleagues, to deny the fact of evolution as a time process, Dr. Stirling refuses to consider it a significant fact, and brands the hypothesis of struggle for existence, the assumed cause of evolutionary progress, as inconsistent with the evidence and speculatively absurd. As often as a union of Darwinism with Hegelianism is proposed, Dr. Stirling forbids the banns. The same attitude is powerfully presented—without the element of personal attack on Darwin—in Mr. George Sandeman's *Problems of Biology*. On the other hand, Professor Alexander's *Moral Order and Progress* represents pretty much the transition from Green to naturalistic evolutionism; while Professor Ritchie's *Darwin and Hegel* stands for the pure neutral synthesis—Hegel the idealistic truth of Darwinism, Darwin the palpable realistic verification of Hegel, struggle for existence a formula to be maintained and enforced at all hazards. Green's sympathies

¹ In 1875-76 the attitude of agreement was recent if not absolutely new.

were rather with the conservative wing. Green is an apologist. He finds the naturalistic account of the origin of thought and of the moral consciousness fatal to philosophy and pernicious to morality. His *credenda* may be few in number, but he is earnest in maintaining a *credo*. If, on the other hand, the "Darwin and Hegel" programme is to be taken seriously,¹ there seems nothing left to fight for; the origin of thought and of conscience not only *may* but *must* be explored along the lines of naturalism. The effect of Green's position in his own case was to make him assert an absolute break between mind and sense. He does not insist on placing the break between man and the animal world; mind might conceivably appear lower down the scale; but, wherever mind first appeared, the decisive break appeared. Green would not know how to defend thought or morality upon any other terms. That may seem a hard saying, yet to a large extent we must concur. Unless *the origin of conscious mind out of non-conscious elements is strictly inconceivable and absurd*, Transcendentalism is a scholastic curiosity, of no practical moment.

Another point where we may expect to trace influences from the new sympathy with naturalism is in the doctrine of the will taught by those of the Hegelian tendency. As a whole, the school deny Free Will in the "vulgar" sense, while asserting it in a shadowy sense of their own. But the more closely they enter into alliance with naturalism, the more likely they are

¹ Similarly, in regard to an earlier phase of naturalism, Professor A. Seth's early *Development from Kant to Hegel* taught that "the whole psychology of the associationists" might be accepted (p. 9).

to become frankly and "hardly" determinist. It is noteworthy, as already remarked, that even T. H. Green's philosophy represents a great stride towards the formal denial of Free Will. Yet Green, while decidedly accepting the facts of evolution, and regarding them as valuable philosophically, was not affected by the movement in favour of belief in natural selection; and as a man he was peculiar for his depth of moral passion. It was his assertion of Kantianism in a positive sense that brought with it the assertion of unbroken universal causation, as absolute and final truth. If to these motives there are added the crowd of scientific prejudgments which support naturalistic evolutionism, it is doubtful how long the British Hegelian school will be able in any sense to champion Freedom.

Another great name in the British Hegelian movement is that of Mr. F. H. Bradley. He might be ranked as a fourth founder; for chronologically *Ethical Studies* stands early [1876], and in it, as we have already observed, Mr. Bradley occupies the characteristic position of Hegelianised Kantianism. We see in that early book an apologetic zeal almost like Green's in denouncing naturalistic schemes of ethics, though the author also—in conformity with Hegel's leading—calls us to a religious region lying out beyond morality, where imputation ceases; this being presented as a philosophical interpretation of the Christian doctrine of Justification by Faith. But, in view of his subsequent developments, Mr. Bradley belongs to the later phases of British Hegelianism even more characteristically than to the earlier. He has refused to reprint his

Ethical Studies, although he has told us somewhat lately that he still agrees in the main with its views. The basis of Hegel's system, the *Logic*, receives no formal judgment in it. When Mr. Bradley published a *Logic* in 1883, it appeared to some readers notably unHegelian. It did not try to elucidate one great movement of thought, such as Hegel dealt with. It seemed almost more akin to psychology than to metaphysics. Any movement by which mind was impelled from one point to another ranked as logical; and the metaphysically bewildering positions which Hegel implied, and which became all the more prominent when we approached him by the way of Kant's Critique, had been discarded. Common-sense had reasserted itself. Experience was again the lawgiver to thought. The repudiation of the belief that reality is a "ballet of bloodless categories" gave welcome expression to the thoughts or instincts of many minds. The idealist tradition continued unbroken upon one line only—some will call it the most important; some may even regard it as the only line of importance. Mr. Bradley's *Logic* still taught us to see in predication a defining of Reality.¹ In a later and more formal study of *Appearance and Reality*, Mr. Bradley ceased to be in any true sense Hegelian. He still makes an appeal to contradiction—still sees it everywhere—still finds it pointing us onward from "appearance" to "reality"; but the various appearances, or the metaphysical impulses which they initiate, are rays converging upon the Real as their centre; they are not a twisted chain, as with Hegel, whose every link grows out of the last and passes again into its successor.

¹ Below, end of next chapter.

And the character peculiar to Mr. Bradley's Real is not defined idealistically as "thought"; it is called *experience*, and contains all the experiences of "finite" appearances in some "transformed" fashion. The change may be welcome to apologists; but we have to recognise that nothing of the apologist survives in Mr. Bradley's more recent cast of thought. Now that he has spoken out fully, we cannot charge him with sharing Hegel's superhuman arrogance or pride of human intellect; but it is not easy to acquit him of resembling Hegel in the inhuman coldness with which all themes are handled.

The doctrine of *degrees* of reality, allotted to the various appearances, presents itself as the last word in a long evolution of thought. The graduation of categories, which Professor Pringle-Pattison and others have praised, is now given a definite ontological interpretation. So far as I am aware, Hegel gives no clear warrant for this development of his views. Indeed, it is hard to extract from Hegel any plain definitions of the Real; the "Being, Nothing" paradox at its start infects the whole of his system. Mr. Bradley's doctrine may be true; it certainly is obscure and difficult to grasp. "To be or not to be—that is the question," exclaims, with no trace of Hamlet's subtlety, a bewildered common sense. "Yes and No," says Hegel; "that is the answer; no other is possible: Yes, and also, No." "I cannot entirely agree," says Mr. Bradley; "but I will give you the correct answer—More or less." Truly, it is a hard saying. There are things which will not graduate or quantify.¹ The "either—or

¹ A brilliant and erratic Edinburgh theological professor, with a mercilessly categorical mind—always at high noon, in a blaze of

of the ordinary consciousness" has some poor rights; as the French say, a door *must* be open or shut. A doctrine like Lotze's stands in a more favourable position. According to it, everything that exists feels, while some existences not only feel but think; and in proportion to the degree of feeling—if we like to say so—is the degree of reality. The unexplained affirmation of degrees, in a literal sense, on purely logical or metaphysical grounds, is far more bewildering.

A special and additional difficulty arises out of Mr. Bradley's doctrine of the nature of the absolute reality. He has a definite doctrine to lay before us; and he affirms that finite "appearances" have no share at all in the nature of absolute and infinite "reality." It is a strange background for the doctrine of degrees of reality; and Mr. Bradley's reasoning in proof of the latter doctrine is not less strange. Every appearance must have *some* degree of reality, since we find ourselves constrained to tabulate appearances, and to rank some *nearer the real than others*. How would this reasoning show in a commoner application? One has to mark examination papers: 300 marks are total; 100 are a pass; less than 100 imply a failure. It rarely or never happens that a student gets no marks at all; in a bad case he gets about 50; a more ordinary failure means 70 or 80 or 90. A tie or bracket is rare; triplets are practically unknown. Would Mr. Bradley permit men who had scored 50 to 90 marks to say that they had *all passed in different degrees*, since each of them stood definitely nearer the standard than others, or

unclouded sun—used to tell how he had asked a boatman, "Is not one of your oars longer than the other?" and received the reply, "*Oh, middling!*"

definitely further from it? I fear it would be necessary to adhere to one's original opinion, that none of them had passed at all. The application of the parable is easy. If the absolute reality is unknowable, it does not seem feasible to affirm that the known "appearance" possesses any degree of reality. But conversely, if the finite "appearance" enjoys a certain degree of reality as an *appearance* of the Real, it seems audacious to declare that the absolute is "not personal, nor is it moral, nor is it beautiful or true."¹ We do not quote these words as summing up fairly the whole of Mr. Bradley's brilliant if difficult book. They represent, however, an important turning-point, and they embody some singularly momentous conclusions. And they seem to be supported by half of Mr. Bradley's mind, while opposed by the other half.

Once again; Mr. Bradley not only formulates a doctrine of degrees, but appeals for confirmation to his own reading of arithmetic. He may further tell us, if he likes, that according to his belief, less than 50 per cent. of the Absolute is revealed in any phenomenon or in the totality of phenomena. (Hegel of course may be said to hold that 100 per cent. is revealed.) Accepting this arithmetical language, while protesting that it is not really relevant, we should have to maintain that more than 50 per cent. is revealed—or, in theological language, that the Divine image in man, and especially in the Son of man, constitutes a relation to God more

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 533. The immediate context goes on to speak of the danger of "worse mistakes." "... It is better to affirm personality than to call the absolute impersonal." But the absolute is *neuter*. "*It is superpersonal*," says Mr. Bradley. Such a subject effectually cancels such a predicate.

real and more potent than the separation between creature and creator, finite and infinite. Or some might try even a bolder argument. Bishop Butler has urged the claims not merely of probability but of improbable though possible risks; and it might be contended that inadequate and even false conceptions of God are less deceptive than the blank negations of Agnosticism. If you affirm the existence of the Absolute, and decline to call him good, you practically force yourself to think of him as lower than man—who is good or at least capable of goodness. Adequate or inadequate, *our* highest *must* serve as our clue in construing the nature of the highest of all. If we do not assert the presence in God of what we hold most sacred, then we implicitly deny to Him all that is sacred and worthy.

The third part of this chapter connects itself with the name of Professor Andrew Seth. Following up his extraordinarily brilliant student work upon Hegelian lines, he appeared as joint editor with Mr. R. B. Haldane of a volume of *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, published in 1883, inscribed to the memory of Green, and introduced in a preface by Dr. Edward Caird. In some respects this book records the high-water mark of the Hegelian tide, at least in Scotland. It was essentially a manifesto from Edinburgh and Glasgow Universities. While several contributors had passed on to Oxford or Cambridge, only one contributor—Mr. Bosanquet—was neither a Scotsman nor a Scottish student. We may say, therefore, that in 1883 "Hegelianism" held the field, not merely in a university which, like Glasgow, was dominated by the influence

of a teacher devoted to the study of Hegel, but even in Edinburgh, where the infection was received from books and not from men. It is not, of course, claimed that these *Essays* were the masterpiece of the movement, though they are well worth reading still, as stating its principles upon many different sides. But they were noteworthy when published as being the first-fruits of men who plainly were destined to attain distinction, and from whose influence much might be hoped.

Some of these writers still maintain or carry to fresh issues the principles which they then expounded. But the editors are not found among these. Mr. Haldane has given himself up to politics and law; and—what is more startling—Mr. Seth has become a confessed and resolute critic of Hegelianism. If the advance of the school seemed in 1883 all-victorious, we must reckon 1887, the year of Mr. Seth's second Balfour Lectures, which treat of *Hegelianism and Personality*, as not less memorable for a severe check to the Hegelian influence.

It must be confessed that the course of Dr. Seth's criticisms suggests difficulties even to those most grateful for a protest on behalf of God, Freedom, and Immortality. Professor Seth does not believe¹ that there is absolute antagonism between his new views and his old, although he grants that, in the essay on *Philosophy as Criticism of Categories*,² he "did not sufficiently recognise the necessary limitations" of the view which he was advocating. Not a few readers will consider that this statement is below the mark. Indeed,

¹ *Hegelianism and Personality*, 2nd ed., p. 21, footnote.

² In the *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*.

even in the later book, as one runs smoothly on from p. 18 to p. 20, nothing occurs to prepare one for the statement contained in the footnote on p. 21, that "the foregoing account of Idealism made consistent is not intended for a statement of" Dr. Seth's "own position." Whatever the historical genesis of the footnote, it reads like an after-thought, and strikes upon the mind with a shock of surprise. In his earlier writings, particularly in his Hibbert Essay on the *Development from Kant to Hegel*, Mr. Seth had given a singularly lucid and persuasive account of the new path to Hegel *via* Kant, while no doubt the difficulties of Idealism were present there as elsewhere. What was to be understood¹ by "the necessary reference of all existence to self-consciousness"? The phrase is vague enough to cover half a dozen interpretations. Again, we are told² that "the idea of God" may be "His real existence"; while pp. 76, 77 amount to a repudiation of the orthodox gloss upon Hegel, vouched for even by Dr. Stirling, which insists that "thought implies a thinker," and so marches straight on to Theism. Only in regard to the validity of the moral consciousness does the *Development from Kant to Hegel* forestall the firm criticisms found in the later work. But no passage of Mr. Seth's earlier teaching is more striking than the passage quoted upon p. 20 of *Hegelianism and Personality* from *Philosophy as Criticism of Categories*. "So far is it from being a figure of speech that the self exists only through the world and the world through the self, that we might say with equal truth the self *is* the world and the world is the self. The self and the world are only two sides of the same reality; they are

¹ P. 50.

² P. 123.

the same intelligible world looked at from two opposite points of view."

These earlier persuasive statements of Idealism are now repeated as being epistemologically true, but ontologically, it would appear, they are now considered false and even absurd. What we necessarily think, in the process of knowledge, is that the world is the *alter ego* of the self. In Kant's terms, "the understanding makes nature." There is great difficulty in such a position, and, conceivably enough, the sense in which idealism is accepted in these pages may be thought to evade some of the deeper ontological questions involved. But is it not stranger still to *dismiss* positions which thought necessarily assumes in the process of knowledge as being true only in some technical sense, while not true "ontologically"—in reality—of reality? That view puts a great strain upon the conception of "epistemology." Professor Seth indeed offers additional explanation and justification of his new position. He tells us that the Transcendental self is simply generic—a class name. Surely this teaching is a relapse into hard realism, and an abandonment of Idealism in any genuine or proper sense. Knowledge is not a process which goes on similarly in a number of different individuals, with results that may be compared and generalised. Knowledge is one. It is the reference of things to an objective centre. The relativity of knowledge is not at all more remarkable than its absolute-ness. What was true once is always true. When you and I know the same thing, we do not simply pass through psychologically similar experiences. We know the same thing, or neither of us knows reality at all; we know the same thing, or we can have no fellowship

in knowledge. In fact, it is difficult to see how knowledge should be possible if "the individual alone is the real."¹ Conversely, if Dr. Seth's epistemology holds good, it seems different to separate it from the ontological conclusion, that in knowledge—so far as attained—individual man is identified with the Absolute.

Professor Seth's lectures have been ably replied to, more than once or twice, by more than one or two writers, and in more than one or two senses. We mention four replies—by Mr. Fairbrother, Mr. McTaggart, Professor Ritchie, and Professor Henry Jones.

Dr. Seth's criticisms were directed as much against Green as against Hegel. For Green, as we have remarked, gives the most explicit development in the English language of Idealism, as an all-inclusive philosophy and a source of guidance. Though he was separated from Hegel by characteristic differences, he defended many of Hegel's positions, and did so from that Kantian basis which is most likely to serve as a rallying ground to Englishmen. Mr. Fairbrother's clear and able little book upon Green devotes a good deal of attention to repelling Professor Seth's attacks. It is successfully shown that Green was a Theist, and that Theism was a vital part of Idealism as Green conceived it. Accordingly, Mr. Seth's criticisms on this point do not hold good in regard to Green's personal belief—but it is still possible to contend that they hold good of Hegel, or even of the natural issue of much of Green's thinking. But some of Mr. Fairbrother's explanations or concessions bewilder us, especially when he assures us that Transcendentalism is simply

¹ P. 135

an analysis of the given fact of human knowledge. If that be so, the praise and the blame bestowed upon Green alike rest upon misconception. He was not the daring speculator we supposed. He was hardly a philosopher at all, but one more plodding analyst of the "facts of consciousness." Unless knowledge is a fact supremely unlike other facts, Idealism is gratuitous folly. If knowledge is what Idealism believes it to be, then the study of knowledge, so far as we can carry it, may be expected to teach us not only what things *are*, but what they *must* be—as in the elementary proposition that $2 + 2$ not only do but must make 4. The present writer at any rate continues to believe that Green was an idealist and a philosopher.

To dispose of Mr. Seth's criticisms upon Green by means of explanations in favour of common sense, might seem bold enough. What shall we say of the courage that proposed the same vindication in the case of Hegel? This has been shown in Mr. McTaggart's *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, a book which introduces us to another singularly lucid expounder of the crabbed wisdom of the Master. Severe criticism is passed by Professor Seth—as by others—upon the transition from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature. But Mr. McTaggart argues that upon a fair interpretation, not even there, and certainly nowhere else, does Hegel try to prove real existence from mere thought. He does not seem to have been struck with that frequent "snort," to which Professor Seth calls attention, in which Hegel expresses his contempt for "mere" existence—as a *thought*, but of a *very low type*. Mr. McTaggart also takes that view of Hegel's idealism which identifies it definitely in ultimate

analysis with the proposition that *Nothing but thinkers exists*. I should certainly have thought that this could not have passed for the whole or the governing motive of Hegel's idealism. When thrown to the front, it seems to suggest an idealism of too "subjective" a type. In some sense, the *Logic* seems to imply that thought, and nothing but thought, exists. In some sense, the *Philosophy of Nature* seems to affirm the existence of a reality which is not a thinker, or a collection of thinkers, though it is reality for thought. Mr. M'Taggart, like Mr. Bradley, may be said to take one clear line through Hegel. Both, in different fashions, confine truth to the highest stage, and treat lower stages as transitory and evanescent. On this view the *Logic* treats reality as a system, *not* because its successive stages together constitute a system, *but* because the thought of a system constitutes the highest term reached. So again, the *Notion* or the *Philosophy of Spirit* stands highest—therefore, says Mr. M'Taggart, spirits are real for Hegel, and everything else is merely subjective phenomenon. Mr. Seth's view of philosophy as criticism of categories, at least in the form in which he now maintains it, develops unambiguously another of Hegel's suggestions. Every category has its legitimate application. Every one is right in its own place. "Criticism of categories" thus becomes a peaceable, and no doubt useful, delimitation of frontiers. In Hegel's *Logic*, as revised by Professor Seth, the categories lie comfortably alongside each other like compartments in a jewel-box. In Mr. M'Taggart's revision, on the other hand, the higher category swallows its predecessors, until the highest swallows all the rest. The bewildering truth is that Hegel

holds to both alternatives. It is doubtful whether we can reasonably be asked to tolerate his "Yes and No." Mere human minds, which try to take a clear line through the Master's tangled utterances, generally have to cut away one-half. And they are very probably wise in doing so; but they are hardly entitled to say that Hegel did the same. Again, with Mr. M'Taggart (as with Mr. Bradley too!), thought is dependent upon experience for data. Thought is a relating activity pure and simple. I should certainly have held that thought with Hegel was both a distinguishing and a relating activity; and in this sense at least created its content, namely, by creating those distinctions which it holds together. Even in the *Logic*, which Mr. M'Taggart has done so much to elucidate, one must take his main point with a qualification. *If you say that anything is, you imply, upon adequately stringent analysis, that it belongs to an absolute system of perfect determination.* What is unHegelian here is a certain emphasis in saying that *anything is*. For, in Hegel's judgment, when you say that, you say nothing at all; you might as well say that it is *not*. Probably this is part of the alloy of paradox in Hegel, and not part of his virgin ore. Yet out of this feature the dialectic method—Hegel's grand means of verification and principle of advance—develops itself; and the dialectic is Mr. M'Taggart's favourite aspect of the Master. Once again Mr. M'Taggart seems credible in his beliefs, but mistaken in imputing them to Hegel. Further differences arise in regard to immortality and in regard to the origin of evil. Mr. M'Taggart feels a living interest in the hope of personal immortality; we see no clear trace of

that in Hegel. Mr. M'Taggart gives up the origin of evil as a mystery; Hegel does not believe in any mystery which his logic cannot penetrate, least of all in this mystery. One difference is admitted. While Hegel finds a key to all difficulties in the purely intellectual idea of system, Mr. M'Taggart in defining reality falls back upon the psychological trichotomy of intellect *plus* feeling *plus* will. Finally, he tells us—in opposition to general British opinion from Dr. Stirling downwards, and particularly in opposition to Mr. Seth—that Hegel's greatness lies *not* in the applications of his principle, *but* in the "Dialectic." He tries, however, to show that the Dialectic rarely—indeed, only at the very first—implies progress absolutely by antagonism. In other words, the value of the Dialectic, or of Hegel's philosophy, is held by Mr. M'Taggart to consist not in any general principle, but in the detailed analysis of category after category. (This, once more, is *half* of Hegel's perplexingly complex position.) Accordingly, Mr. M'Taggart's book affords little material for judging of the value of Hegelianism as newly interpreted. Several articles contributed to *Mind* since 1896, and not yet reprinted in book form, furnish interesting and suggestive discussions on particular points—explaining Hegel, correcting his logic in detail, and endeavouring to show that the Dialectic wears a less and less paradoxical aspect as it advances. One can hardly doubt that much of this careful and ingenious work will be found permanently valuable. Still, it seems as if the commentator and interpreter discredited the Dialectic *in principle*. If paradox is an unworthy thing, how can it come in at all? If there is a flaw at the

foundation, does it not render the whole superstructure unsafe? One holding these views is not likely to rescue more than an occasional piece of salvage out of Hegel's thoughts. Last of all we may mention still another suggestive contrast. Dr. John Caird greatly offended common sense by calling upon us to "think" this or that object. Mr. M'Taggart always "thinks of" reality.¹

The third reply to be noted—that of Professor Ritchie—is significant for our present purpose, as representing—clearly, vivaciously, decisively—the central currents of the British Hegelian movement. He states² the main position of the Kant-cum-Hegel doctrine in the following italicised sentences: "*If knowledge be altogether dependent on sensation, knowledge is impossible. But knowledge is possible because the sciences exist. Therefore knowledge is not altogether dependent on sensation.*" This is very suggestive; but is it adequate to the idealist doctrine to speak as if knowledge were *partly* dependent upon sensations in contrast with thought? What ontological meaning does the position bear? It will be unfortunate if the controversy with naturalism should collapse into a mere scholastic technicality; and that danger is brought appreciably nearer by Professor Ritchie's enthusiasm for Darwinism. Mr. Ritchie is perhaps bolder, and probably more representative, when he writes,³ "we"—idealists—"are quite as

¹ For a notice of some parts of Mr. M'Taggart's later *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*—the use of the expression "cosmology" as applying to all realities is peculiarly Mr. M'Taggart's own—see Chaps. XV. and XVI.

² *Darwin and Hegel*, p. 10.

³ *Ibid.* p. 105.

ready to talk of 'thought conforming to reality' as we are to talk of sunset and sunrise, although in both cases we have accepted the 'Copernican' theory."¹ Though he accepts as satisfactory one or two corrections made in the 2nd edition of *Hegelianism and Personality*, I do not apprehend that Professor Ritchie considers all of Dr. Seth's positions worthy of approval, or even compatible with one another.

The last reply to be quoted is that of Professor Henry Jones. In the course of some articles in *Mind*, and again in his valuable though very hostile examination of *The Philosophy of Lotze: the Doctrine of Thought*, he affirms as the genuine position of himself and his friends, that "*Reality determines Thought*." These words—italicised by Professor Jones—are in flat contradiction to Professor Ritchie's "Copernicanism"; and indeed, I take it, involve a deliberate repudiation of Idealism. Both Hegel and the British Hegelians—e.g. Green—have (in different ways) verified by an analysis of the nature of thought the correspondence between thought and things; and both of these idealist pleas—the "Notion" or the "Dialectic" in the case of Hegel, the constructive reading of Kant's Critique in the case of Green and others—have staked everything upon the principle that *the understanding makes nature*, or that *thought creates reality*, or that *we find necessity in all things, and necessity exists only for*

¹ Kant compared his revolutionary change of the point of view in philosophy with the astronomical revolution of Copernicus. It was finely said by Professor Seth in his early *Development*, etc., that the parallel had more justice than Kant supposed, since, when we take idealism in a positive and constructive sense, we perceive thought to be the true objective centre of reality, not a dependent planet or a phenomenon of individual minds.

thought. Professor Seth may at least pride himself on having secured this pointed recantation of Idealism from a distinguished fighter in the Hegelian ranks. It is true that Professor Jones does seem conscious of having withdrawn or even modified any assertions. It is further true that—like Mr. Bradley—he continues the idealist tradition so far as to hold that Logic deals with or defines reality, and does not merely compare thoughts. Further, he makes a gentle protest against Mr. Bradley's unidealistic doctrine, that in external perception the mind comes *in a peculiar sense* in contact with reality. A logical doctrine, the nature of the copula, worked out by Mr. Bosanquet and implied by Dr. E. Caird, is regarded as giving a deductive clue to the nature of religion.¹ Still, if the true truth is that reality determines thought, Professor Jones' philosophy is not idealistic, even if it be an outgrowth of idealism.

The British Hegelian movement—if we may once again use that questionable title—took its rise in Dr. Stirling, and has kindled a flame of thought in many acute and able minds. By degrees it has secured for itself prophets who are masters of literary clearness and utterance—possibly to the damage of its original burden of obscure but weighty thoughts—certainly to the comfort of the reader. All through, the leading minds have hesitated to pledge themselves to Hegel; but, all through, they have sharply resented criticisms directed against any part of Hegel's teaching. The

¹ Footnote on p. 389. It is very Hegelian, on the strength of a purely logical doctrine—from contemplation, not of a "little flower," but of a little copula—to make the claim, "*I know* what God and man is."

formal value of the Dialectic might have seemed to find no defender—though probably Dr. E. Caird implies its truth—when Mr. McTaggart arises, and with whatever novelties of interpretation, singles it out for special praise. He and others have done their best to pare away the more obvious excrescences. Whether they have succeeded or not—and whether or not, if successful, they have lopped off living branches—at any rate the effort is significant. And perhaps more significant still is the appearance of works by men who learned their philosophy from Hegel, but who are now breaking fresh ground. For many years a characteristic literary product of the movement was the commentary in which an author was proved—in contradiction perhaps to his own formulated belief—an unconscious prophecy of Hegelianism. This has been done by Dr. E. Caird not only for Kant, in whose case there are special reasons justifying the identification, but for so different a writer as Comte; by Dr. C. M. Douglas, M.P., for the ethical writings of J. S. Mill; and by Professor Jones¹ for Browning. Valuable as these books are from their contents, their method tends to become an artificial mannerism. It was well that the fashion should change. Though we probably have among us no writer who is worthy to wear the mantle of Kant or Hegel, still we are emerging from an age of commentaries and epigonism when we have such books produced as Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, or Professor Royce's *World and the Individual*.

¹ Professor Jones' *Lotze*, on the other hand, is frankly hostile, and in no sense a sympathetic self-criticism of Lotze in the light of his own principles, unless the *reductio ad absurdum* is a form of sympathy.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HEGELIAN LOGIC

LITERATURE.—*A.* The lesser *Logic* is translated with prolegomena by Dr. W. Wallace, 1st ed., 1874; 2nd ed., 1892. Portions of the greater *Logic* are rendered and expounded in Dr. Stirling's *Secret of Hegel*, 1st ed., 1865; 2nd ed., 1897; and it is summarised in Dr. Harris's *Hegel's Logic*.

B. The *Phenomenology* runs parallel with the whole of Hegel's later writings.

C. Dr. Caird's *Kant* and Mr. M'Taggart's *Hegelian Dialectic* deal with questions of principle. Mr. Bradley's and Mr. Bosanquet's *Logics* are the work of men who have learned much from Hegel, but who are anxious to push farther on. Dr. Baillie's *Hegelian Logic* gives a most useful account of its genesis, and adds some criticism.

It is one of the peculiarities of Hegel that the same discussion passes muster as logical and as metaphysical. From the point of view of Idealism, the identification is obvious enough. Logic tells us how we must think of things; metaphysics tell us how things must be; and, whatever else Idealism involves, it involves a belief that necessary principles of thought are true in point of fact. We may even find it harder to recognise in Hegel's work the analogies to other men's logics than the analogies to other men's metaphysics. Certainly one approaching Hegel's treatise

Logic in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is the binding link; but that path is difficult and obscure. Can we explain matters in any simpler way? What is logic? And what is syllogistic logic?

Syllogism is the logic of argument; the merit which it seeks to secure is self-consistency. But argument is not the highest or healthiest exercise of the human mind. It is a kind of prize ring. If you modify your premises—and the best or only use of argument to a wise man is to help him to modify his premises—you fall under suspicion of “shifting ground,” and so breaking the laws of the logical prize ring. Or at least you suffer a rhetorical defeat. You cannot therefore afford, in arguing for victory, to become wiser than your former self. Syllogism gives an unreal fixity to the merely provisional utterances of fallible minds.

In spite of this defect, logicians have generalised the principles of the syllogistic prize ring under the high-sounding name of *Laws of Thought*. Here we come nearer to Hegel's point of view. He also is investigating the “laws of thought as thought.” But he differs from formal Logic in refusing to believe that the one concern and interest of thought is self-consistency. That is the one principle of argument, for argument cannot go on in its absence. Certain fixed points must be granted on both sides, and whatever either side affirms it must continue to affirm; or debate will be fruitless. But there is no such fixity in healthy unpolemical human thought. Its rule is to modify,

revise, approximate—to be tireless in the search for perfect accuracy and absolute truth. Self-consistency would be a sufficient rule only if premises were infallibly true, and if all premises were given exhaustively. Yet the maxim is evidently made for a being who gets his experience (apparently) in distinct scraps, and has to bring his thoughts together. It has no meaning for “thought as thought.” As long as pedants maintain this logical ideal, the Philistinism of the practical man will flourish in their despite. He will still go to experience for abundant living detail, careless whether or not he can piece it together; and on the whole he will be right in doing so.

There is another reason why we must maintain that self-consistency is not the whole ideal of thought. We have spoken of a man’s correcting his statement of principles as a result of argument. But even where that does not fall to be done, our knowledge grows when we learn how a principle is embodied in its details, and when we consciously regard the details as instances of a principle. If we do not secure the absence of contradiction, we secure the presence of combination. And thus knowledge becomes more coherent, or, in Hegel’s words, more “concrete.” Hegel protests against the view that concreteness is peculiar to sense, or, strictly speaking, is found in sense at all. Many-sided coherence is the mark of thought; “abstract”—i.e. one-sided—thought is vicious, if it be anything more than a passing stage towards a fully conscious grasp of the many-sided coherence of reality. The true movement of thought is not from discord to self-consistency, but from vagueness to definiteness—from a vague generality to a general known and

grasped in its applications [Hegel says, in *all possible applications*—from a vague particularity to a particular *placed* in the system of thought-mirroring reality.

The same rule—"from vagueness to definiteness"—can be verified in regard to *perception*. Accordingly, the rule helps us to claim perception as a process of thought—not a process of sense anterior to thought, as vulgar opinion makes it. Ordinary opinion regards sense-experience as a series of disconnected or arbitrarily connected fragments. Our knowledge is of $A+B+C+$. . . There is no relation between the different terms; relation is a human fiction. Or, if relation exists objectively, we learn it from the behaviour of the terms themselves, wholly *a posteriori*. It may exist or may not—terms do not imply relations nor relations terms. Even sense-perception, however, verifies the rule, *From vagueness to definiteness*. No perception is entirely new. Each is a fresh instance of what our past intellectual life has consisted in. Wholly new experience would be impossible experience; it would rend the unity of consciousness. We have always before us our half-vague, half-defined picture of the universe. New experience is not so much a new stock of material as a new touch of shading in a plan or a picture already constructed. As Sir Joshua Reynolds claimed that it took him "thirty years" to paint a picture, so we take all our years to apprehend the last fragment of conscious experience *as we apprehend it*.

The logic of consistency, when transferred from syllogism and applied to nature, becomes a logic of classification. Ancient science worked with this logic

and thus took the necessary first steps towards the knowledge of nature. Science begins in classification. We put things together which are alike; if they are not altogether alike, we inquire how far they agree; and we put those closest in which the resemblance is greatest. Now the significant thing here is, that nature submits to classifying. In a random world, were such a thing possible, it would be useless to classify objects. Our class names would carry no coherent connotation with them, and we should lose our labour, as if we were children classifying flowers by their colours. The shallow conceptualist solution of the Realist problem of the Middle Ages leaves out of sight the only fact of significance, namely, that it is worth while to group things under general names, since in *rerum natura* they exhibit general characters. Science knows of natural as well as of artificial classes. There are natural classes in thought, because there are classes of things—genera—universals—in nature around. Thus even the logic of classification implies that nature is an embodiment of thought. The very possibility of classifying—and still more its *usefulness*, wherever a distinct mass of general assertions is true of a defined group of phenomena—implies that our world is ruled not by chance but by reason. One might even ask whether, as we rise in a genuinely scientific or natural classification, our more and more general assertions do not also become more and more true.

We have spoken of the grouping of phenomena; but, once more, classification itself carries us beyond phenomena to things or substances or “permanent possibilities” of phenomenal manifestation. But there the logic of classification stops short. Behind the

veil of changing qualities it indicates the permanent thing or substance—recites its likeness or unlikeness, as manifested in its phenomena, to other things or substances—and then is done. A great positive step in advance is made by inductive logic, best stated on the pages of J. S. Mill. The main emphasis now falls, not upon substances, but upon causes. Still it is an entire error—though Mill himself was seduced into it by his bad metaphysics—to suppose that you can study causes without referring them to permanent substances. The world which science investigates is no flickering phantasmagoria of bodiless appearances. It includes, on Mill's own showing, "kinds" and "the great permanent natural causes"—in fact, it is a world of substances. But instead of *qualities* we now say *causes*. An acid, *e.g.*, is defined in chemistry by three marks—(1) It has a sour taste, (2) it reddens blue litmus paper, (3) it combines with a base to form a neutral salt. The first quality arises in a relation to human sensibility; the other two have to do with relations to other substances. If a quality is not a relation, at least quality is only known or knowable *in relation* to other things. "In itself" it is or can be nothing at all. Plainly, it is only a matter of phraseology whether we call sourness a quality of an acid, habitually latent but coming into exercise when it encounters a palate—or whether we say that the acid (given necessary conditions) *causes* a sensation of sourness. Studying from the point of view of cause, we leave the *hortus siccus* of classification for a living world of orderly changes. We see the changeless substances of classification melting away into the ordered changes of the universe. There is only one substance in ultimate analysis—the world

itself, with its unalterable sum of matter and of force. Things or substances round which we draw a line by "abstraction"—to which we give a name of their own—are but the provisional local representatives of the universe. In chemistry, perhaps, we see most distinctly the transition from the apparently solitary and self-centred substance to the living world of causal processes—permanent in its regularity. Each substance seems complete in itself, but it turns out you can say nothing about it except you put it in relation to others. Substance, causality, reciprocity—these are the thoughts vindicated and defined by Kant—these are the thoughts defined and explained by Mill. Mill's logic implies a better metaphysic than his own. It articulates into the constructive portion of Kant's idealism.

We have spoken in our own fashion of the defects of the syllogistic logic; Hegel's criticism is naturally bolder. Not content with dethroning platitude, he installs paradox in its place. His views upon two or three points of the old school logic may be mentioned in passing.

His lesser *Logic* contains an examination of the alleged Laws of Thought as follows:—(1) He treats the Law of Identity and Law of Contradiction as synonymous. At the same time he declares the logic which works by these laws a barren logic of the understanding, and charges it with treating distinctions as given elements of reality, instead of merging them in a higher unity. (2) He identifies the Law of Excluded Middle with an application of Leibniz's Principle of Difference, according to which no two things can be exactly alike. The abstract understanding thinks it does justice to that view

when it asks, "This — or not this?" Really, says Hegel, the idea of unqualified *difference* is a parallel abstraction to the idea of bare tautological *identity*. (3) The synthesis of identity and difference is said to be found in "the ground," which is equivalent to Leibniz's "Law of Sufficient Reason," and points us not to abstract identity or endless unlikeness, but to the higher truth of a principle developing into a system of mutually involved and related elements. The discussion is characteristically suggestive and characteristically obscure.

It is also noteworthy that Hegel repudiates the very form of the judgment or proposition round which Logic is built up. As the substance in nature is a merely provisional representative of the universe, so the subject in predication is "abstractly" separated from the whole of things to which it belongs. Thus the proposition is an inadequate formula; and Hegel always permits himself to substitute "false" for "inadequate"; he therefore calls the proposition false. Or its true speculative type is found, he tells us, in such a proposition as "the real is the rational." Plainly this alleged higher type is a sort of equation, or a universal proposition with quantified and universal predicate—Thompson's *U*; "All A is all B." Dr. E. Caird regards quantification of the predicate as a stage in the rapid descent by which formal logic passes from implied to explicit tautology and equivalence. If Hegel approves one of its phases, we may be sure it is not as an equation that the "speculative proposition" pleases him. What he loves is the element of difference; and he finds that in the peculiar kick or plunge which the unexpected quantification—the second "all" or the

second "the"—inflicts upon the reader. The proposition *bucks*; we do not know which is its head or which is its tail. Considered as a proposition, it is not one proposition (or attribution), but two. Hegel values it as the break-up or the break-down of the inadequate propositional form which misses the speculative truth of things. In a proposition, the subject masquerades as a fixed and definite magnitude. When the predicate is quantified, the predicate becomes a sort of second subject, and tries to turn the original subject into a predicate. Thus justice is done according to Hegel to the fuller Reality. It is well to recognise the limitations of the propositional form. "Speech," said Carlyle, "is linear; character is solid." We might generalise the remark, and say, Propositional thinking is linear; reality is solid. But is Hegel right in holding that progress involves the pulverising of the imperfect implements with which our thought works—ay, and has to work?

Again, Hegel confronts the ordinary placid logic of self-consistency with his dialectic, alleging the latter to be the law governing every movement of thought. Mr. M'Taggart insists that when the dialectic is called objective, this need not mean that any superhuman mind, nor yet that any impersonal and Pantheistic unity of thought, passes in historical succession through the phases which the Logic records. Mr. M'Taggart goes further. He suggests that the *Logic* describes the path only of human thought—thought which has to "tack"¹—not of [Divine?] thought, which marches straight to its goal. Or it describes what the process *seems* as we pass through it; not what it *is*, and shows

¹ *Studies*, p. 146.

itself on retrospect. The present writer is more and more inclined to favour such a distinction in its former reading, if the distinction can be well established, and not merely assumed upon principles of scepticism by asserting "relativity of [human] knowledge." Hegel, however, will not sympathise with this. "The man," he says, "who speaks of the *merely* finite, of *merely* human reason, and of the limits to mere reason, lies against the spirit."¹ Hegel would call such procedure dualistic. Probably he would also apply the same fatal epithet to Mr. M'Taggart's contrast of the dialectic process with its results.

In speaking of Hegel's Logic in parallelism with other logics, we are therefore met by the Dialectic, claiming to be the true law of thought. It may indeed be questioned whether there is any general formal principle binding together the whole of Hegel's Logic. Apparently Mr. M'Taggart would hold that there is not. On that view, the authority of the Logic rests upon the detailed transitions, and any general view of the nature of the process of advance is a matter for subsequent inductive discovery. Accordingly, Mr. M'Taggart's work largely consists in interesting views of *different* ways in which a dialectic transition, as Hegel conceives it, is possible,—some ways receding as we advance, others growing prominent.² And sometimes it is optional whether the transition shall be stated in terms of contrast or of similarity. In particular, it is only at the first triad—Being, Nothing, Becoming—that we have absolute unqualified opposition. Moreover, Mr. M'Taggart in-

¹ *History of Philosophy*, tran., vol. i. p. 74.

² See his quotation from Hegel, *Dialectic*, p. 121.

be self-contradiction if no higher thought-construction asserted itself, by means of which the old opposition may be merged and transcended (to take the simplest example, Becoming is the contrast and the synthesis of Being and Nothing). Walking is said to be a perpetual falling just arrested in time. Similarly, Mr. McTaggart regards Hegel's *Logic* as perpetual self-contradiction, just converted day by day at the eleventh hour into reconciliation. Hence we are asked to believe that Hegel is less paradoxical than has been generally supposed. The correction may have some truth in it, but even Mr. McTaggart offers no relief for the first and the hardest transition of all. We suspect that, as so often, Hegel is on both the opposite sides. He does assert progress by antagonism; as we have said, contrast is taken by him as the typical form of necessary connexion, latent in all others. But at the same time he does hold that the antagonism is perpetually merged. The most abstract and violent of all thinkable oppositions is an opposition within thought, and therefore in some sense not an opposition. It is the habitual "Yes and No" under cover of which the philosopher continually evades us. "Others abide our question; thou art free." Very similar is Hegel's attitude on the broader issue. There is a general principle or general formula in the *Logic*, whether, with Jowett, we take our name for it from the earliest example, and call it "the unity of Being and Nothing," or whether, like most interpreters, we take our name from the new



group of categories added by Hegel to those of Kant, and call it "the Notion." But, on the other hand, it is perfectly true that Hegel claims to be judged on his detailed analysis of the conceptions through which we grasp reality. These seem as if they were alternative ways of enforcing or of testing the Logic; but characteristically Hegel insists upon both. He allows of no formal truth in any region unless we reach it through—or verify it in—an examination of all types of content. He does not maintain his great thesis—which, according to Mr. McTaggart, consists in the assertion that "Reality is rational and righteous"—otherwise than by examining the characteristic concepts under which we grasp the real, and by showing that every one of them passes into or involves the idea of absolute system. This makes his writings singularly instructive. He has occasion to utter remarks upon a whole encyclopædia of things. Also it makes his system burdensome and somewhat precarious. No chain is stronger than its weakest link. The chain of the Hegelian system is long; it goes three times round the universe. It will be strange if there are no weak links in it.

We now turn to the deeper aspect of Hegel's Logic: its metaphysical significance. Already, notably in the last paragraph, we have trenched upon this ground. And though Mr. McTaggart's commentary, from its great clearness, is a serviceable introduction to Hegel's meaning, it is doubtful whether he does not explain away or keep out of sight much of the central difficulty. Hegel freely allows himself such language as "all reality is Thought."¹ Upon Mr. McTaggart's own

¹ *History of Philosophy*, tran., vol. ii. p. 1.

admission, the *Logic* implies that *something exists*.¹ We should have thought it implied that *something* or *that everything necessarily exists*, and probably, too, that it *necessarily is what it is*. In any case, the Logic to Hegel is a necessary vision of reality. This is probably the central meaning and the central difficulty of his Idealism.

More simply, Hegel is defining reality. He begins with the barest possible assertion of reality (It is; it has quality; it has quantity). He passes on to the trap-laying categories of essence, which go in pairs (it is reality behind the appearances; it is a thing with qualities; it is a cause with effects; highest of all here, it is a reciprocal system). Agnosticism waits upon the categories of the first group, lamenting. But we never know pure Being! To which Hegel brusquely replies, Of course not, since Pure Being is pure Nothing. At the next stage, Agnosticism changes its ground. We meet with substances, it allows; but we only know their attributes! Or, if we are allowed to speak of reciprocity, it is urged that reciprocal determination is self-contradictory, and that thought has lost its labour. Hegel seeks not merely to *affirm*, but to *show* that the thing is known *in its qualities*. He wishes not merely to make the obvious retort, but to "think" it. Unhappily (perhaps) he has recourse as usual to the dialectic method. He holds that thought need not and cannot pause at reciprocity. Behind the apparent plurality of forces or substances it must divine its own image in an underlying unity—such an all-pervading unity as we find in conscious thought with its *notion*, explicated into a form of opposition in the *judgment*,

¹ *Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 20.

but recombined into the highest unity—conscious of difference but transcending it—in the *syllogism* or the “idea” strictly so called. Hence reality is a unity of elements like the unity of thought; and “the idea which has existence is *nature*.”

This idea of system—expounded by us in an earlier chapter—Mr. McTaggart seems to regard as the main burden or message of the *Logic*. Dr. E. Caird, however, finds in the *Logic* a further and fuller meaning. He tells us that its lowest third, the doctrine of Being, corresponds to ordinary unscientific thinking, which may be said to take things one at a time; the next, the doctrine of Essence, corresponds to science, “finite” science, which connects things together upon certain given presuppositions, showing the relation between thing and thing, but not reaching absolute unity, and not criticising its own categories; while the third stage, that of the Notion, is not merely the recognition of absolute unity or system, but the explicit reference of all things to thought and the discovery of unity there—in the highest sense, only there. And even Mr. McTaggart finds *also* his own form of the reference of things to thought in the highest section of the *Logic* as well as [?] in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. The *Logic* forces us to regard things as a unity or system; the *Philosophy of Nature* shows us that we have to project this system into space and time, and to recover it again from its apparent loss in the multiplicity of the phenomenal, or to verify it there once more under altered conditions; the Ideal [and the *Philosophy of Spirit*?] teach us to think of reality as (in its ultimate analysis) a communion between thinking spirits, and so essentially related to thought. In any case, the

last third of the Logic compels us *at least* to think of things as a system. Hegel asserts that we must predicate absolute organic system, if we predicate anything at all.

The way in which Hegel's proof of system runs can only be indicated. Beginning with the lowest affirmation that can be made regarding anything, the Logic seeks to show that we are inevitably driven on by a sort of logical parthenogenesis to the assertion of an absolute system ruled by perfect order and lucid to thought. In two ways Hegel tries to make this good. By the *successive phases* in which thought qualifies or defines reality, a system of reality or realities is constituted whose successive aspects are likewise (as already hinted) coexistent parts. But, secondly, the highest stage we reach—the Notion; or the highest phase in the Notion, the Idea—is itself the thought of an absolute system.

Perhaps the *Logic* is best read for the first time as a study of different thoughts or aspects of reality. Hegel is extremely subtle and extremely original in his detail. His analysis is hair-splitting, if his synthesis is all-inclusive. One almost questions, on the side of analysis, whether it is fair to attach (for the moment) one definite meaning to a thought or a term. In real thinking and living speech, a term modifies itself according to the colour of its surroundings. We may be told that every compiler of a dictionary undertakes the same task. That is true in a sense; but Hegel seeks to construct a dictionary of thoughts rather than words. The ordinary lexicographer follows the guidance of usage. If a usage were never so incorrect at first, custom hallows it. Hegel, on the con-

trary, tells us not only what the successive terms imply, but what they *must* imply. This metaphysical dictionary is plainly a dictionary with unusual features! Then, too, Hegel largely constructs his terminology, and constructs it from purely Teutonic stems. Again, he is greatly addicted to punning etymologies, and even seems to attach a serious importance to them. Is not this significant? Amid the shifting quicksands of human speech, Hegel seeks for some bed-rock on which he may erect his exact determinations and definitions. The only thing which offers any promise of *necessity* is the etymological derivation, real or supposed, of a word. Further, this singular dictionary coheres throughout. One meaning pervades it from first to last. Each term interprets—*i.e.* more fully interprets—the one before it. The dictionary is a study after all of one "Logos"—but that Logos is the immanent reason in all things; the Notion; the Idea. Thus, if there is only one word in this dictionary, that word is or includes everything. It tells us "what God and what man is."

On particular "categories" of thought Hegel's teaching is brilliant and conclusive. For an instance we might take the perplexing and entangling twofold determinations of "essence." Does not Hegel lead us behind the illusions associated with these when he shows us the categories in questions as creations of thought, and necessary working implements, but yet imperfect? On the one hand, we know the substance through the accidents. On the other hand, it is an imperfect view of reality which conceives it as a multiplicity of parts, each revealing a multiplicity of characters. It is imperfect, one might say, but necessary

because of our finitude—we cannot grasp the whole as a whole. Hegel takes a bolder flight, and says, It is an imperfect way of thinking, and therefore of itself necessarily passes into one more perfect. *Substance* must become *subject*—a thought-unity, which breaks itself up manifestly into its own particulars, which is itself and its opposite and the unity of both. The real is the individual which combines or presupposes the mere universal (of “thought”) and the mere particular (of “sense”).¹ Or, the real is the individual, since in reality there can be no such thing as *mere* thought or *mere* sense. These are the two sides of the shield, absolutely implying each other, absolutely not two but one in the higher potencies and to the deeper insight of living speculative thought. Still further, Hegel holds that things which we quite legitimately treat as substances are really *sub specie aeternitatis* phases or rather stages, through which the subject fulfils itself as a subject.

Again, Hegel offers a striking contribution to thought in his doctrine of the Infinite—another term with which the self-stultifying wisdom of the Agnostic “understanding” is never weary of making play. Thus we are told that the Infinite is purely negative, that it is plainly unknowable, and so forth. Hegel meets these views with a resolute and reasoned denial. He begins by distinguishing in *quality* a false infinite, which is the mere negation of the finite. [The first suggestion of the Infinite to thought is that which has not the *quality* of finitude, rather than that which is non-finite in *quantity*.] However, Hegel has sub-

¹ Hegel, however, speaks of the *particular* as the “middle term,” uniting the “extremes” of individual and universal.

stantially the same criticism to pass upon both of the false infinities—the qualitative and the quantitative; and as the latter is the more familiar, we may pass to it at once. According to popular opinion, eternity is simply endless time, and infinitude is simply quantity without limit. Such an infinite is negative. It is a quantity which lacks the characteristic features of quantity. We can say nothing about it except that it is non-finite. It has nothing to do with the finite except to repel it. But our thought is guilty of error in regarding the Infinite thus. [More exactly, according to Hegel, we reach an inadequate approximation to the truth, and we have to pass through it and beyond it on our way to a fuller truth.] Really, the infinite is not the non-limited, but the self-limited. It is not out of relation; it is self-relating and self-related. It is not undetermined, but self-determining or free. Over against it there is no strange limiting power; it is at home in all things, recognising its own image everywhere. Infinite and finite cannot simply lie alongside each other as contrasted opposites. Else they limit each other, and both are finite. The true infinite must be that of which the finite is a phase or function. But here again Hegel goes a step further. To him, finitude is not merely *a* function, but *the* function of the Infinite—its fulfilment and indeed its very essence *sub specie temporis*. As little as the world means anything without God, so little will Hegel allow God to mean anything without the world. We must admit that Hegel is true to himself in thus mercilessly pressing the idea of system—and of system as a unity of opposites which pass into each other. Yet we shrink with extreme repugnance from his doctrine. Perhaps it is

speculative weakness in us; but we cannot see the dependence of infinite on finite as we see the dependence of finite on infinite. If the correlation and parallelism are so precise, what becomes of the contrast?

At other points the *Logic* sets before us difficulties which scarcely even seem to find relief.

The first three terms, as most readers will know, are Being, Nothing, Becoming. Reality *is*; but when you have said *is* you have spoken so vaguely as to say nothing at all; you might as well have said *is not*. *It is—it is not*; these empty determinations are in a sense equivalents. Yet they are opposites; and relief is found when we no longer say *it is* or *it is not*, but *it becomes*—or, in other words, having become *it exists*¹ (definitely). Now it is true enough that when Becoming is suggested it may be taken as a unity of Being and Nothing. At least one understands what is meant when that is said; though one might offer criticism. Science knows of no absolute beginning—of no transition from Nonbeing to Being. Absolute Becoming is as purely an abstraction as absolute Being or absolute Nonbeing. (Also of course science knows nothing of annihilation.) One sees what is meant when Becoming is suggested; but one does not see that there is any innate power in the summation of Being and Nothing to impel the mind to that leap forward. In themselves, opposite assertions merely cancel.—Another objection frequently taken seems to be less valid. Does Becoming imply time? Nay, how should any expenditure of time bridge the absolute gulf which separates Non-

¹ Hegel employs the Teutonic form *Daseyn* at this point, using the Latin *Existenz* for one of the categories of "Essence."

being from Being? Perhaps there is an appeal to time, however, when Become is taken as *has become*—*has quality—exists definitely*.¹—On the whole, we must surely agree that Being, Nothing, Becoming, while miraculously, not to say monstrously, ingenious, “will never ring quite true.”²

Letting this serve as a specimen, perhaps an extreme one, of the difficultness and questionableness of Hegel's transitions, we pass to the end of the *Logic*, where we find features hardly less startling than those of the beginning. Why should the subjective and psychological term, *the Notion*, be used? We understand that Hegel is giving us progressive definitions—or, as he thinks, one progressive definition—of reality, and that, as the highest definition, he wishes to name a peculiarly intimate unity and harmony, a peculiarly close and well-knit system. But why call it Notion? We have been speaking of the *thought of* Being, the *thought of* Becoming, etc.; it is not the *thought of* a Notion, however, but *thought as* Notion, *as* Judgment, *as* Syllogism, that we are now asked to ponder. To write and think symmetrically, Hegel ought to name the kind of coherence which he thinks he traces in a “Notion” properly so called—perhaps “organic unity”³—perhaps even “unity of consciousness.” Speaking as he does, he is stealing a march, one fears, in the interests of idealism—in the interests even of that extreme phase of thought (or of speech) which informs us that

¹ Not *the only way* in which Hegel seeks to justify his further advance.

² Dr. Stirling, *Schwegler*, p. 475.

³ Mr. M'Taggart holds that Hegel's names for categories are mere vague suggestions—“a unity such as this.” But he also holds that Hegel now or shortly arrives at the position “Reality is [nothing but] the experience of some thinker.”

nothing but thought exists. We are pushed in this direction, without explanation or argument. Ill-gotten gains do not prosper. Unexplained or unjustified idealist phraseology is likely to repel the learner from idealism in every form.¹

Hegel's logical method has not been widely copied by his latter-day followers. Two able books in our own language, largely influenced by Hegel, illustrate this: Mr. Bradley's and Mr. Bosanquet's *Logics*. They do not indeed represent a simple growth or development of Hegelian principles. There have been other influences, and there has been original thinking. Indeed, Mr. Bradley at any rate cannot now be called a Hegelian except in a very indefinite sense. Still, these writers, like Hegel, manifest the attempt to show that reality is a system grasped by thought; and we notice that their reasonings in support of this position are free from the more paradoxical elements of the Hegelian Logic. They do not start with a single thought and show that upon inspection it dissolves automatically into a complex of many thoughts, which recombine into an absolute unity. They start with the judgment. That is frankly taken as the minimum of thinking; and in judgment a system is explicit; for a judgment contains a plurality of elements brought to a unity.

Thereupon a further question arises—What is the relation of judgment to reality? A bad old logical tradition informs us that the judgment is simply the

¹ Hegel might urge that the only unity in which differences are absolutely at one is the unity of thought, which can *move from* one to the other—or, which *must move* from one to the other, and back upon itself.

comparison of one thought with another. If that be true, a judgment need never come within ten thousand miles of reality. Nay, there is more to be said. Upon the view in question, a judgment cannot touch reality; thought is confined to its own ghostly world. Here, once again, we have stumbled upon a trap which thought lays for thought. Mill was wiser than the champions of intuitionism. With a fine defiance of his own metaphysics and his own psychology, he persisted in maintaining that judgments concerned reality. Mr. Bradley's keener analysis now holds that reality is the ultimate subject in every judgment, while the predicate is an ideal content. Thought is always healing the schism between reality and the ideal content by persevering in its task of predication, though—according to Mr. Bradley—the task is in the nature of things incapable of accomplishment. Mr. Bosanquet finds the reference to reality rather in the copula. We are concerned here to note that these modern Logics differ from Hegel in beginning with an explicit system of relations, while they agree with him in striving to make good the reference of thought to reality.

NOTE.

CONTENTS OF HEGEL'S LESSER LOGIC (omitting Introduction).

I. Being.

A. Quality.

- (a) Being.
- (b) Being determinate.
- (c) Being for self.

B. Quantity

- (a) Mere Quantity.
- (b) Quantum.
- (c) Degree.

C. Measure.

II. Essence.

A. Essence as ground of Existence.

(a) The primary Categories of Reflection.

(a) Identity.

(β) Difference.

(γ) Ground.

(b) Existence.

(c) The Thing.

B. Appearance.

(a) Phenomenal World.

(b) Content and Form.

(c) Ratio (Relation).

C. Actuality.

(a) Relation of Substantiality.

(b) Relation of Causality.

(c) Reciprocity, or Action and Reaction.

III. The Notion.

A. The Subjective Notion.

(a) The Notion as Notion.

(b) The Judgment.

(c) The Syllogism.

B. The Object.

(a) Mechanism.

(b) Chemism.

(c) Teleology.

C. The Idea.

(a) Life.

(b) Cognition in general.

(c) The Absolute Idea.

The Larger *Logic* differs somewhat widely under *Essence*—n
elsewhere

CHAPTER IX

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

LITERATURE.—Hegel's Lectures on this subject are not translated.

THE Philosophy of Nature is generally admitted to be that part of his system in which Hegel shines the least. The admission, however, is recent. Hegel's admirers at the present day feel the necessity of lightening the ship; but Michelet, the editor of the lecture notes for the posthumous Berlin edition, speaks in a very different tone. Out of the "dawn" of philosophy of nature, heralded by the "DioscURI," Schelling and Hegel, "the full day of victorious truth has arisen in the heaven of science," and the Philosophy of Nature is "one of the noblest fruits ripened on the garland [*sic*] of these then budding flowers."¹ Nor can we be considered mere resurrectionists if we refer again to forgotten and seemingly obsolete controversies on points of physical science or its theory. A great man's errors are significant: it is more respectful to study than to ignore them. It will be found that Hegel here gives us that opportunity of testing his principles which we hardly obtain in the field of history. And the Philosophy of Nature is an integral part of his system. If he has

¹ Editor's Preface, p. v.

erred in it, there is a margin of error to be allowed for throughout.

On the other hand, it will be important to keep in view the naturalness and necessity of some sort of Philosophy of Nature in any constructive system of thought. Empiricist habits of mind urge us to believe that everything is merely given;—it *is* so-and-so; it might have been quite otherwise. And, for the purposes of science, it is enough to reach a basis of given fact. But where science ends philosophy has scarcely begun. We have still to ask whether it is credible that the Cosmos of nature reveals in itself none of the lineaments of reason. Is our world after all simply a heap of particulars, bound together by external association? Or has it not, even in its most material and most mechanical sections, traces of an ideal significance? Not the Philosophy of Nature merely, but anything which deserves to be called philosophy, will answer the question with an unhesitating Yes. We may have less detail and less range of *a priori* certainty than Hegel; but we shall have something corresponding to this section of his work; and it will be strange if we do not draw our materials in part from him.

The method Hegel adopts is the same dialectic method which rules in the Logic. This is stated in so many words by the editor, Michelet.¹ "In a phenomenon, we are to find the idea, or the nature of the thing . . . by the measured path of self-moving and dialectically progressive thought." The same position is implied in the emphasis which Hegel still lays upon antagonism in this new region. Time is the opposite of Space [in

¹ Preface, p. xiii.

Space *per se* nothing changes and nothing affects its neighbour; whereas in Time nothing lasts,—the past is dead, the future unborn, the present an imaginary line]; there are “elements” of opposition [modern science would discuss the “elements”—earth, air, water—as “states of matter,” or not at all], and there are “qualities of opposition” in the qualities of matter [in contrast with the qualities-of-relation-to-light, we have the “opposition” qualities of smell, which is a specialised airiness—i.e. scents are regarded as gases—and taste, which is a specialised water—i.e. to be tasted food must be dissolved. The higher unity in this region is—electricity!]. The importance of Hegel’s adherence to this method consists in the fact that it leads him to claim apodictic certainty for all his results. We think his method a play of fancy on the part of a man of genius—a man profoundly gifted and widely learned, though very unequally endowed in different directions. Hegel thinks his method, here as everywhere, the scientific organon of absolute truth.

But, we ask, is it really possible for a deductive process of thought to define with absolute necessity this or that in nature—*everything* in nature (in broad outline), or even anything? Here Hegel and his editor both meet us with the same distinction. According to Michelet, “Philosophy deduces not immediately the forms of nature as such, but certain relations of thought which belong to nature, for which it then seeks the corresponding perceptions in the circle of natural phenomena.” He explains that both Space and Time are deduced *in a sense*, yet not determined *as* Space or *as* Time except with the help of empirical knowledge; the order, however—first Space then Time—

is an absolute dialectical necessity. He goes on to deal with an obvious difficulty. "If an idea deduced *a priori* should find no corresponding percept, two ways are open to us: either to supply in this empty division an as yet undiscovered empirical phenomenon—a dangerous policy (says Michelet) though often made use of by Oken—or to throw the thought-determination back into the crucible of Dialectic, and out of the matrix of Reason," etc. etc.; in fact, to *try again*. "For the philosopher may have been guilty of an error in the process of thought by admixture of his own individuality, instead of following the straight path of universal and creative thought, which lies, unconsciously to us, in every breast." If Schelling complains that this boasted productive thought has not created so much as one blade of grass but only thoughts, Michelet replies, "Yes—only what is universal, abiding and alone of value; not the individual, sensuous, transient."¹ So Hegel tells us that "empirical physics" are "the presupposition and condition of the philosophical science," and that "besides indicating the object according to its ideal significance, we must further name the empirical phenomenon which corresponds to it, and prove that it really does correspond. But this," he adds, "is not dependence on experience in relation to the *necessity* of the content."² This odd and unexpected dualism is apparently connected by Hegel with the presence of *contingency* in nature. Michelet's words quoted above make that very manifest, and we shall shortly quote Hegel's own utterance on the point. Is it fair to seek help from the doctrine of natural contingency? Is the difficulty in question peculiar to

¹ P. xv.² P. 11.

the Philosophy of Nature—or even, more indefinitely, peculiar to the *applications* of the Logic? Do we not everywhere, even in the *Logic*, find a gap between what is suggested (or, as it is called, “deduced”) *a priori* and what is realised as Idea or as higher empirical Fact? It appears to the present writer that “Deduction” never gets beyond the vague recommendation, “Can’t you state this differently?” or “Can’t you try the opposite of this—what would it be?” Then the humble *Vorstellung* (in plain English, experience) whispers, *Try so-and-so*; whereupon the philosopher shouts aloud, “Deduced again—so-and-so it is.” Quantity, *e.g.*, is deduced in the Logic as non-quality; but except for specific experience of quantitative phenomena, what alchemy could extract the positive contents of quantity from negation of quality? It was the *Vorstellung* here as usual that saved a difficult situation. It was experience that whispered to the philosopher, *Try Quantity*. The difference is that Hegel confesses in Nature a difficulty which he ignores in Logic. He has owned that he does not deduce Space, Time, Matter, etc., but only their ideal analogues; and in so far he has attenuated his paradox. He admits and asserts dependence on experience. He is not proposing to tell us *what is*—only in flawless series *what must be*. Experience tells us quite fully *what is*, yet under the condition that *what is* has to embody stage by stage the necessary categories laid down by thought. Surely this is incoherent. Surely the dialectic process would be available only for omniscience, or for a perfected vision of the last results of future science. On the other hand, it is probable that omniscience, with its genuine and unbounded resources, would not care to

make use of so ingenious and artificial a device as this method of Hegel's.

We may for our own purposes divide our study of the Philosophy of Nature between three questions: First, How do you get into it? How do you justify the fact that the perfect thought-system of the Notion, or (at its highest phase) the Absolute Idea, transforms itself into a material manifold in Time and Space? Secondly, How can you verify the presence of rationality in what seems opposed to reason—what seems no better than dead matter? Thirdly, Can you show that, in successive stages, nature reveals itself as more and more life-like or thought-like, until it transcends itself in finite mind?

The first question points us to one of the *mauvais pas* in the Hegelian philosophy. Yet, difficult as it is, it was necessary for Hegel to try the passage. His principles and methods compelled him to do so. In relation to Kant, as noted above, this difficulty corresponds to the question of the connexion between the *Æsthetic* and the *Analytic* in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant left the two in sharp unexplained contrast; Hegel is pledged to bridge the gulf. Kant implied that no reason could be assigned why reality should be thought or perceived by man under the forms of Time and Space; Hegel asserts that, just as it is logically necessary to think all things as parts of a system which is created by thought, so, too, it is an absolute logical necessity to think reality (and at one stage to think *all* reality) as an existence in Time and Space. We must think the finite as not simply *an* utterance, but *the* utterance of the infinite. Of course this is not the

last or highest finding of reason. Time and Space determinations occupy only a few stages in the Pilgrim's Progress of the thinker. To the Philosophy of Nature will succeed in due time the Philosophy of Spirit; and from that final point of view Time and Space will be in their turn transcended. For the present, however, if we are to trace Reason in all things, we must trace it in that apparently hard and alien necessity, which throws the self-centred system of reality into the boundlessness of space and endlessness of time, and which defines it (provisionally) as (dead) matter. Perhaps the best point made by Hegel is the apparent absoluteness of contrast between thought on the one hand and matter on the other. The two, nevertheless, are parts of one universe. Is not this a crucial proof that the law of dialectic contrast corresponds to real facts?

Well may Hegel say that this transition—though dictated, if we are to believe him, by the same dialectic process which gave us the Logic—differs from the individual transitions within the Logic. They added touch upon touch to the picture by which reality, at first indicated as bare unqualified Being, was construed as an absolute system. This new transition, on the contrary, bids us forget all we have learned about system. It bids us think of reality as a bare side by side plurality of atoms in space, a bare one-after-the-other multiplicity of moments in time.

The method by which the transition is justified is delightfully simple. Just because Space or Nature seems so unlike thought—therefore of course it had to come. It is the *other* of thought. "Internality," according to Dr. H. Stirling, becomes "Externality." On this

we may offer the same comment which we have already made upon a similar statement. There would be no force in calling thought Internal, unless we had knowledge of that peculiar kind of Externality which we call material or spatial. Properly, Internal and External are both space-terms, referring to space relations. They describe what is inside or outside a given limit or area. It is, as usual, by a metaphor that we transfer to thought a term characterising the external world; in this case, the word *Internal*. All that we thus accomplish is the defining of thought as a region where space-determinations are not applicable. After we have described thought as "non-spatial," then of course we can characterise space—twenty times over, if we like—as the negative contrast to thought. But the definition is borrowed from experience, and is in no true sense the result of "dialectic" deduction.

Another peculiarity in Hegel's statement is due to the rigorously serial character of his dialectic. He is not content with anything so humble as the position, "we must conceive reality"—or even as the position, "we must conceive all things—in space." Nay more; it is not enough for him to say, "All *is in space*." Hegel's position is, "All *is space*"; "Reality *is space*." Every existence, logical, material, or spiritual, disappears for the moment. We are left with the great blank emptiness of space before us, that we may thoroughly take it in. Then there follows by the law of contrast—we tried above to give a hint of the reasoning by which Space and Time are induced to pair off as complementary opposites—"all is Time"; and for a negation of the negation we have, "All is motion"; [but there must be something to move, and so] "All is matter";—and we

may breathe again [You may think away all matter, but you cannot think away space; yet space is a mere potentiality whose actuality is matter. Space is *the place where matter may be*].

Once more; this last transition, if no other, surely implies that inference from Thought to Being which Mr. M'Taggart so courageously tries to eliminate from Hegel. The mystic formula at the end of the *Logic*, perhaps, *may* be construed in different ways. But who can doubt Hegel's meaning in these sections of the Philosophy of Nature? The movement from thought to material being breaks up into two—(1) from thought to empty time and empty space, (2) from the idea of these back to matter. The latter is nothing else than the dreaded *mauvais pas*, and we are called upon to attempt it, to an accompaniment of jeers from our guide at the cowardice of those who dislike it. Here surely, if nowhere else, the comfortable substratum of reality which Mr. M'Taggart assumes in Hegel deserts us and leaves us in the void. Had Hegel been content to say, "All is *in* Space," we should still have had our *all* of reality to hang our predicates upon; and if many predicates were lost to sight [if "absolute system" had turned into "endless side-by-side and endless series"], we might hope to recover them again later on. But if *all is space*—why, then, all is gone; or all is emptiness. The clearance is as thorough as when Being turns into Nothing—a paradox which Mr. M'Taggart seems to dislike, but yet to excuse as happening only once, and happening when thought is so young.

Whatever congruities and fitnesses thought may discover in a Time and Space world, we are persuaded that thought never can "deduce" Time and Space. Its

attempts to construe them are like the blind man's comparison of the colour scarlet to "the sound of a trumpet"—rhetorically telling and suggestive, but empty of substance; *Vorstellung* and not in the very faintest degree *Begriff*. Here surely is one of the points where we must be content with a knowledge which seems to be absolutely given as a mere opaque fact. If we come better speed with the remaining questions belonging to the Philosophy of Nature, that must satisfy us. At the present point we meet with a limit to possible explanation whose transcendence is unthinkable. At the present point we find one of the proofs which make it plain that thought in us is not fully identical with absolute thought, but represents the working of thought under a certain finite mode. God, or the absolute intelligence, must think the world of Time and Space, but cannot think it, as we have to do, *in* Time and Space—*i.e.* with an indefinite unexplored fringe beyond the possibilities of accurate knowledge.

But Hegel has another way of making his transition or of stating an answer to the first of our three questions. The passage into Nature is not only from Thought to Space, but from Necessity to Contingency. It has been remarked¹ that he vacillates in his treatment of the idea of contingency. Sometimes it is presented as a category or thought-definition, worthy to stand beside any others (and if thought moves by contrasts, how should the supreme contrast of all—irrationality *versus* the rational—fail to find a place in the natural history of thought?). Sometimes Hegel treats contingency as attaching indefinitely to all

¹ M. Taggart's *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 65.

non-logical portions of his philosophy. The individual, either in nature or in history, is "contingent," and therefore plainly cannot be "deduced." We can only deduce the "universal."

This may perhaps have a good sense read into it. There may be evidence showing that all our thought is "hypothetical" in Mr. Bradley's sense—i.e. is general. But that position seems hardly legitimate within a Philosophy of Nature which "deduces" the solar system along with Kepler's laws, and which at great length expounds the nature of earth as the supreme "organic individual." For good or for evil, Hegel has identified his work with a different theory. The "science" which he expounds is not merely abstract but historical—it is at least worth investigating, whether he has not mixed up without sufficiently contrasting two very distinct species of science. Be that as it may, he has certainly treated the individual as significant, deducible, demonstrable. And therefore his repudiation of the "contingent individual," where repudiation is convenient for the course of his arguments, awakens deep distrust. The present writer has no faith in the scientific worth of the dialectic method in any region of philosophy. But if it is to pass muster, how can its patrons assert that there is a limit beyond which it is inapplicable? "The contradiction of the idea, grown external to itself as nature, may be more closely defined as follows: on one side, nature *necessarily* arises from the notion of its several forms and of the rational unity of these in an organic whole; on the other side, nature implies indifferent contingency and indefinable lawlessness. Contingency and determination from the outside have their rights in the

sphere of nature. . . . The impotence of nature shows itself in its maintaining only in the abstract the determinations of the notion, while leaving details to be filled in by forces external to the individual. . . . The impotence of nature sets limits to philosophy. It is most perverse to ask of the notion that it should conceive, construe, deduce such contingent existences." A footnote adds that if philosophy had no more work to do on great themes, one might give Herr Krug the hope that his writing-quill would have the glory of being "deduced" in due time.¹ A distinguished teacher of the past generation was maliciously represented as saying, *What I don't know isn't knowledge*. That, in all sobriety, is Hegel's attitude towards individual phenomena. What he can't deduce isn't worth deducing. This, as we observed before,² is an unexpected outcrop of dualism. Whether or not this contemptuous view of the individual phenomenon is compatible with the claim to produce an *absolute* philosophy,³ it is plainly incompatible with Hegel's monism, and therefore is a bad excrescence on the symmetry of his thought. On all accounts it is to be rejected. We know one teacher who believed in the significance of individual sparrows and even of individual hairs. And we have need of modesty enough to conclude that our failures to solve a problem do not prove the problem to be necessarily trifling or unreal, but only prove that our powers are limited. The theory of the meaningless individual is one more doctrine of sour grapes.

If it be pleaded, alternatively, that Hegel is entitled to impute contingency to nature as being the other or

¹ P. 36.

² Chap. III. p. 34.

³ P. 34, and note there.

contrast of reason, we must assent to the criticism that such a position proves too much. We have deduced and justified abstract unreason, have we? Then why continue reasoning—and reasoning upon such themes?

We now pass to the second question (in our own division of the subject), namely, whether we can trace the lineaments of reason in the strange territory of material nature.

Here the obvious answer is, that the order of nature—or, to use a less ambiguous expression, the uniformity of causation—is rational. (Would keen enough thought show us that uniform causation necessarily implies phenomenal regularity—or, say, cycle—in nature as a whole, regarded as the joint product of many co-operating causes? That is, at any rate, not immediately evident. Hence it is rather an exaggeration to say¹ that on a positive reading of Kant, *world* and *soul* are identified, and are regarded as the same material differently viewed. Compare *supra*, p. 116.) It is a saying of Huxley's² that the course of nature is "a materialised logical process." Is not that a significant bit of Philosophy of Nature in a rather unexpected quarter? We presume it was causal order which led Huxley to speak thus. This aspect of things—this knowable Kantian world of substance, causality, and reciprocity—is expounded to the English reader with great ability in Mill's *Logic*. Mill, of course, held that the uniform sequence of causation was simply a fact found

¹ *E.g.*, in Professor A. Seth's early and brilliant *Philosophy as Criticism of Categories*, see p. 116, *supra*.

² I only know this as a quotation, *e.g.*, in Ritchie's *Darwin and Hegel*, p. 87.

good so far, believed in, generalised by custom, but liable to break down below our feet at any moment. Still, his *Logic* points the intelligent reader to a much better Metaphysic and Philosophy of Nature than Mill's own. Mechanism and mind, which Lotze so sharply antagonises, answer to each other like the seal and the wax. Because nature is mechanically determined, mind anchors itself to nature's permanent substances, supports itself on nature's orderly processes, and so maintains unbroken the unity of consciousness. Unfortunately, Hegel is so preoccupied with his obsession about contingency, that he never lays much emphasis upon this notable regularity of nature—unless under the name of mechanism, of which we have to speak shortly.

There is another and a particularly unfortunate recognition of rationality in nature when Hegel sallies forth to defend Goethe's theory of colour, and to attack Newton's theory, Newton's intellectual competence, and even Newton's character. Colour, like everything else, must be a unity of opposites. This is secured on Goethe's theory, which makes colour a synthesis of light and darkness; it is forfeited by Newton's use of "the worst of all forms of reflective thinking, [the category of] composition," by his "lack of skill," his "silliness," his "dishonourableness," his "blunders," and the "simplicity" and "incapacity" of the scientific judgment of the time.¹ Even Newton's advance from Kepler's laws to the theory of gravitation is described as a very poor thing, and German feeling is invoked against the foreigner.² "The only difference is that what Kepler stated in a simple and noble fashion as

¹ Pp. 303-307.

² P. 110.

laws of celestial motion, Newton changed into the reflective form of the Force of Gravitation, and of gravity manifesting the law of its magnitude in falling.”¹ Now we do not deny the right of philosophy to scrutinise the methods of science, and to raise deeper questions. If Hegel had merely done that, his mistakes, if he erred, would have been pardonable. But he has gone much further. He has challenged Newton’s work in its own region; and, while professing to serve the objective truth of “the notion,” he has appealed to vulgar prejudice. What can we conclude except—in his own vigorous language—that he has given an exhibition of “lack of skill,” “silliness,” “dishonourableness,” and “blunders”?

The answer to our third question introduces us to the main drift of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. We may prefer the language of a part of the Logic (Mechanism, Chemism, Teleology) to that of the Philosophy of Nature (Mechanics—Physics, with chemistry as a subdivision—Organics). But the general drift is the same either way. And if, in entering the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel was seeking to exhibit a rational connexion between the *Æsthetic* and the *Analytic* of Kant’s great work, here he is using materials furnished by the *Critique of Judgment*, as well as materials inherited from Schelling. Life, we have said, is the Achilles’ heel in a consistently materialistic or mechanical view of nature—life, and, still more, thought. Hence a thoroughgoing materialism tends to assert not simply that *consciousness sprang from matter by a kind of accident*, but that *there is no such*

¹ P. 99.

thing as consciousness (for mind must not be allowed to affect matter; and if mind receives influences from matter without reciprocating, what has become of our logic?). The conclusion, if paradoxical, is acceptable to materialists. On the other hand, the Philosophy of Nature, believing in mind, wishes to trace lower terms in the same series—transitional forms between the externality and indifference of mechanical matter and the self-centredness of life and thought. In spite of the serious objections of Professor Royce, we believe that the attempt is legitimate and wise. But once more we distrust Hegel's parade of a necessary development. Let it be enough for us to recognise that things *do* in point of fact appear in a certain rising scale. We cannot say with any width of reference how things *must* be, until we know the whole of that which science is destined to discover.

Mechanism is the mode of existence which characterises mere or inorganic matter as such. We spoke in Chapter II. of Hegel's considering a magnet and still more an organism as revealing the nature of reality better than an aggregate can do. In nature, however, the primary aspect of things which we have to face is that of the aggregate in which the parts are neutral to each other, and determine the whole by mere summation. The "flower in the crannied wall" *can* be studied without a knowledge of God or of man. We can specialise. We can make ourselves creditable coleopterists and accomplished scarabeeists while stone-blind to God and deaf to the cries of the human soul. On other terms, how could knowledge exist in finite minds? If we were confronted with the impossible task of summing a divergent series, we must

die in infantile ignorance. These considerations do not suffice to "deduce" *mechanism*—the signature of reason in *parts* of nature more plainly than in the whole. They do not show it to be involved in the nature of thought. But, assuming time and space as given, and taking for granted the postulate that knowledge is to be possible, we show that mechanism is involved. In other words, we adhere to Kant's Transcendental method. Human thought is enabled by the existence of mechanism to "abstract." It takes one part at a time, and it regards the remainder of nature as a neutral background. This assumption is perhaps in no case strictly true; no such thing may exist as absolute unqualified mechanism. But the assumption is at least nearly enough true to work upon. For the moment, the remainder may be neglected.

If this ceased to be the case, we could no longer envisage matter in space—parts outside of parts. Wherever space is found, there in a sense we have mechanism before us.

It may seem a different view of mechanism if we say that it implies determination from without. Yet probably this is no more than another facet of the same truth. If we determine that which is mechanical, placing it in relations, the determinations necessarily present themselves as falling outside of its inner nature. Or—more strictly, perhaps—what is mechanical has no inner nature.¹

¹ Lotze's discussion, praised in Ormond's *Foundations of Knowledge*, according to which relation implies some deeper and more inward bond, is advanced precisely in the interests of the view that on the final analysis mechanism has no place in reality.

A second stage is represented by a force like gravitation, which, while nothing more than a cause of motion, implies a nearer approach to systematic unity than can be seen in the mere push and thrust of mechanism strictly so called. The same view seems to hold good of those energies—light, heat, sound, electricity—which are now explained as undulations or modes of motion.

In chemistry, where we come upon transformations, the relatedness of the material elements manifests itself more plainly. They disappear in the process; they lose their qualities and acquire new ones. They are no longer independent parts linked in a casual co-operation; they are elements in a synthesis; they had been forcibly sundered, but have now come together again. Yet even the new synthesis is not absolute. Chemistry therefore introduces us to a cosmos of related elements, transforming themselves in the most unexpected fashion, yet always according to law. On the other hand, even chemistry does not abolish mechanism. A chemical transformation proceeds and concludes itself upon a neutral background of unmodified nature. Without relatively inert substances out of which we might fashion our implements, no experimental knowledge of chemistry could arise. Without a stable staging of solid earth, liquid rains, and unexplosive atmosphere, there could be no delicate poisoning like that of the forces and processes which chiefly interest us—those of Life. Given these constants, we can study one aspect of chemistry at a time. Our chemical knowledge, too, implies this *quasi-mechanical* assumption.

In the higher region of organic life we are intro-

duced to transformations and processes in which the individuality of the whole is not lost but preserved. Primarily, of course, we cannot say that all nature is organic or alive. Primarily, life is presented in experience as the quality of a few things, which live in a largely non-living and inorganic environment. Perhaps we shall not err if we say that here we find the mechanical point of view asserting itself even in organics. It is a more difficult speculative question whether it is possible to assert the livingness of reality in any wider sense. So far, what we have rapidly indicated is this—that in nature, where all things have the aspect of lying alongside each other in complete mutual indifference, or, at the most, with casual and contingent relations connecting them together, we yet find in the course of further study ever-increasing traces of connexion between the moving bodies of space. We do not affect, like Hegel, to show that this growing connectedness *must* come to light by a “logical” necessity. We find, however, that *it is*; and it seems impossible to deny that it is significant.

We said a little ago that the discovery of reason in things in the form of causal law was enforced by Mill's philosophy. A newer type of English Naturalism, represented by Mr. Herbert Spencer and his friends, calls our attention to this other manifestation of rationality in the material cosmos—to this evolutionary emergence of unity or system or connectedness in what had seemed mere plurality and contingency. Is scientific evolutionism anything to the point? *i.e.* Is there any ideal significance in the fact—if it be a fact—that the higher forms of nature have arisen

successively in a time process by natural causation? It is quite a different question whether, supposing evolution to be a natural process, we can regard Mr. Spencer's account of the factors of evolution, or any other purely naturalistic philosophy, as a true or adequate interpretation of the facts of science. The present writer does not think that Mr. Spencer's merits in the region he has made his own are comparable to those of J. S. Mill in his region. According to Mr. Spencer, the significant thing in evolution is increasing complexity—though the definition is crossed and intersected by others of an incompatible tenor.¹ The really significant thing, we take it, is that the lifeless (or the seemingly lifeless) has become alive, and that finite mind has appeared.

Now Hegel viewed such speculations with strong disapproval.² He interdicts them in the name of the Notion. Nature, he tells us, is to be regarded as a "system of stages, one of which necessarily proceeds from the other, and is the proximate truth of the one from which it results, but not so that the one is *naturally* produced out of the other—only in the inner idea which constitutes the ground [and foundation] of nature. Metamorphosis belongs only to the Notion as such; its change alone is development. But the Notion exists in nature only [in imperfect fashions], partly as mere inward, and partly as the individual animal. The latter therefore alone has the capacity

¹ The author has tried to work out this criticism in Chapter IX. of *From Comte to Benjamin Kidd*.

² Hegel even prefers the conception of *emanation* to that of evolution—possibly, as Professor Ritchie suggests, because he thinks it points to interpreting earlier stages by later.

of actual metamorphosis." He adds: "It is a foolish blunder, though well known both in the ancient and the recent study of Natural Philosophy, to regard the continuance and transition of one natural form and sphere into a higher as an actual and external process of production—which, however, for the sake of clearness, is always pushed well into the darkness of the past. Nature is precisely that externality which allows differences to fall asunder and present themselves to view as separate existences indifferent to each other. The dialectic notion which leads from stage to stage is the *inner* force of nature. Real thought must reject such nebulous and essentially sensuous fancies, especially the alleged *origination* of plants and animals from water, and also the subsequent *origination* of the higher animals from the lower."¹ Hegel's position is plain. "Metamorphosis belongs

¹ P. 32. It may be of interest, in view of our frequent references to Tennyson's "Flower in the crannied wall," to subjoin Hegel's characterisation of the vegetable as such: "The *subjectivity*, according to which the organic exists as an individual being, develops itself into an *objective* organism, the *Form* as a *Body*, which divides itself into limbs, or parts *distinct from each other*. In the plant, the *only first immediate* form of livingness, its *objective* organism and its *subjectivity* are still immediately identical. Hence the processes of the self-differentiation and self-maintenance of the vegetable subject are a coming-out of self and a division into several individuals. The whole organism is rather the soil in which the parts live than their subjective unity. The part—bud, twig, etc.—is also [capable of becoming?] the whole plant. Hence, too, the difference of the organic parts is a mere superficial metamorphosis, and one can easily assume the functions of the other." So far as I understand this somewhat tall talk, it seems to assume—(1) that no plants feel, (2) that all animals feel. Or, in other words, it seems to hold good scientifically of the lowest animals equally with plants. Perhaps every "speculative" definition of the plant *qua* plant would incur similar difficulties.

only to the Notion as such," and the patent rights of thought must not be infringed. Hegel is willing to hail the destructive forces of nature as a manifestation of the power of the Notion. Living things die, and all things change, because they are, each and all, only finite. But new constructive determinations cannot be permitted to occur by natural process. The laboratory of reason is needed for securing such products.

Here Hegel plainly was in error; and yet it is possible to suggest at least partial defences. The fixity of nature, even if only a relative thing, still affords a marked contrast to the progressiveness of the human mind. Progress may be hailed as—

"man's peculiar note,
Not God's¹ and not the beasts'; God is;¹ they are;
Man partly is and wholly hopes to be."

Again, we might point out the danger of exaggerating the significance of a theory of natural evolution. It assumes so many fixed and given data—Space and Time and Matter with its states, and Heat and Gravitation and the other physical forces. These are the extensive stock-in-trade with which evolutionary science—or evolutionary naturalism, which is science masquerading as philosophy—undertakes to explain the universe. They might, of course, many of them, be latent or confined to elementary manifestations in the fiery cloud to which a speculative science leads us back. Generally, indeed, in a relative sense, the simple may precede the complex. But for the sake of theory

¹ It is scarcely necessary to point out how very unHegelian Browning is here.

naturalism (in the hands of Mr. Spencer) makes everything absolute. He points us to an "unstable homogeneity," which seems as mere an abstraction as Hegel's Pure Being—with the considerable difference that, while Hegel knows pure Being for an abstraction Mr. Spencer regards his Homogeneous as a historical fact. Is it not mythology rather than science which interprets the ideal relations and conditions of things as events in an imaginary history, "pushed for the sake of clearness well into the darkness of the past"? Why nature as a whole ever took the trouble of becoming absolutely homogeneous one cannot conceive, especially as, having become so, it had, we are told, to quit that position at once. Is the synthetic philosophy really to be trusted? Has matter actually gone through its paces in orderly sequence, one after another, beginning with the goose step, for the convenience of the contemplating philosopher? Is this evolution a historical fact, or is it theory run mad? Process, relative and contingent, to which facts point back, is one thing. Process, absolute and necessary, which theory postulates, is another thing entirely—the bad kind of *a priori*.¹

When we consider the appearance of life in the higher animals and man, we find this result: those undulations which had existed in nature hitherto only as undulations, now for the first time come to exist as colours and sounds. It is true that not all the modes of motion become direct psychical consciousnesses. If

¹ Nothing has been said of Darwinism, for in spite of Professor Ritchie's insistence on the phrase "struggle for existence," the present writer considers it not only hopeless but absurd to treat Darwinism as a cosmic philosophy. See *From Comte to Benjamin Kidd*, p. 72.

electricity is a mode of motion, the organ for direct perception of it is lacking in us. It is possible to make complaint of the fewness of our senses. The relativity-men have done this in every age, and Mr. Balfour now takes up the tale. What would satisfy such critics? If they had fifty senses in lieu of five, they might complain that they had not five hundred; if they had five hundred, they might clamour for five thousand or for fifty thousand. Our senses can enable us to perceive the orderliness of nature and control its uses and thrill to its beauty; they put us in touch with our fellow-men and suggest to us the great unseen Friend. And thus they do their work. Perhaps it is in the region of the Beautiful that the change is most noticeable which a wise acceptance of evolution involves. Nature is not objectively a quivering jelly, and only subjectively "for us" a thing of life and beauty. The lower view is put with great force by a mind who saw well past it, R. L. Stevenson in *Pulvis et Umbra*.¹ "Matter," he says, "when not purified by the lustration of fire, rots uncleanly into something we call life; seized through all its atoms with a pediculous malady; swelling in tumours that become independent, sometimes even (by an abominable prodigy) locomotory; one splitting into millions, millions cohering into one, as the malady proceeds through varying stages. . . . In two main shapes this eruption covers the face of the earth, the animal and the vegetable. . . . What a monstrous spectre is . . . man, the disease of the agglutinated dust."

This we say is the lower view of nature. According to the higher view, life is not a strange something inserted

¹ In his volume, *Across the Plains*.

into nature from without (*and here is the advantage of belief in natural evolution*). Life is only the fulfilment of matter's own "promise and potency." The undulations were incompletely real until they were seen and heard. If all nature is not demonstrably alive, at least all is framed for life and craves life. Not what is first but what is last in evolution is most characteristic and most important; not the blind, deaf world of the primeval nebula, but that world of poised forces, that world of glory and beauty, in which man and humanity live; that world which has evolved into colour and music, into life and thought and love.

The environment in man's case is a wide one. Across the almost measureless yet measured abyss of space, stars and nebulae send their beams to this earth; and some rays touch the optic nerves of men, giving a new vision of the "starry heavens above." The furthest "parcels of matter" as well as the nearest have significance for us. We find all nature correspondent in some sense to man's life and man's thought.

And we trust—though we do not prove—that the life and thought, which have emerged here for a little season, do not pass away into the darkness again, but pass into the light.¹

¹ We must confess to having abandoned Hegel's guidance. The highest stage in Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* is the healing art; and its highest attainment is—death. This is neither a jest nor a Platonic parable, but a piece of sentimental unbelief.

The contents of the *Philosophy of Nature*—in its advance from *space* to *man*—may be given in the briefest outline:

Mechanics.

Physics.

Organics.

Mineral (fossil).

Vegetable.

Animal.

CHAPTER X

TRANSITION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT

HITHERTO we have mainly considered Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute or his doctrine of reality; in other words—in Hegel's own words—we have dealt with his *Logic*. We have inclined to accept Hegel's idea of an absolute system as in some sense true, while we have seen reason to distrust that dialectic method upon which Hegel relies for the confirmation and the elaboration of his doctrine. Now we have to proceed to *applications* of the *Logic*. In the light of a triumphantly established doctrine of *reality* as such, we are next invited to take account of various *realities*. One such has already been before us in the Philosophy of Nature; but Hegel's ill success there is pretty widely admitted by his friends, and the realities with which the Philosophy of Spirit deals are of such importance as to give an entirely new interest to the development of Hegel's thought. Even the abstract doctrine of reality as Hegel teaches it has strange difficulties. What is the full account of the relation of reality to thought? We have not yet ventured on an answer; but *in some sense* Hegel holds that thought does not simply explain reality, but implies reality, is coextensive with reality, *is* reality. And henceforth, not in Nature

merely but in Spirit, Hegel undertakes to show by deduction from his *Logic* the necessity and the real but limited worth of every phase of existence. The potentialities of the *Logic* require or imply the highest experiences of the human soul. Of course the dialectic method of development goes with us still, and we have cause again to dread its limiting influences. Hegel will aspire to show us how within ethics, æsthetics, religion, the various phases of ethical, æsthetic, religious thought and life may be expected to emerge. Each mode of the spirit must come to light, and each must reveal its weaknesses. But nothing will be done to show us how the various elements of spirit supplement each other, either inside an area, or upon an encyclopædic view of the complementary areas of the world of mind. Reality is still to be serial or successive. Nothing in any region of study is to be more than a phase.

Has the conception of absolute system any real contribution to offer in the fields of study that now lie before us? Can inquiry into the nature of the True shed light upon the nature of the Beautiful and the Good? Surely it must do so. There are not two regions of reality,—one, where truth reigns; another, where distinct ideals that know nothing about truth set up their thrones. Beauty and goodness, we may trust, are part of the truth of things. One kind of knowledge—if we are to carry analysis and distinction even as far as this—deals with beauty; another kind—if we are to call it so—deals with goodness. But all are akin in this, that they give us knowledge. All deal with reality. There cannot be two realities—if there are, why do we call them by the same name? From the Divine point of view, accessible to us or inaccessible,

the two will necessarily reveal themselves as phases of one reality.

Perhaps a different question arises when we ask whether we learn anything *further* in the study of Beauty and Goodness. As usual, there are plausible grounds for reckoning Hegel a supporter of each alternative. He adds to his *Logic* a *Philosophy of Spirit*—would he have done that if he had had no fresh material to submit? He regards everything as settled in principle by the *Logic*;—does such a position do justice to the human heart and conscience?

The question is largely discussed upon psychological grounds, or at least in psychological language. The trichotomy of intellect, feeling, will, is in high favour at present. Even so strong an admirer of Hegel as Mr. McTaggart makes use of it, telling us that "while Hegel was justified in identifying all Being with Spirit,¹ he was not justified in taking the further step of identifying the true nature of Spirit exclusively with pure thought,"—exclusively, *i.e.* in contrast with Spirit's "two other aspects besides thought, namely, volition and feeling."² The *Philosophy of Spirit*, in Hegel's hands, undertakes to show how will—*Objective Spirit* in Hegel; *Practical Reason* in Kant—necessarily emerges from a study of thought and its object. (*Feeling* is rapidly dismissed; Hegel despises it too much to do more than note it as a link with the brutes.) Ultimately, like all opposites, it coheres with its opposite (with thought) in the Absolute Mind.—Must we not say here what we have said before? Is it not

¹ Compare closing chapter.

² *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 119.

to the intellectual life. One may value every protest against Hegel's cold intellectualism, and yet may wince under the tendency to regard the psychological trichotomy as an ultimate metaphysical truth. A brilliant but whimsical theological professor, now passed away, used to make great use of the hypothesis of a "fairy"—i.e. a possible intelligence without morals or responsibility. Are we to take for granted that intellect and will are really and objectively separable? Is it a mere accident that our census enumerators do not need a column for the Good People? Must we not rather aspire to show—in less airy fashion than Hegel—that all psychical phenomena are joint manifestations of one spiritual principle? Even if we fail to *prove* this, must we not continue to *believe* it? At any rate, it does not seem possible that moral or aesthetic or religious experience should occur except in a rational being. Whether or not Reason (demonstrably) implies the Good, the Beautiful, and the Holy, these great "values" obviously imply reason. Yet deduction may not be possible. It is questionable whether man's mind can deduce either space or sensation from the idea of knowledge; and it may be no less doubtful whether mind can deduce heart or conscience from the idea of Reason.

Hegel's grouping is different from the division so generally accepted to-day. His trichotomy—for of course he divides as usual by three—is mind subjective, i.e., roughly, Psychology; mind objective—

Ethics; moral institutions rather than the moral consciousness; and mind absolute or religion, with a threefold subdivision; Æsthetics, Religion in the narrower or more proper sense, and, triumphant over all, Philosophy or Absolute Knowledge.

The prominence given to psychology is unexpected. Its treatment is not the least characteristic part of the Philosophy of Spirit. We look in vain for what we ordinarily expect under the name of psychology. The *self* is absent. Knowledge is analysed once again; knowledge, not the knower, is important to this type of idealist philosophy. We observe the tendency not only in Hegel, but to a large extent even in Green. Locke's "thinking thing" awakens the fullest scorn of Green's mind. Even to the saint of the British Hegelian movement the individual mind is a paltry affair. Kant and Hegel are held to have suppressed not simply the soul-thing of the old Rational Psychology, but almost the soul itself—thing or person, substance or (individual) subject.

We venture to suggest that this strange colour-blindness can be accounted for. *From an analysis of mere knowledge, it is impossible to infer the importance of personality.* As long as men are studied merely as knowers, their "individuality" is as "casual" a thing as Hegel himself could wish to make it. As knowers, we differ from each other—if the expression may be allowed—*quantitatively*, and only so. Some know more truths than others do; but whatever we truly know, so far as we truly know it, is identical—in you, in me, in every one who attains it. Once a truth, always true. Nor can there be a sillier development even of a Protectionist tariff than the attempt to

boycott foreign thoughts. Yet "made in Germany" passed for years in our country as a refutation of any unwelcome Biblical discovery; and in Germany itself the whole orthodox development of the early Christian centuries is condemned off-hand by a vigorous school of theologians as a working of the Greek mind. Such wholesale condemnation is at least overhasty. A syllogism is not the less cogent because a ponderous Teuton or because a hungry Greek was the first to put it in shape. From the point of view of mere knowledge, indeed, our separate minds are no better than shifting heaps of percepts, principles, syllogisms, in rapid circulation from one to another. Mind is *homousios* or even *autoousios* with mind, so far as mere knowledge goes. Differences "are null, are nought"; individuals share the same knowledge, and not even the highest individual fully embodies—much less engrosses—the great stream of the knowledge of his time. But feeling is differently constituted. Pleasure is profoundly personal, and so is pain. "The heart knoweth his own bitterness, and a stranger intermeddleth not with his joy." Modern wisdom reiterates the truth: "we myriad mortals live—alone." It may be that Lotze erred in making personality a thing of feeling *in contrast with* consciousness; he is certainly right in urging that we shall never understand what personality means or where it ends by ignoring the feelings and studying the abstract intelligence. We carry this truth with us into the region of ethics. Hegel's doctrine of system is good for something, good for much, but emphatically not good for everything. The self which selfishness caters for is the self which feels pleasure and dreads pain; the self which love

sacrifices is the same throbbing feeling atom—in no sense is it the Pantheistic logical self of *A-dvaita* or “Nondualism” which is identical in all conscious subjects. Finally, the self which love prizes is the self who is a particular embodiment of universal reason, not barely as intellect but as intellect, will, love. My friend is my *alter ego*; and that he is *alter* is quite as important as that he is *ego*. All love is a “synthetic” union of differences which persist through the union and enrich it. By an analysis merely of knowledge you cannot penetrate into the Holy Land of personality—God’s or man’s. The most striking feature in the philosophy we have still to study is Hegel’s absolute confidence in the relevance and adequacy of intellectual clues. Such exaggeration turns truth into error.

NOTE.

OUTLINE CONTENTS OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.

I. Mind Subjective.

A. Anthropology; the Soul.

(a) The Physical Soul.

(α) Physical qualities.

(β) Physical alterations.

(γ) Sensibility.

(b) The Feeling Soul.

(α) In its immediacy.

(β) Self-feeling.

(γ) Habit.

(c) The Actual Soul.

B. Phenomenology; Consciousness.

(a) Consciousness proper.

(α) Sensuous consciousness

(β) Sense-perception.

(γ) Intellect.

(b) Self-consciousness.

(a) Appetite.

(β) Self-consciousness recognitive.

(γ) Universal self-consciousness.

(c) Reason.

C. Psychology; Mind [*Geist*].

(a) Theoretical Mind.

(a) Intuition.

(β) Representation.

αα Recollection.

ββ Imagination.

γγ Memory.

(γ) Thinking.

(b) Mind Practical.

(a) Practical sense.

(β) The impulses and choice.

(γ) Happiness.

(c) Free Mind.

II. Mind Objective. [See after Chap. XII.]

III. Absolute Mind.

A. Art.

B. Revealed Religion.

C. Philosophy.

CHAPTER XI

HEGELIANISM AND PSYCHOLOGY

LITERATURE.—A. Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, translated with Prolegomena by William Wallace.

B. The *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

C. Green's papers, "Can there be a Natural Science of Man?" in *Mind* for 1880, are the most important "Hegelian" discussion of Psychology in our language. Professor Sorley on the *Historical Method* [*Essays in Philosophical Criticism*], referred to below, may also be studied with advantage.

THE traditional English approach to philosophy, from Locke downwards, is by way of psychology and the method of introspection. Among the perplexities which beset the learner, who tries to grasp the thoughts of Hegel, are the absence of psychology as he knows it, and the contempt with which "empirical psychology" is sometimes spoken of.

The expression "empirical psychology" was not invented to express contempt, any more than "higher criticism" was invented to enforce lofty assumptions. Both are or were technical scientific designations. Wolf contrasted "empirical" with "rational" psychology. The latter was the science which claimed to demonstrate the unity, simplicity, and immortality of the substance composing the human soul. In con-

trast with that sublime body of truths, empirical psychology was but a poor thing in Wolf's own judgment. Still, it had its place among his sciences; and there are writers of Catholic Manuals of Philosophy—also I think some others—who even now practise the study under both names. Kant, however, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* pulverises the more pretentious science or pseudo-science, the Rational Psychology. Those who accept Kant's guidance or admit the force of his criticisms have no psychology left except the empirical, to which on occasion the great masters themselves, both Kant and Hegel, refer with a certain marked disparagement. In lieu of the old rational psychology, Kant created a new thing in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Some may call the new thing an epistemology, but Hegel transforms it into a Logic or into an entire philosophical encyclopædia—construing the nature of reality from a centre, and reading off its chief headings *a priori*. In the Hegelian Encyclopædia the name Psychology is assigned to one-third part—the highest third—of his treatment of Subjective [cognitive] Mind [literally, Spirit]. This is more or less a technical restriction; and we may say that all the pages in which Hegel discusses Subjective Mind deal with the topics of psychology—though not in the fashion of ordinary psychologists.

What is the difference between this discussion and the handling of mind and mental topics which we have had from Hegel in the *Logic*? So far as I understand, the *Logic* threads together categories, according to which the mind may classify or define reality, without inquiring whether mind anywhere exists. So far as we may tie down Hegel to a definite choice between

alternatives—and so far as he believes in reality at all—he recognises no field of reality corresponding specially to the *Logic*. All realities are either natural or spiritual, while both classes alike embody the ground principles of the *Logic*, considered as an analysis not of this existence or of that, but of all possible existence. Or, as Hegel might prefer to say, reality being a unity is the unity of the natural and the spiritual. Now, however, we have reached a stage in philosophy at which it becomes expedient to observe—or, as Hegel might say, to demonstrate *a priori*—that *mind exists*.

Empirical psychology is regarded by many idealists as not merely empty but harmful; they distrust the metaphysical assumptions which are apt to be associated with it. It aims at showing the origin of mind. It can hardly do anything else; it is a science; and science studies the origins of things in order to account for them and to estimate their value. A generation ago, the chief reliance of empirical psychology was placed upon the laws of association. Mind was a number of sensations, shaken up together as if in a bag—though indeed there was no bag in the case—and somehow adhering to each other in vacancy by resemblances and by contiguity. This older form of empirical or rather empiricist psychology—*i.e.* empirical psychology made thorough, or empirical psychology with empiricist metaphysics—has pretty well disappeared. The Intuitionalist or the Kantian refutation was cogent. Without a principle of unity, the moments of time could never penetrate into consciousness; they must be held together for that purpose; or

time must be an *a priori* consciousness. Still plainer is the futility of every effort to account for the origin of a consciousness of space in a mind as yet destitute of it, even if such a mind had somehow learned to arrange its sensations in time. Thus space also must be an *a priori* consciousness; while Kant of course proceeds to add to the *a priori* stock all that makes knowledge rational and orderly.

Conclusions regarding the consciousness of time and of space are met by theories of heredity. Whether legitimate or not on biological grounds—there the matter is doubtful—such theories cannot possibly score a psychological success. What is psychologically and consciously unthinkable yesterday—the origination of a consciousness of time out of loose sensations, or of a consciousness of space out of something so heterogeneous to it as time—is no less unthinkable any number of thousands of years B.C., when the “probably arboreal” ancestor of mankind began to take stock of his mental furniture. We must not, as Martineau has said, allow the materialists to suppose that they can “crib causation by inches.” And, as Hegel would warn us, we must not accept an impossible evolution simply because it has been “pushed, for the sake of clearness, well into the darkness of the past.”¹ If space became a consciousness in primitive psychology, it cannot have been by origination out of any previously existing consciousness; it must have been by some subconscious process. But if we are to resort to the subconscious self for explanations, there is no reason why we should go thousands of years back for them. We gain nothing by doing so. The appeal to heredity is therefore

¹ Compare p. 170.

irrelevant. What the theory really amounts to is an affirmation that consciousnesses of Time and Space are reactions of mind upon the data of sense.

This conclusion suggests an interesting remark by Professor Ritchie, that "chemical analogies lie at the base of many current psychological theories," but that a "higher stage" in consciousness is not "a mere chemical product of elements different from it."¹ Empiricists may retort by asking how Professor Ritchie can veto chemical theories if the facts are found to support them. If, as a matter of experience, we find that the union of two or three facts in the mental area results in another and heterogeneous fact—"not a fourth sound but a star"—may we not say so? Professor Ritchie's reply, one fancies, would be that we cannot regard as ultimate [in any region?] the analysis established by the categories of "chemism," and that, if two things by coming together result in a third, they must have had from the beginning a relation uniting them—they were never merely two distinct and separate things. Further, an idealist would in all probability demand that a higher value should be attached to *the mental area*. In the case before us, the idealist might plead that the mind which reacts is *the* cause of the new idea—and probably, further, that the idea ought to be accepted simply as true. In view of the difficulties raised by another consideration,—the Kantian antinomies,—it may be better to regard the consciousnesses of Time and Space as relatively, not absolutely, true. We may accept them as the fitting

¹ *Darwin and Hegel*, p. 12. I am not certain, however, whether the theory spoken of is one of the class which Professor Ritchie has in view.

way of conceiving natural realities from the point of view of limited human thought. If that be correct, we should not get nearer the real nature of things by endeavouring to strip our mental picture of the colours of Time and Space. *On the contrary, Time and Space are the very means by which we approach as near as is possible for us to a true construing of natural realities.* But the fringe of the false Infinite round their margin shows that they cannot be absolutely true—or, true for the Absolute—or, true for God (God is not in Time and Space. Nor are we; but our experience *is*). Hegel, on the other hand, thinks none the worse of Time and Space because of the taint of antinomy in them. He finds paradox and antinomy in all realities, or at least in all finite realities; and he recognises no absolute reality beyond its embodiment in the finite. The Absolute escapes from contradiction by its unending *process*; in which surely all reality threatens to disappear.

It follows that Hegel will criticise the intuitionist psychology, which we have been championing, quite as strongly as the empiricist psychology opposed to it. He declines to study an empty mind, assumed to be equipped with a set of empty faculties lying alongside one another. He will not separate mind from its contents. The subject of his study is thought. He will not accept what he regards as the "Vorstellung" of a mind originally opposed to a world, of which it is somehow to obtain knowledge. (The opposition arises, he grants, in the development of thought; it marks the stage of Phenomenology; but it is transcended again.) Such a representation he regards as making knowledge impossible. No manipulation of ideas will

enable us to reach across into real knowledge, if, in the determining *data* from which we start, this gulf is found. If we begin with mere ideas of our own, we must end with such mere ideas. The doom of "cosmothetic idealism" is as plainly decreed in Hegel's judgment as in Hamilton's. But he finds no remedy in a "natural dualism," *plus* the assertion of an "immediate" knowledge of a foreign reality. To Hegel such knowledge—stated as the knowledge of a particular finite mind—is a sophistication and an absurdity. The Natural Realist defines the situation in a way which opens up a prospect of cosmothetic idealism or of scepticism; then, in defiance of himself, he affirms that the mind knows reality. Hegel wishes to prove this, or, in his own language, to "think" it, and not merely to affirm it in defiance of one's own metaphysical assumptions. He believes that he is able to "think" or justify it by his peculiar method of treatment. Mind or thought or knowledge is itself the infinite totality. That haunting presence and potency which everywhere pervades Hegelianism, is here conceived as realised in knowledge as such. Knowledge is made up of knowledges of every possible (significant) kind; and knowledge treated *qua* knowledge—not as this being's or that being's, but simply as *knowledge* on the part of *mind*—shows us that it cannot be conceived as separated from its object. Or rather it is so conceived only at an inferior and inadequate stage in the evolution of thought. There are three stages—First, that of the animal mind, or subconscious self, to the study of which Hegel appropriates the name Anthropology. This is in parallelism to the logical categories of Being. Secondly, we have the stage lately spoken of—the stage of distinc-

tions and oppositions—of consciousness as Hegel calls it, to whose study he appropriates the name Phenomenology. This is regarded as corresponding to the reflective categories of Essence in the *Logic*. At this stage we study the mind and its phenomena; or we study mind in relation to things and to itself; or phenomena are referred (at this stage) to a reality beyond, alike in the subject and in the object. The early *Phenomenology of Spirit* includes a review of the whole contents of philosophy as conceived by Hegel, and includes, as we have observed,¹ a large number of the arguments and even *bon-mots* which are repeated in his later treatises. In the briefer statement, included in his *Encyclopædia*, Hegel tries to make Phenomenology a part of philosophy, rather than a microcosm or encyclopædic outpouring. According to the usual Hegelian argument, the study of mind as cognitive, with which we have been occupied, requires or suggests a third view of mind—*Geist* in the proper sense—to whose explicit study Hegel appropriates the name Psychology. This branch of study corresponds with the logical Notion. One is tempted to say that the department named Phenomenology corresponds better to what is ordinarily known as Psychology, since in Phenomenology the mind is (temporarily) individualised by contrast with its objects. Still, in Hegel's Psychology, we have a discussion of the functions or faculties of mind; and thus far his nomenclature is intelligible. The whole method is characteristically Hegelian. He is discussing the manifestation of *mind* in a series framed by himself and justified by its significance; ruled of course by

¹ See note on p. 71.

his dialectic formula. He believes that the result is to urge us forward into the position of Free Mind or Objective Mind (or Morality), and ultimately of Absolute Mind (religion, etc.), in which subject and object are identical (whatever that means; whether it means, All is rational, or All is thought, or All reality is composed of thinkers). The only refuge which Hegel will admit from the ordinary psychological dualism of mind and things, with the scepticism which he believes to follow close upon it, is this strange pantheistical study of mind as mind. When treating of the "soul" in "Anthropology," Hegel warns us against separating the individual soul from the general life of nature to which it belongs. When he speaks of finite mind, we must beware of supposing him to speak of finite *minds*. To him, finite mind is not a mind of an imperfect type, but an imperfect stage in the evolution of mind as mind—which, while imperfect, is nevertheless in its own place a necessary stage. Such is Hegel's attitude towards the problems of psychology; and this unwonted attitude is represented by him as the only alternative to a pseudo-scientific treatment of the subject, involving the abrogation and abandonment of knowledge. As usual, during the development of his theme he contrives to say a number of fine things in essayist fashion. As usual, also, his method is attended with such ambiguity that very different views may be taken of the question, what he is talking about; and to the end the answer remains doubtful. When a writer repudiates the proposition as a mode of statement inadequate to truth, and when he considers such forms of thought as identity and difference no better than empty abstractions,—why, then, it is only natural that he him-

self should not know what he is talking about, nor yet what he says about it. Unfortunately, so long as he uses human speech, he can only write down propositions. What then is the subject in his propositions? What is mind as mind? We can only repeat a suggestion made in last chapter: it is mind conceived as barely cognitive. So conceived, mind possesses no real individuality. As far as knowledge goes, no definite line separates one mind from another. If, holding a Theistic creed, we take a Theistic view of Idealism, then Hegel teaches us to regard God as the Great Supreme mind. If we are Pantheists, or if we interpret idealism pantheistically, then Hegel must be held to trace the evolution of the average normal (human) mind, though perhaps one so ideally normal as never to have existed.

One result of Hegel's position as understood by many of his followers, was a rejection of empirical psychology as pronounced as Comte's. Both Idealists and Positivists have treated psychology as a sham science. Comte wished to replace it by sociology or by phrenology; Hegel offered in its place his *Logic* or his own Psychology, which, like his *Logic*, treats all parts and subdivisions as successive stages in the evolution of a whole. In the early *Phenomenology* Hegel pursues the sham science of phrenology through many pages of angry banter;¹ but at the end he lets us see that he is aiming past phrenology at empirical psychology. Any doctrine of a mind [Locke's "thinking thing"] means to Hegel that the mind is being treated as a non-fluid sensuous material existence. As well say "skull" and "bumps" as "mind" and "faculties"

¹ Pp. 235-251.

affirm is that *all things* are of the nature of *mind*? If such an ingenious *tour de force* is to pass muster as an argument, who need despair of demonstrating *a priori* any position which has hit his fancy?

The science—if we are to call it so—of empirical psychology has, however, held its ground and fought its way back to recognition by sheer weight of metal as a useful body of observed facts. What we have cause to fear is lest it should come back like other *émigrés*, "having learned nothing and having forgotten nothing." In a word, we fear the revival of dangerous metaphysical assumptions. It is true that modern naturalistic psychology is more respectful than the older naturalism to ideals—*e.g.* the ideals of morality. It accepts them as facts of the human mind; but one fears that the justification is inadequate and the acceptance half-hearted. It is true, again, that there is a form of psychology which proposes to suspend all metaphysical issues and merely describe phenomena. As science grows older and more *blasé* or perhaps more *rusé*, we may expect similar proposals in many different regions. Will the programme ever be acted on? And if you do describe psychical phenomena so as to admit all reference to a Self, have you really observed scientific neutrality? Or have you drawn the disputed line altogether in favour of the wrong claimant? Psychical phenomena which have no reference to a Self are surely fanciful monsters; unless they are the conventional materials of an admittedly technical and provisional statement of facts. The



restriction, however, is rarely kept in mind. Even the doctrine of a presentation *continuum* seems to say too little. Just as a conscious series must be more than a series, so a conscious *continuum* must be more than a *continuum*. Consciousness is a unity, not a continuity. Though our experience is in time, we are not in time. Just because we are the conscious subjects of experience, and are conscious of phenomena in time, we must stand above the stream.

Hegel knew nothing of these later refinements or sophistications. In the British 'school, where his influence has been so strongly felt, differences of opinion have appeared, mainly perhaps since the general adoption of belief in evolution as a process in time. If not logically necessary, it was humanly natural that the new position should suggest a friendlier attitude toward empiricism; and to empiricism time-evolution is everything, while mind is one of many phenomenal products. Professor Andrew Seth, in his early *Development from Kant to Hegel*, suggested that Idealism was strong enough to accept "the whole associationist psychology"; and Professor Ritchie, who puts so high a value on Darwinism, seems equally favourable in his attitude towards the modern psychology of evolutionism. T. H. Green, on the other hand, felt that in fighting naturalism he was defending the most sacred interests of the moral consciousness; and Professor Sorley's contribution to *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* vindicates some of the findings of a non-empiricist or intuitionist psychology. This latter position we believe to be wise. Psychology is not Alpha and Omega, as the Scottish philosophy supposed. We need a deeper and more thorough metaphysic. But

assuredly we also need to affirm certain views in psychology and to exclude others. Both knowledge and morals are at stake. If mind can be accounted for and explained as a phenomenon, we shall vainly try to gain acceptance for a complementary or supplementary doctrine of a deeper cast. If "psychogeny" is feasible, idealism in every form will soon be stone dead, and it will go badly with those interests or "values" which connote the truth of some form of idealism. We must fight the problem of psychology, or we must lay down our arms. But to fight naturalism only in order that we may substitute for it the misty ambiguities of Hegel's teaching would seem to be scarcely worth our while. Valuable as an instalment of truth, Hegel's doctrine of the Absolute is a dreary failure when presented, by himself or by his admirers, as the whole of truth.

NOTE A.

On the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Valuable help to an understanding of the *Phenomenology* is furnished by Chapters V. to VII. of Dr. Baillie's *Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic*; and by the tolerably full summary in Dr. Harris's *Hegel's Logic*, Chapters IV. to VIII. Professor Baillie calls attention to the assumed peculiarity of the *Phenomenology* as contrasted with the *Logic*. The spring of advance in the former is the "difference between knowledge and truth"—in other words, between knowledge and our conscious ideal of what our knowledge ought to be (—ought to be in order that it may correspond to the *object*; Hegel, however, insists that we should be equally warranted in inverting the formula, and in saying that we perceive a gap which must be filled if the *object* of knowledge is to be

adequate to *thought*). This may be regarded as a reply to agnosticism. That fashionable form of opinion tells us that we are (consciously) unable to know things in their truth. Hegel retorts that, before we could make such a statement, we must already possess a consciousness of what the truth or reality of things is; and he adds that such a consciousness will operate on our knowledge so as to ripen it. He further adds that, when we know things more truly, we get as it were a new object;¹ and as to it, we make again the distinction between our knowledge and the reality [or the "truth"]—then correct our knowledge—then find that we have a new object on our hands—and so on. Hegel thus teaches, here as everywhere, that the various possible types of consciousness will emerge in a single linear series—complete in every part, and nowhere redundant or repeating itself. We may begin with the lowest sensuous knowledge; we end with the fulness of Reason, with a knowledge become absolute. From *consciousness* [of things] through *Self-consciousness* [which knows the Self] we proceed to ["Reason"] an idealism which is aware that things are of the very nature of Thought or Self. In contrast, however, with his immediate idealist predecessors, Hegel requires that this should not be merely *asserted*, but exhibited in detail. Accordingly, the whole of what he subsequently names "Philosophy of Spirit"—all the content of Psychology, Ethics, *Æsthetics*, Religion—with Metaphysics—is alleged to be generated in this singular serial fashion. Thus is constituted the later and larger part of the book. And all types of experience are assumed to have their significance as *Knowledge* types,—their defect, as falling short of absolute knowledge—their value, as (each in its turn) pushing us forward towards that goal.

¹ So far as Hegel's idealism involves anything of the nature of a trick, this is one of the points where that shows itself. Psychologically, the object may be new; ontologically, how can it be?

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We are not said to measure (in the *Phenomenology*) each consciousness against absolute knowledge, but against *its own* truth. It is supposed to be characteristic (of the twofoldness of the attitude of mind at the stage when it contrasts *mind* and *its object* ?) that consciousness in this region sees double, and stands face to face with two magnitudes—our actual knowledge of the object, and our half-conscious perception of the object-in-itself. The contrast presented by the *Logic* does not consist in the mind's making play with the highest category—at least not directly or consciously. In “pure thought” we have but *one* object before us at a time. Category succeeds to category. We do not condemn them by any process of reflection or comparison; they tumble forward by their own instability. So far it may be true that the *Phenomenology* stands nearer to the ordinary consciousness than the *Logic* does, and offers an imaginable “ladder” for scrambling up to Hegel's heaven of absolute knowledge. Yet the whole purpose of the *Phenomenology* is to *abolish* the contrast with which it starts—between things and thought—between the thing-in-itself and the thing as we (in the first instance) imperfectly know it.

If we suspect a trick when we are told that *a different view of the object* “of course” means *a different object*—our suspicion is again aroused by the transition from law [or system] of forces to thought.¹ Up to that point, with the exception noted, there is a great deal of brilliant argumentative power in Hegel's discussion. Human thought begins by attributing reality to the mere sensuous particular; but that changes while we speak. So, too, the self is not unchanging but constantly changed. The reality, we then perceive, must be a universal and *not* a particular (—must be a permanent self and a permanent object, constant through change ?). But it is

¹ This is very similar to the sudden appearance of “Notion” in the *Logic*; see p. 146.

hard to see how the permanent object with its manifold qualities can be one or can be real. It is surely self-contradictory—its qualities you say are many, and yet you persist in calling it one. Is the quality alone real—the sensuous universal? Do *we* develop qualities in the innocent and simple object by the multiplicity of our sophistical senses? Or do *we* impart a spurious unity to the endless miscellaneousness of the object by the intrusion of our thought? Or do things *evoke qualities in each other* by mutual interference? [Every “quality” implies a *relation* to the Self, or—at least, and so far as clear consciousness goes—to another object.] We are thus pointed from *things* to a conception like “force,” which implies action between different “things” (—which implies processes of a range and complexity that reduce the assumed hard and impenetrable “thing” to a mere playground of forces). Next we are pointed on from force to “law” [or *system of forces*; is this identification legitimate? Dr. Harris thinks that more modern views on the correlation of the physical forces and the conservation of energy form an excellent illustration of Hegel’s point]. And here the unity or system (or unity in differences) is so complex, that we have before us in nature visibly the image and likeness of mind or thought or notion.¹ Matter itself is revealed as having an “inner nature.” Hegel makes his insight into the rationality [complexity?] of physical nature serve as a justification of Fichtean language; the development of his *thought* seems to be something different.

¹ For *Begriff* Dr. Harris renders or substitutes “self-activity.” We cannot think that he fairly represents Hegel. He holds that we find recognised in Hegel necessary dependence of matter on thought, of the world on God, but not equally necessary relation of thought to matter (as its implied opposite), of God to the world (as the sphere of His self-fulfilment). God is “an immaterial Spirit” or “first cause,” determining Himself, and free to determine “created” things, *if He likes*. For good or for evil, Hegel’s view is different.

One is again perplexed at the continued use of the method of the *Phenomenology* after this rational insight (granting it to be legitimate) has been reached. Still, Hegel's method—the "Dialectic" method, employed first in the *Phenomenology*,¹ then in the later system—requires this procedure, and (if the method be regarded as valid) warrants it. So far as the Idealist thesis is affirmed "immediately," or is an "assertion," Hegel will have it verify itself by developing dialectically into all the contents of Spirit—all ethics, æsthetics, etc. etc. Necessary connexion or necessary contrast is to be traced everywhere; the clue (it is alleged) will not fail us. Hence, if we are to criticise the *Phenomenology* as false to Hegel's presuppositions, we must make our appeal to its peculiarities of order and arrangement. In "Observing Reason" it looks as if Hegel arbitrarily introduced us to another inferior stage—a Reason which seems more akin to "abstract understanding,"—one which only observes from outside, though it is conscious that these outside things have a certain kinship with itself.² According to Dr. Baillie, the stage of Reason is subdivided—(1) Reason dealing with the material, (2) with itself, (3) with what is both self and non-self, subjective and objective—Spirit. Here, then, the earlier ground is simply recapitulated; but of course Hegel is fully warranted in telling us that that *must* be the case where the higher "rational" point of view has been reached. In this way Hegel reaches another new [consciousness or] "object"—Spirit; and [in this book, but not in the later system] "Spirit" is contrasted with other objects still—"Religion" and "Absolute Knowledge." Again, when we compare with the later system, it seems anomalous to meet with subjective morality at a position later—and higher—than that of the

¹ Dr. Baillie's *Hegelian Logic*.

² It will be competent for the Hegelian to retort that that position is too painfully characteristic of the present writer and of his limitations.

moral institution,¹ and close upon religion. Yet again, Art is here a department under Religion.

From this point of view we must answer Dr. Baillie's contention, that the *Phenomenology* is an abiding and integral part of Hegel's system. We must hold—and apparently Professor Baillie might admit this—that “Phenomenology” means the same thing in the earlier and later writings of Hegel. That is to say, *Phenomenology* for Hegel denotes a form of mind in which thought and things are contrasted with each other, though it is certain—and he will show it—that this attitude of mind contains *in nuce* a higher synthesis. Granting the legitimacy of the Hegelian system, we must grant that any fragment of such an organism of truth, put under the microscope, will reveal the characteristic structure of the whole. In the *Philosophy of Spirit*, “Phenomenology” is only one small part, occupying its limited place. In the early treatise, the evolving individual mind, or mind *vis-a-vis* with things, is put under a very powerful microscope; and we see “what God and what man is.” Still there seems no reason to deny what our own study asserts and the best Hegelian authorities confirm, that the early *Phenomenology* shows a good deal of arbitrariness, subjectivity, mal-arrangement. In that sense we must hold that the book is *not* part of Hegel's final system.

Finally, as to the contrast in procedure between *Phenomenology* and *Logic*: believers will be impressed by it; those who believe less fully will think it of little consequence. Hegel may tell us that the mind sees double in one region and single in a higher [?] region. But if it be true, as his recent followers tell us, that in both alike the mind has the

¹ “Morality” is not treated with any more respect than elsewhere in Hegel's writings. If possible, it is even more contemptuously handled. It is impossible not to feel that the twofold discussion of morality under “Observing Reason” and “Spirit” is redundant.

whole of experience, and the highest results attained, somehow operating as its guide, the contrast alleged between the two books (and regions of study) seems technical, if not arbitrary.¹

¹ The table of contents of the *Phenomenology* is curiously intricate in contrast with the more systematic triplicities of the later system. Of course there is triplicity:—*A.* Consciousness, *B.* Self-consciousness, *C.* Reason [strictly, the third grand heading is anonymous]; and again "Consciousness" is divided—I. Sensuous Consciousness, II. Perception of "things," III. The world of [imperceptible] "forces." Again, "Reason" in its peculiar and technical sense is subdivided—*A.* Observing Reason, *B.* Self-developing Reason, *C.* Abstract Individualism [both *B.* and *C.* are part of a continuous ethical discussion, with a great deal of historical illustration or *a priori* construction of history; the same discussion, with the same features, continues through the section of *Spirit*]. This part of the treatise is subdivided—*a. b. c., α, β, γ, αα, ββ, γγ*, with the most perfect trichotomist orthodoxy. On the other hand, *C.* has four main divisions—(AA) Reason, (BB) Spirit, (CC) Religion, (DD) Absolute Knowledge (Philosophy?). We have therefore a threefold, a sixfold, and an eightfold division—*A.* (including I., II., III.), *B.* (=IV.), *C.* [including (AA)=V., (BB)=VI., (CC)=VII., and (DD)=VIII.]; or *A., B., C.; A. B. (AA), (BB), (CC), (DD)*; and I.–VIII.

A. Consciousness.

I. Sensuous Certainty.

II. Perception [*Wahrnehmung*].

III. Force and [its discoverer] the Understanding, etc.

B. Self-consciousness.

IV. In its Truth.

A. Dependence and Independence; Master and Slave

B. Free Self-consciousness — Stoicism, Scepticism
Pessimism.

C. (AA) Reason.

V. Certainty and Truth of Reason.

A. Observing Reason.

B. The Self-realisation of Reason.

C. Abstract Individualism.

(BB) Spirit [Mind].

VI. Mind.

A. True Mind; Morality [*Sittlichkeit*].

B. *Self-estranged* Mind ; Culture.

I.

II. The *Aufklärung*.

III. Reign of Terror.

C. Mind *certain of itself*, Conscience.

(CC) Religion.

VII. Religion.

A. *Natural*.

(a) Light.

(b) Plant and Animal.

(c) Artizan.

B. *Art* Religion.

(a) The Abstract Work of Art.

(b) The Living Work of Art.

(c) The Spiritual Work of Art.

C. *Revealed* Religion.

(DD) Absolute Knowledge.

VIII. Absolute Knowledge.

CHAPTER XII

HEGELIANISM AND ETHICS

LITERATURE.—A. The ethical sections (Objective Mind) of the *Philosophy of Mind*, translated by Professor Wallace. More fully in the *Philosophy of Right*, translated by Dr. Dyde.

B. Many sections of the *Phenomenology*.

C. Mr. F. H. Bradley's *Ethical Studies* and Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* are the most important works in this department produced in the course of the British Hegelian movement. A *Manual* by Professor Mackenzie, and a briefer one by Professor J. H. Muirhead, contain more recent statements of ethics from the same general point of view.

THE ordinary British reader is accustomed to do his ethical thinking under the guidance of an intuitionist theory. He believes that the final court of appeal is the voice of conscience in the human breast. He further believes—though perhaps he is increasingly conscious of the difficulties which such a position involves—that the oracle within, when you can reach it, supplies the same answers to the same questions in every human heart. He may follow one of two opinions as to particular intuitions. He may think of them as practically numberless; or he may conceive that there are a few grand *ultimate* moral intuitions, which for the most part are deductively and derivatively applied by the understanding, lawyer fashion, to particular cases

Either way, soon or late, intuitionism leaves us face to face with an atomic plurality of distinct and separate moral axioms. These are regarded as self-evidently true, and as called in question only by a dishonest heart. Accordingly, the effort to find an explanation of their authority, or the effort to unify them, is thought to be already tinged with immoral casuistry.

So closely does English popular opinion identify an earnest ethical philosophy with intuitionism, that Kant has generally been catalogued in our country as an intuitionist. The truth is very different. Kant has really gone far towards making intuitionism impossible. On the side of knowledge he has shown that the supposed given elements of perception are all shot through with the work of thought, and that the supposed distinct first principles of *a priori* connexion between things are the manifold utterances or applications of the idea of an orderly and knowable universe in Space and Time—with the vague presentiment lurking behind of a more absolute and systematic unity, such as corresponds more fully to the nature of thought. Similarly, on the side of conduct, Kant has urged that there must be *one ideal* operative in all the *dicta* of conscience. He finds, in fact, that conscience is *reason* working *practically*; and, since he accepts the theory that self-consistency is the nature of reason, he defines morality as absolutely self-consistent behaviour. ("Act so that thou canst will the maxim of thine action to be law universal.")

Hegel and other critics have had no difficulty in showing that Kant's theory breaks down at this point. If reason is purely abstract, it can yield no concrete law of duty, and formal self-consistency cannot result

in material precepts or prohibitions. On watching at all closely, we see Kant reading into the idea of abstract self-consistent law those detailed differences which constitute a significant list of duties. Hegel, however, somewhat strangely and very characteristically, seems to hold, not that Kant is wrong, but rather that Kant has brought to light the weaknesses of the merely moral consciousness. The contradictions of merely or subjectively moral thinking are supposed to play the part which is everywhere assigned in the Hegelian system to contradictions. They drive us onwards, and thus there results a more healthy and more concrete form of morality. Then later contradictions spring up which drive us entirely out of morality and the objective mind into the Absolute Mind as Art (Hegel puts this first), or as Religion (Hegel puts this second, but the English Hegelians generally incline to draw a straight line from morals to religion), or last of all as Philosophy. Yet we must not suppose that Hegel rejects morality because of its contradictions. He acts as usual: he condemns it and he spares it.

Alternatively, English and Scottish ethical thought has taken the direction of hedonism and empiricism. Dismissing intuitionism as a lurking-place of fallacies and a bulwark of indefensible and irrational abuses, eager political reformers like Bentham and the Mills have sought to make all things crystal-clear by the application of the pleasure-test. Virtue is the purchase of a deferred annuity of future pleasures at the cost of present pain. Or virtue is the law of society imposed upon the restless and possibly selfish individual, restraining him in the interests of maximum average happiness. Not to dwell upon other difficulties—the position is by

no means so crystal-clear as its votaries hoped—this evidently is a fashion not of explaining but rather of explaining away the moral consciousness. Recent empiricist work has not the frankness of Jeremy Bentham's. It inclines rather to *assume* morality as given, and to study the phenomena of its development. It would be ungracious to quarrel with this new procedure. Certainly empiricism is nearer the ways of truth when it *assumes* than when it *denies* the validity of the moral ideal. Still, it was a healthy demand on the part of the older empiricists that a reckoning should be taken, sooner or later, for all assumptions employed. How will that reckoning be faced? If empiricists are right—if we live in a world of mere phenomenal sequences—have ideals any standing ground? Evolution can do a good deal, but, if it works merely *on phenomenal lines*, can it ever justify conscience? Error has its evolution as well as truth. By asking *what has evolved?* we do not discriminate. If logic is given effect to, consistent empiricism must brand conscience as a morbid growth. Such thoroughness has already been shown by some.

Over-against Intuitionism and Empiricism, Idealism takes its stand, offering something new. It proposes to scrutinise the assumptions which Intuitionism merely reiterates; and it hopes to explain or sanction ethics without explaining it away. The general theory offered us is in essence Kant's, with a correction. Conscience is again defined as Practical Reason—or, in Hegel's own terms, Mind [*Geist*] when Theoretical is Mind Subjective and Practical Mind is Mind Objective. Its aim or ideal is self-realisation. The self to be realised is not the natural individuality or natural temperament, but rather the self as rational or social—the self which finds its

interest and its satisfaction in the claims made upon it by a seemingly alien society.

Hegel himself is evidently less interested in the moral consciousness than in the moral institution. He finds deliverance in the latter from the defects and from the sharp antitheses of the former. Sociology, Politics, Economics, Ethics, all enter into his "Philosophy of Right"—the very name is significant. If there is a stepchild in the family, it is ethics. Hegel's contempt for the subjective foams constantly into ebullition. Thus, while he admits that marriage may be entered upon either from inclination or at the paternal command, he finds that only the latter system is just to the moral interests and moral significance of the marriage union. Again, to make education pleasant to children is dangerous; we ought to break them in. Again, to claim as a right liberty for the press—to "say what it pleases"—is "undeveloped crudity and superficiality of fanciful theorising." Indeed, Hegel treats the moral consciousness almost with the impatient contempt with which his interpreter Dr. Hutchison Stirling treats the *Aufklärung*. It had to come in—of course! It has its place—no doubt! Still, it is pitifully weak and subjective; it is riddled through and through with contradictions;¹ let us hasten onwards to pleasanter and worthier themes!

Hegel's triplicity here may be taken as follows: Morality first begins to arise in the consciousness of abstract or individual *rights* over-against other individuals. Then Right gives place to Duty, and men say, with Carlyle or with Comte, "Thou hast one right—to do thy duty." But the higher truth is found in

¹ The criticism in the *Phenomenology* is particularly merciless.

the conception of concrete or social right. Neither [personal] "right for right's sake," nor [abstract] "duty for duty's sake,"¹ but rather "my station and its duties."¹ Or—with Hegel this is treated as an equivalent formula—*Both* "right for right's sake" *and* "duty for duty's sake," *and*, more emphatically, the relatively perfect stage of Social Institutions—Family, Civil Society, State. In other language—not perfectly accurate, but serviceably clear—Hegel may be said to begin with the right of the individual against society;² to proceed to the abrogation of individual right in the consciousness of the claim of [society or rather of] duty, and finally to emerge into that region of realised institutional morality where the individual is not sacrificed, but merely subordinated, and so finds his own satisfaction in serving the interests of the whole.

The first great institution is the family. Man finds his complement outside himself; individualism is proclaimed a falsehood by every happy home. Still the unity here reached exists only in the region of feeling; or, if it reappears in bodily form in the child, the child grows up to be a third individuality alongside of the parents, and on his reaching maturity the natural unity of the home undergoes its natural dissolution, and fresh homes are formed. The last fact, according to Hegel, proves the finitude or imperfection of the form of social unity found in the family, sacred as it is within its own limited sphere; and the immortality of

¹ Chapter titles in *Ethical Studies*.

² This is not strictly correct. Society has not yet been recognised. The right of the individual holds against other individuals—not against society.

the *State* is held to furnish a significant contrast. Before the State, however, we reach what Hegel calls the "Civic Community." This is civil society, not society in an indefinite sense, as pleasure-seeking or as a scene of formal intercourse and courtesy, but society as legally organised—as organised (perhaps) for the recognition and defence of those individual rights which constitute the first third (A) of the ethical treatise. If in the Family natural passion is controlled and transformed to be the vehicle not of the lowest but of the highest type of love—the moral institution *solving* in a sense the problems of abstract morality—so, too, in society the free play of private interests, being duly controlled, gives a richer life to the State. Hegel in his maturer days is not a Socialist. He condemns Plato for suppressing that subjectivity which is one element in the general weal. But Hegel is a Prussian bureaucrat; he repudiates the merely individualistic conception of the "civic community," and insists on the rights and duties of the State. Vaccination is a minor instance mentioned by Hegel; the most important instance is education. In Hegel's time Prussia had begun that career which has resulted in placing her at the head of European Powers, and she began it with Hegel's approbation.¹ Our own country, in its hesitating adoption of the same policy, has given a blow to individualistic ethical theory in Great Britain, whether intuitionist or utilitarian, from which it still reels. The State, insisting upon educating the children, has come forward as a moral institution. But theory among us tends to regard morality as

¹ Against the extravagantly vehement protests of William von Humboldt.

simply an individual concern, social action being relegated to the guidance of expediency or force. Only the High Church Anglicans believe heartily in the *control* of the individual; but the priestly control which they desire is a thing very imperfectly moral. An older instance of anti-individualist policy is furnished by a Poor Law. A modern instance, again, is the Free Library, by which Mr. Herbert Spencer is conscious of being cruelly oppressed, or those Factory Acts which, designed to regulate the work of women and children, have done so much to give legal shaping and limits to the work of men. Hegel classifies and subdivides as follows: (a) The system of wants, or economic society—here Hegel has nothing very distinctive to bring forward; (b) Administration of Justice; (c) Police [we note the bureaucrat here], and the "Corporation," as translators call it; Hegel's meaning seems to be the Trade Guild, which in his time had not yet quite accomplished its disappearance from modern life.

The third division of social or institutional morality is the State, in contrast with the merely civic community. From the idea of the unity of the State Hegel deduces *a priori* the necessity of monarchy; and although in one passage the King is described as simply dotting the i's, yet Hegel, as a good Prussian citizen, distinctly favours the Prussian rather than the English conception of a constitutional monarchy—or, as he says, the *Notion* favours Germany. A similar *a priori* deduction postulates a professional army rather than an armed nation; the defence of the State is a distinct function, and ought to be the affair of a distinct class. Hegel's admiration for war and cor-

responding contempt for the enthusiasts of peace are rather startling. The truth is, he idolises the nation-state of the present. There is hardly a shadow of difference between his doctrine that "the real is the rational"—as he applies it—and the old superstition that "whatever is is right." "The owl of Minerva," as he tells us in his *Philosophy of Right*, and as his English advocates love to quote, "only takes its flight when the shades of night are gathering." "When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old." Are we really gainers by this owlish wisdom, which depicts the past or the present as the absolute and perfect, pouring forth unmeasured scorn upon all dreams of a different and better future? It is well to assure ourselves that past history is not a mere aberration, and that morality has not been invented within the last five minutes by some revolutionary talker or journalist. Hegel—as was said of Carlyle in his time—may be a valuable alterative to our insular thought. But is not the philosopher every whit as one-sided as the fanatic whom he despises? To say of the heavy yoke of dubious custom, *it had to be*, is to make a bold assertion. When you proceed, speaking for Absolute Reason, to say further, *it has to be*—that is fatalism. Hegel's optimism at this point shows itself to be what we have called it—a remorseless naturalism. It was doubtless to him and others a comfortable faith that all dissatisfaction with the present is due to philosophical incompetence.

One even questions what is gained by contrasting the Civic Community and the State, in obedience to the trichotomy formula. Service of the State as such seems confined to the dramatic self-devotions of war.

These are indeed the chief moral benefits accruing from that dreadful evil, and they have their high excellence. But if the peace state—the so-called “civic community”—is a moral institution, positive as well as negative in its action; training the young, and slowly, as occasion serves, building up good customs into a fabric of wise and just law—is it not a somewhat pettifogging technicality which assigns less “renown” to the “victories” of such endeavour than to the service of the “State” amidst military pomp and glory?

What is really moral in these idealist ethics can be more clearly recognised in the teaching of Green than upon Hegel's own pages. It is a deep and valuable truth that, besides recognising, on the one hand rights, on the other hand a consciousness of duty, in the individual, we ought to recognise kindred rights and a kindred consciousness of duty in the State. The State will then subordinate the individual, while acknowledging a sphere into which it must not penetrate. We may even claim that individual rights and duties are not truly known or safely established until they are seen as elements in the development of something greater and wider than themselves. Whether the dialectic method is of real service here or anywhere else, seems very doubtful. Green makes no appreciable use of it. To a great extent he goes back upon Kant. Like Kant, he knows two sides of the shield of reason—theoretical and practical, reason as seen in knowledge and as seen in conduct. He is not concerned to vindicate social ethics by discrediting personal ethics; nor, again, does he teach that, in passing to religion, we transcend morality, and land in a region “beyond good and evil.”

To Hegel it is only the abstract understanding¹ which accepts the contrast of good and evil as absolute or fixed. Mr. Bradley has always concurred in this view of Hegel's; Green, we believe, never did. If one cared to adopt some of Hegel's methods, we might say that the very definition of a moral consciousness is the consciousness of a contrast which cannot be set aside or transcended. It is idle to propose to be moral on the understanding that morality is relatively binding, while on a deeper analysis it is marked out as a merely passing phase of the human or rather of the absolute spirit. Such morality is immorality. Discords may heighten the effect of a subsequent concord, but evil is no ingredient in good. Of course when we say this we incur responsibility for the old burdens and problems of the human conscience. Hegel, on the contrary, escapes these. If it be true that evil arises with automatic necessity in the development of reason—if it be true that evil (or the consciousness of evil) is simply the analogue of the Finite—if it is merely the manifestation of that *other* implied in the identity of what is self-identical, or of that *difference* which is organically involved in the unity of the universe—then evil is not evil at all; it is a form of good—deeply but not impenetrably disguised. By denying the real evilness of evil, you evade "the burden of the mystery," but you also forfeit the blessedness of good and the hope of salvation.

The English adherents of Hegel are fond of stating the principle of his ethics in the formula, *die to live*. This formula is of course rooted in the dialectic upon which Hegel builds up his entire system. When

¹ *Phenomenology*, p. 359.

quoted in the region of ethics, it implies that things are not what they seem; that the longest way round may be the nearest way home; that trial, pain, failure, [and sin?] are good things to those who are duly exercised thereby; that limits are not mere limits to us; that self is fulfilled, not beaten down, in social service. This strikes a deeper note than we hear from Hegel himself, at least within the *Philosophy of Right*. Hegel is not fond of dwelling on the thought, I—or, you—must die to live. As we have said, he is impatient of the subjective phases of morality, although he books them in his encyclopædic catalogue. In dealing with them, he insists almost exclusively upon the baffling contradictions with which they are, or may plausibly be said to be, associated. Morality is [known to us as] a progress towards goodness, full of struggle; if the ideal were reached, morality, it is said, would collapse. Morality says, Duty *ought to be* done. According to Hegel, this implies that duty *is not* done at all—it *only* ought-to-be. A less superfine reasoning will accept the moral law as proclaiming an unconditional good—one valid *even* if not obeyed, while assuredly not becoming less good if it is fulfilled. It is another question whether the conception of the good as what *merely ought* to be fulfilled is adequate to its full contents. Idealism holds strong ground when it insists that morality implies as its background a religious faith in the reign and triumph of goodness, a belief in goodness as the greatest among actualities and powers. But idealism becomes weak again when it treats this fulfilment or complement of moral law as its *negation*. Hegel further regards the advance by negation, with all that he ascribes to it, as a universal

automatic process. Life must flower from death, and the positive emerge from the negative. When he is asked for practical counsel, he says nothing so Christian-sounding as "die to live"; he repeats the cheerful and superficial antique advice, "be a citizen of a good state." The outer institution, not the inner consciousness, appears to him significant and safe. "The high for earth too high, the heroic for earth too hard, the passion that soared from earth to lose itself in the sky," find no friend in Hegel. He points out that such high-sounding claims and such tumultuous passion *may* be mere hypocritical evasion of the definite duties of earth, mere fantastic contempt for its definite possibilities of happiness—perhaps therefore contempt for our only duties and our only happiness. Granted; there is danger of hypocrisy and the like; but is it philosophical to eliminate the heart of man because some fools wear it on their sleeves for daws to peck at? That is Hegel's practice, and it leaves a great lacuna in his ethical system. He scorns to ask, what are the conditions of the subjective emergence of virtue? He is not interested in subjective virtue.

This becomes specially manifest when we turn to study his views on Free Will. No thinker ever had more ample resources for asserting libertarianism than Hegel. He insists that, in the very nature of things, individual phenomena are casual. Law defines them with *a priori* necessity up to a certain point; beyond that point their detailed embodiment is accidental. They might as well *not be* as *be*; but if the reality of things is their rationality, this fringe of the non-rational in everything that is actual can be nothing except

chance. It would have been easy for one holding this view to affirm that man's action embodies itself in an exercise of choice between opposing possibilities; and we actually find Hegel including caprice among the phases of human will. But all his emphasis is given to the assertion that freedom cannot be *merely* caprice. He never asks whether, in such a being as man and in such a world as the present, moral freedom can arise otherwise than by the exercise of moral choice between real alternatives, not narrowed to one by any outward predetermining force. He never cares to point out how the man's hair's-breadth of choice gives all its significance to human art and human conduct. Natural law gives us machine-made articles; the very irregularities of hand-made work are the vehicles for beauty and for goodness. But, as we have said, Hegel was not interested in the soul, if by soul we mean anything else than mind. It does not interest him to observe that liberty of choice is more than an exception to law, being a precondition for higher fulfilments of reason. He might agree with us that mechanism is not the highest category for interpreting this universe, or, as he indeed might say, for interpreting any part of it; but the rejection of mechanism by non-libertarians is a mere phrase. Sooner or later they have to affirm that man is mechanically determined.

Hegel only becomes of service again when we study other elements in goodness. He will teach us as clearly as any that merely to be undetermined from without cannot make us free. And we may add to his teaching the further truth that non-determination is to be used as the opportunity and vehicle for acquiring

true freedom, in self-control, and by the service of goodness.¹

¹ Outline contents. [These exactly concur with the section "Mind Objective" in the *Philosophy of Mind*, expanding a little further. The expansions are generally omitted here.]

A. Law (or Abstract Right).

(a) Property.

(α) Possession.

(β) Use.

(γ) Relinquishment.

(b) Contract.

(c) [Right *versus*] Wrong.

B. [The] Morality [of Conscience].

(a) Purpose [and Responsibility].

(b) Intention and Welfare.

(c) Goodness and Wickedness. [The Good and Conscience.]

C. The Moral Life and Social Ethics. [Ethical Observance.]

(AA) The Family.

(a) Marriage.

(b) Family Means.

(c) Education of Children and disruption of the Family.

(BB) Civil Society.

(a) The System of Wants.

(b) Administration of Justice.

(c) Police and Corporation.

(CC) The State.

(a) Constitutional Law.

I. The State Constitution.

(α) The Prince.

(b) The Executive.

(c) The Legislature.

II. Foreign Policy.

(β) International Law.

(γ) Universal History.

CHAPTER XIII

HEGELIANISM AND ÆSTHETICS

LITERATURE.—A. Briefly, in the *Philosophy of Mind* (Mr. Wallace's translation), where *Art* is expounded. The fuller *Lectures on Æsthetics* are represented by "three partial reproductions . . . in English, namely, Mr. Bryant's translation of Part II.—New York, Appleton & Co.; Mr. Kedney's short analysis of the entire work—Chicago, Griggs & Co., 1885; and Mr. Hastie's translation of Michelet's short 'Philosophy of Art,' prefaced by Hegel's Introduction, partly translated and partly analysis." A fourth is furnished by Mr. Bosanquet's translation—with an introductory essay and some notes—of Hegel's Introduction ["Phil. of Fine Art"]; the above sentence is a quotation from Mr. Bosanquet's preface.

B. The *Lectures* themselves and some sections in the *Phenomenology* ("die Kunst Religion," etc.).

C. Mr. Bosanquet's *History of Æsthetics*; Professor W. P. Ker's essay on *The Philosophy of Art*—in *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*—vivid and luminous.

ÆSTHETIC theory is little in favour in our land of common-sense. Mr. A. J. Balfour, who criticises other manifestations of "Transcendentalism," does not consider that its theories of the beautiful are worthy of more than a contemptuous footnote. His own analysis of the perception of beauty is purely sceptical and destructive. He doubts whether any such thing as beauty can be proved to exist. He feels certain that most of our supposed æsthetic admirations are due to

the concealed working of imitation and the love of fashion. One expects Mr. Balfour to dismiss the whole æsthetic fact or idea as a fraud, when suddenly "like a man in wrath his heart stands up and answers, I have felt," and we are astonished to learn that, athwart the perverse workings of natural causes, a manifestation of the Divine glory reaches our souls in beauty, more particularly in the beauty of nature. Never was there a clearer case of *Credibile est quia ineptum est; certum est quia impossibile*. Others must hold that very imperfect attempts at a philosophy of the beautiful are better than such a blending of sceptical analysis with credulous assertion.

We are prepared by Kant's grouping for Hegel's method of treatment. According to Kant, beauty is a realisation of Final Cause [which perhaps means less that "A thing of beauty is a joy for ever," than that beautiful objects are systematic wholes, all of whose detail subserves the unity]. In contrast with scientific knowledge of nature, which never can be complete—in contrast with morality, where the law of reason bridles but cannot transform the workings of passion, or, where at the best the good is struggled after—art or beauty is the ideal in the sensuous; unity attained; system realised. Only, whereas Kant regards this pre-eminent triumph of unity as vitiated in a special sense by man's subjectivity—since beauty cannot be shown to be a necessary feature in a world of orderly processes—his characteristic scepticism is no less characteristically set aside by Hegel. To Hegel, beauty is a revelation of the nature of things, or—which for Hegel has almost the same meaning—a revelation of the power of thought. Just as he believes that in the

humblest piece of mechanism there is somehow latent the spirit of Reason or of wholeness—whose presence manifests itself in the emergence, soon or late, of a *contradiction*, vitiating even the most “self-evident” explanations which treat a part as if it were an isolated whole—so he believes that in beauty this union with the whole takes visible shape and sensuous embodiment. Much more than every mechanism does every beautiful object throw light upon the whole of things. Mechanisms show that *they are imperfect* apart from a wider whole; beautiful objects exhibit the perfection of the whole embodied in a single significant image. Hegel seeks a proof of this by means of the assertion that beauty [art beauty] exhibits the power of thought to deal with an absolute content. Art for him belongs to the nature of religion. “Religion” is the general name which he gives to the “Absolute Spirit”—that region where we deal with the whole as a whole, with the perfect as perfect, or with thought as thought. In art, he tells us, we have the idea objectified sensuously and immediately; in religion proper we have it subjectively, in emotion and in *Vorstellung*-thought; in philosophy we have it in the form of true thought, which is both more fully subjective than any emotion or any *Vorstellung*, and more truly objective than any natural sensuous object.

Hegel's Philosophy of Art receives a twofold praise from Mr. Bosanquet. Partly, as already noted, he commends its excellent remarks in detail; this is to praise Hegel as an essayist. But partly also he admires the book because it may serve as a good introduction to Hegel's system. Such praise as this gives one pause. Is it not significant if a Hegelian philosophy

of art teaches at least as much regarding philosophy proper as regarding art proper? Certainly Hegel, here as always, keeps his general principles fully in view. In the first place, he is anxious to show that the Idea ("Totality") is found embodied in the beautiful. In the second place, he is anxious to show that the various phases of art arrange themselves in a regular sequence of contrasts. And that is all. Whether art or beauty adds anything to our conception of the Absolute, he does not inquire. His conception of thought as not simply the predominant partner but the universal essence in existence, robs the phases of the Philosophy of Spirit of most of their interest. Yet surely we ought to learn from them something fresh?¹ Of course beauty is not set aside by Hegel any more than he sets aside goodness. There are forms of art, just as there are moral institutions, which gain his respect as actualities. On the other hand, when we come to consider religion, we shall find it hard to verify in religion as such—and as contrasted with philosophical thought—any value for Hegel. There are ethnic religions, but they are "creeds outworn"; and, while Christianity is politely described as "absolute religion," the absolute religion, when distilled into pure thought, scarcely resembles historical Christianity, which latter is of service only to the unthinking popular mind.² Yet surely even the most and the best that Hegel says for the realisations of the idea is inadequate. It is hardly

¹ Or is it the peculiar glory of *ethics* to serve as a literal revelation of absolute truth? And may we permit beauty and all else to be indefinitely transmuted in the Absolute, so long as we know with assurance that God is good?

² See below, Chapter XV.

enough to be told, they are phases, or to be told further that their own subordinate phases—with the help perhaps of a little judicious pressure—pack neatly together in the recognised way.

The beauty of nature is dismissed by Hegel somewhat brusquely. In the Introduction he remarks that nature stands lower than the lowest manifestations of [human] mind, and that natural beauty is therefore essentially inferior to art. This is surely a case of *ignoratio elenchi*. In perceiving nature to be beautiful, we transcend the point of view from which nature can be described as *merely* natural. It becomes to us a manifestation of mind and a work of God. *Mere nature* is an unreal abstraction—the reality is nature as a manifestation of spirit. Hegel knows this well; in fact, it is his own teaching; but the ground of his confidence in regarding “nature” as an abstraction is mainly that *we* are here. His Theism on the most favourable view is too thin and too vague to allow him to regard nature as a work of mind independently of the human mind. His God is too little objective to have His presence traced when He is not obviously working through the finite spirit of man. But since the days of Wordsworth it has been common property that we get closest to nature’s spiritual meanings when the distracting influence of our fellow-men is least. Hence, while art beauty is of less significance in a spiritual religion, the beauty of nature has become profoundly important in these latter days to all religious minds.

Returning a little later in a special section to the subject of natural beauty, Hegel places his disparagement of nature upon somewhat different grounds.

Beauty must be looked for in nature; for nature is the "first reality" of the Idea (its "higher reality" being the human spirit, with its works, artistic and other). We find beauty in nature chiefly in living forms. This is an interesting reminiscence of Kant, and an interesting attempt to blend the two unconnected sides of his *Critique of Judgment*. In contrast with the lower beauty of symmetry in the crystal (seen again in art in the region of architecture), we find higher expressiveness in the living body as the phenomenal realisation of the unity of the soul or life. It is a specimen of Hegel's idealistic assumptions—or of the steadiness of his idealistic faith—that he should insist on regarding the body as a congruous expression of the soul; just as he considers the *human* body not an accidental emblem, but necessarily the very highest phenomenal expression of reason. Here, then, Hegel would have us look for natural beauty—in beautiful forms of life.¹ And we find it; but it proves to be an imperfect thing, partly because (even in man, with his more expressive countenance and blushing skin) we only see the outward manifestation, not the inward life-unity, partly because everything natural depends upon external and so far accidental conditions. Thus the beautiful body may be pinched and starved for lack of food. Only the work of art lives in a realm of unchanging beauty, superior to most if not absolutely to all natural accidents. Once again we must ask whether Hegel has not been rendered obsolete by Wordsworth. Hegel's description may serve well enough for the beauty of rich and cultivated nature: what shall we say of the

¹ The beauty of vegetable life—flowers, fruit, trees, forests—seems rather slurred over.

modern taste for mountaineering? Is it a mere aberration?

When we pass in Hegel to the phases of art, we have two series, more or less modified: one for art in general, the other a sequence of the special arts. In general, art is said to have progressed from *symbolic* art through *classical* to *romantic* art. Or, as we might paraphrase this, it has passed from *inartistic* art through *artistic* art to an art which is *more than* artistic, and which therefore cannot embody all its meanings. The special arts come in the sequence—Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music, Poetry. Architecture is the characteristically symbolic art. It is kindred to those rude stones which expressed the piety of early and pre-artistic ages. Here Hegel is probably misled by his authorities in supposing that the stones in question ranked as symbols to those who actually worshipped them in the Stone Age. It is a defect in the essayist's method of penetrating to truth, that he is a good deal at the mercy of any fine interpretation which occurs to him. Yet it is difficult to tie down an idealist to an error on a question of fact. He can always hold that *un sich*, and from some more authoritative point of view, truth was as he stated it, and Stonehenge, *e.g.*, *was* a great collection of symbols. In a more advanced age, we have artistic temples, in which the religious meaning of this art of stone masses is still obvious. Sculpture is the classical art *par excellence*, and it has its characteristic manifestation in the production of a Divine image in a fair human form—solid or real in space, or, as it were, safely fixed in absolute embodiment, but without colour except in the material. Greek religion took its gods from the artists

as it took its scriptures from Homer. The work of art was the absolute and adequate realisation of its attitude towards the Divine. When a higher type of religion came in contact with the classical world, the old gods fell without a struggle. Here again Hegel is probably wrong—but is the error of any great importance?—in supposing that Greek statues were without colour. It is doubtful, too, whether he does justice to the deeper elements in Greek religion; and this is a graver matter. We all know the man who gets identified with one particular line of activity, and is forced to adhere to it, even when he would fain make a change, because the public has catalogued him, and will not be perplexed with cross entries. So to Hegel the Greek is the artist *par excellence*, and if the Greek is religious, he must be artistically religious, with all the consequences and with all the weaknesses that such a position entails. Probably Greek religion was affected by the hypertrophy of the Hellenic art consciousness, but it will not do to omit contrary evidence, or to assume the full normality of the predominance of the art temper in Greece, when we see it overmastering religion. There remain the three romantic arts—first, painting, where reality is represented in a more ideal form by a merely coloured surface; secondly, music, where art passes altogether out of space [Mr. Bosanquet thus interprets Hegel's references to a *quivering point*], and lives, as it were ideally, in mere time; finally, poetry, where sensuous beauty counts for little [Hegel is prepared to say, *goes for nothing*], and the beauty of *ideas* remains. On the whole, Hegel seems right in this last matter. When Tennyson sings his song of "O swallow, swallow," the beautiful image of the bird rises before

the mind, and we have a thrill of æsthetic pleasure. Take the noun as a verb, however, and think of swallowing food—the beauty of the words vanishes, overborne by the commonness of their signification. Again, Matthew Arnold quotes as a sample of a rhythm grateful to English or German ears—

“Siehst sehr sterbeblässig aus,
Doch getrost! du bist zu Haus.”¹

Will any reader lay his hand upon his heart, and say that in themselves these are beautiful sounds? Undoubtedly, within the limits of the material (*i.e.*, first, language as significant of ideas; secondly, the particular language used), the poet ought to make his verse graceful and musical. But when it is hinted that Shelley can write witching verses with no particular meaning, a doubtful compliment is paid to the poet. Such lines in a sense might be beautiful, but they would not be poetry.

The three romantic arts are supposed as a whole to be later than the other arts. Once again this seems a very questionable position in the light of fact. We moderns cannot criticise ancient paintings, because—in spite of their art “immortality”—their material has mostly crumbled away with the lapse of time; but, judging from the extraordinary merit of fragmentary remains like those of Pompeii—second-rate work of their period, as practised by the artists of a little Italian provincial town—we must hesitate to proclaim our modern superiority. And is poetry, the oldest form of literature, so modern an art? Must we thrash

¹ Quoted with rapture for its “rhythm” by Matthew Arnold, *Essays in Criticism*, p. 150.

out again the endless controversy of moderns *versus* ancients? Only in one art can we claim unquestionable superiority, namely, in music, and that on the ground of our extrinsic advantages in technique. Instrumental music is a modern creation. The music of the ancients, always wedded to words and not perfectly disentangled from the dance,¹ was to a symphony or a sonata what a banjo is to the mighty organ or to the complex harmony of the orchestra.

Hegel has classified the arts partly by the art-idea of expressiveness, partly under the obsession of the contrast of subject and object. A humbler but more practical treatment might be content to group the forms of beauty in their relation to human uses, somewhat as follows:—First, we might place architecture at the head of all the arts and crafts—that of dress not omitted—by which use is made beautiful. Secondly, we might name the arts of pure creative beauty—not use idealised, but the ideal followed for its own sake. Thirdly, we have beauty recognised in nature. Which is the greatest? (Is there anything gained by such a discussion?) Much is to be said for the opinion that art is most truly estimated when viewed as the idealisation of the useful. If we adopt this view, we shall agree with Ruskin that architecture must always be the fundamental art. There is no more conclusive proof of vulgarity than the disposition to treasure up a few beautiful things in cabinets, while we are content to let comfort displace beauty in the things of daily life. To *endimancher* one's self is as thoroughly bad in art, as a religion for Sunday which has no

¹ Why has Hegel omitted *dancing* from the arts? In the *Phenomenology* the religious procession at least has its place.

effect on the other days of the week is bad in morals. Compromise, no doubt, is the highest attainment we can reach in serving the beautiful. It will not always be possible *miscuere utile dulci*. But, just as a religious view of beauty in nature believes in its ubiquity, in spite of its shining through into our minds at certain points only, so a moral view of art will teach us not to cultivate beauty on rare holidays, but, so far as we can, to make the whole of life a poem. And while beauty stands lower than goodness, goodness which ignores beauty is very imperfectly good. Here again we must be content if we can recognise distinct aspects of the ideal. We must not demand that the aspects should always manifestly pass into a unity. Beauty and goodness are separate; art ceases to be art if it works directly for moral purposes. But we need both; and idealism may well remind us that both belong to the nature of things or to the workings of reason. We may arrange the two in a definite order as superior and inferior, but we must recognise the higher as incorporating the lower, not superseding it. Even in modern industrial life, with its organised hideousness in dwellings, in factories, in masculine dress, we see everywhere, however unadorned in actual result, things which have no motive except ornament. Even the chimney-stalk or the mill may have its poor attempt at a cornice. These groping efforts are the legible signature of the Ideal.

But the idealisation of the useful, though it may be the chief thing in art, cannot stand alone. If we love to make useful things beautiful, then we must love, so far as we have opportunity, to make or acquire beautiful things which are not useful; else our love

for beauty is shallow. And so again, if we are lovers of natural beauty, we shall also love to make our own work beautiful. It is unnecessary to endorse the high-flown claim that art is superior to nature in point of beauty. Only in relation to ourselves can it be said that art stands higher. We are too near our own life, amid the actual and the useful, to discern its ideal meaning. We cannot scan the universe in those grand proportions in which all discords are resolved to harmony. So we create a little conventional human world of beauty upon the level of our own eyes; it may mean little in itself, but it means much to us. And, as Browning has said, in enjoying our own efforts we learn to appreciate more fully the beauty round about us. If indeed God had made His world—men and women, flowers, birds, fruits, animals, landscapes—fundamentally ugly, it would be useless for art to ride forth knight-erranting in order to show how things ought to have been made. Since they are made beautiful, it is for art to disengage the types from the details in which (*for us*) they are apt to be lost, presenting them—according to the limits and opportunities of the sundry art materials—in significant and characteristic attitudes. We must remember, indeed, that there is another cognate category. Everything which exists, we may say, shows the marks of the ideal, since it is either beautiful, more or less, or else more or less *comical*, or both beautiful and comical. The artist and the caricaturist are alike—if not in equal measure—ministers of the ideal. The latter's art is easier and also lower; but, if rightly practised and limited, it has its own place. During our present imperfect civilisation, men of the Western races are

much more plainly susceptible of the idealisation of the caricaturist than of that which makes or finds us beautiful. But we may hope that this is a mark of temporary evils. The beauty of human life ought not always to lie so deeply hidden.

Hegel divides and contrasts *classical* and *romantic* not *idealist* and *realist*. We may regard the two groupings as furnishing very nearly pairs of synonyms; but, from the point of view of idealism at least, formal realism is not a kind of art, but the negation of art. Or it is a polar extreme, a limit in a certain direction. If reached, it would imply the cessation of art; but, so long as it is not reached, art stays between these two extremes—an idealism, in which fact is suppressed and generalised so as to make plain paths for our sympathies; and a realism, in which we flee from the conventionalities of ordinary idealist treatment, and make sure of rich material, whether or not we can handle it worthily. The handling is the art; beauty is form, not substance, and a good song is better than a bad epic; but the ideal idealism will appropriate all materials, re-embodiment them so as to manifest their beauty and meaning. How many books we may regard as attempts to answer a riddle! "You say you cannot sympathise with such and such action—you condemn it unheard? Well, I am going to show you that it is natural, characteristic, beautiful, when its circumstances are explained and rightly understood. Will you really disparage my Dorothea Brooke? Will you really slander my Diana Merriam?" For this as for other reasons, art grows more complex as evolution proceeds. The easier themes are worked out and worn threadbare; late comers must use more

complex machinery if they are to make æsthetic impressions upon us. But as there are reactions against conventional types of beauty, so there come to be movements of reaction against undue elaborateness; and a higher stage in evolution retrenches the complexity which was necessary at a lower stage. Thus mind ever and again returns upon itself.

No part of man's nature (which is God's image) can safely be starved; and, so far as it is true that the English people "entered the prison of Puritanism," we have paid a heavy penalty for doing so. If we had been a more artistic people we might have been less Mammonite. Should we have been less pleasure-loving? Art has the twofold effect of developing and of controlling the love of pleasure. Much depends upon the maintenance of a due balance between these two tendencies. Art is the idealisation—if you will, the redemption—of pleasure considered as a natural incident in the human psychology. What was originally a mere perishing sensuous particular becomes of abiding significance when it *refines*. On this point, once more, we have nothing better to hope for in practical life than compromise. It is impossible to relax one's self effectually over the Hundred Best Books. The art which appeals to the people must be simple; the pleasures of the people will always be a shade rough, if not coarse. When we can discern even a leavening of beauty, we may be satisfied that something good has been accomplished.

Once again, in discussing Evolution we inquired whether a belief in the evolution of man from nature did not point to our acceptance of "secondary qualities" as equally real with "primary qualities." These

secondary qualities are the seat of the beautiful; and the perception of beauty is a refutation of materialism in any proper or strict sense of that word. As, subjectively, art is the idealisation of pleasure, so, objectively, beauty is the spiritualisation of material nature. While unsophisticated empiricism may claim to regard some things as beautiful and others as ugly, idealism teaches us that, looked at from the right point of view, all things are beautiful.

According to the lowest conceivable empiricist view, *beauty is the organic source of pleasure to one of the senses*.¹ It is already an advance, if also a sophistication, when beauty is recognised as a secondary product in psychical evolution by means of *association*. Within the limits of the method of individual psychology—at any rate—this doctrine of beauty explains beauty away; not being an original psychological element, it is treated as a hallucination. We cannot possibly admit that casual association is the only source of a sense of the beautiful; but as little can we exclude association from playing some part in æsthetic pleasure. “The dear—the brief—the for ever remembered” of which Thackeray speaks,² are all or mostly treasures and pleasures of *association*. Higher senses may produce effects independently of it: lower senses pass into the region of the beautiful by means of its help. We can hardly call scents beautiful in themselves; by association they

¹ The present writer can remember struggling to formulate that precious doctrine as a very young student, when he was in rebellion against first lessons in metaphysics upon the lines of the Scottish philosophy.

² *Roundabout Papers*, quoted in Dr. John Brown's *Horæ Subsecivæ*, 2nd Series, p. 192.

may thrill our very hearts. And words? And phrases? Can we draw any hard and fast line between æsthetic effects and accidental pleasures due to association? Is not the truth this, that beauty is primarily sensuous; else, no beauty at all; but that beauty grows and evolves and becomes alive with spiritual suggestions? Some of these latter, though poor specimens, are found in the *associations* of the Allison-Jeffrey theory. Beauty is one of the experiences of a spiritual being. Man's spiritual nature leads him to immerse himself with delight in the sensuous, because of its fair material qualities. But his spiritual nature will not let him halt there. Beauty in the end includes those things which a *developing spiritual being* finds to be beautiful.

Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine, that beauty evolves out of play, seems to be an interesting and accurate archæological note, but throws no light upon the spiritual meanings of beauty. These are invisible at first. It is in the higher members of a series that we perceive the drift and tendency of an evolution. It is the higher ranges of æsthetic experience, not its poor beginnings, which show what beauty is.

NOTE.

HEGEL'S "DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT" (Mr. Bosanquet's translation).

1. The Condition of Artistic Presentation in the Correspondence of Matter and Plastic Form.
2. Part I. The Ideal.
3. Part II. The Types of Art.
 - (a) Symbolic Art.
 - (β) Classical Art.
 - (γ) Romantic Art.

4. Part III. The Several Arts.

(a) Architecture.

(β) Sculpture.

(γ) Romantic Art.

i. Painting.

ii. Music.

iii. Poetry.

CHAPTER XIV

HEGELIANISM AND HISTORY

LITERATURE.—Hegel's *Philosophy of History* is translated by Sibree, and summarised by Professor Morris in his series of *German Philosophical Classics*. The Lectures on the *History of Philosophy* are also translated (by Miss E. S. Haldane). Parts of the *Philosophy of Religion* (see Chap. XV.), of the *Aesthetics* (pp. 218, 233), and of the *Phenomenology* contain historical materials.

IN proceeding to discuss Hegel's attitude towards history, we are retracing the ground covered (or to be covered) in the departments of the Philosophy of Spirit. On the other hand, the problems or difficulties which we now encounter are the same which met us in the Philosophy of Nature. Hegel has the same arduous task to accomplish there and here. He must deduce facts, or at least he must account for them in the light of pure thought. Real facts physically separated in space constitute nature; real events separated from each other in time—perhaps we ought to add, not barely repeating each other, but forming a progressive development—constitute history. It may not be possible to draw any absolute contrast between the two regions. If modern evolutionary science is founded in fact, there is something of development, something historical, something spiritual, even in material nature.

And yet it remains true, as when Hegel wrote, that on the whole natural processes are marked by repetition and history by progress. The other portions of the Philosophy of Spirit, in which, as we have said, Hegel reviews the same ground which has to be studied in the light of history, aim at a sort of ideal analysis of reality. Or, to use more modern slang, their study is statical, not dynamic. If they bring to light definite facts, *e.g.* social institutions, yet they do not introduce us to particular details; they can always generalise. History is, like nature, a world of details, while it is—unlike nature—a world of significant details. So the problem emerges again here which caused us hesitation or misgivings when we looked at Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Can even the highest philosophical theory quite succeed in laying down the law to reality? If it is able to draw general outlines, but declines to fill them in, how far is this sketching or shading to be carried, and how can we justify its being arrested? If we assume that we can construe the significant individual detail, how shall we act if no detail appears¹ to correspond with our deduction? Is our deduction a mere label; have we a large liberty of shifting labels without philosophical discredit?²

The Philosophy of History deals with the Objective Spirit³—with morals, or with the ethical institution; the subject of a systematic treatise in the Philosophy

¹ Compare the passage from Michelet in regard to nature, p. 153.

² Dr. Pfleiderer put Mark where Baur put Luke and Luke where Baur put Mark, but still produces a dualism and a synthesis. Is that satisfactory?

³ Psychology (or Subjective Spirit) has no history—reasonably enough; but if so, can it be rightly grouped on the same line with other portions of the Philosophy of Spirit?

of Right. All three departments of Absolute Spirit have their historical development; so all have their historical treatment by Hegel, either separately or in combination with their systematic exposition. Art has a history,¹ and religion, and absolute knowledge or philosophy; hence philosophy has to deal with these subjects not merely in abstract analysis, but in the sequence of their concrete phenomenal forms.

There can be no doubt that Hegel's work on history has more substantial value by a great deal than his Philosophy of Nature. History was a region in which he was more at home. The degree of value to be attached to Hegel's historical work may be differently determined by different disciples or critics, and the sources of that value may be variously traced to a *priori* insight, or to a *posteriori* knowledge, or to both causes. Dr. Stirling seems inclined to impute almost unlimited excellence to Hegel's results and to the philosophical method used in their attainment. Hegel is often led to the facts by the requirements of his ideal system.² That is surely a doubtful compliment. It recalls the boast of a great poet—Dryden—how the requirements of rhyme had led to some of his happiest poetical turns. Rhyme might do this at times, but it was likely oftener to lead to platitudes or irrelevances. Thought should lead rhyme, not rhyme thought. Simi-

¹ No attempt will be made in this chapter to deal with the history of *Æsthetics*.

² Hegel's principle "seems not to have been always for him a canon of regulation, but sometimes also an organon of discovery. There are several points of view in his *Æsthetic* and *Philosophy of History*, for example, to which he appears to have been led in simply prosecuting the dialectic of the Notion."—*Schwogler*, pp. 437, 438. Again compare the passage from Michelet on p. 153.

larly, ideal meanings ought to be elicited from facts, not imposed on them. It is a perilous achievement to construe or deduce facts that hitherto have been unobserved. And yet, so important are general ideas, that *any* scheme may be better, however forced and artificial it be, than a planless heaping up of particulars. Jowett's praise is also worth recalling.¹ On the other hand, a capable if severe philosophical critic of Hegel tells us² that "it will be time to reconsider the claims of the Hegelian logic when some competent historian confesses himself content with the account of Greek philosophical development"; the critic goes on to express a similar censure on other parts of Hegel's work. It would be beyond the province of the present writer to express an opinion upon the merits or demerits of Hegel in points of historical detail. But one may continue to believe that philosophy has a great deal to do in the way of interpreting history, and yet may think that here, as usual, Hegel exaggerates what is to be accomplished by deduction, or construction, and underrates what is to be learned from specific experience.

A somewhat unexpected view of Hegel's historical work is propounded by Mr. McTaggart. He finds that in those regions Hegel was not at his strongest, but rather at his weakest and least authoritative. In anti-metaphysical days, when Hegel the philosopher is losing ground, Hegel the historian is likely to secure a larger proportional meed of praise. Even his *a priori* elements, or some of them, seem to have more in their favour when applied to history. The idea of progress

¹ Above, p. 90.

² Mr. A. E. Taylor in *International Journal of Ethics*, April 1901, p. 356.

by antagonism bewilders us in other regions; but no one can find such a suggestion violent or incredible when history is under discussion; nor can it be denied that Hegel accumulated much knowledge of historical phenomena and wielded his knowledge with characteristic power. But Mr. M'Taggart inverts the usual comparisons. He tries to bring Hegel's pretensions within more manageable limits—startling as they still are when he takes leave of them; and in seeking to do this he would have us be satisfied with the general result of the dialectic, while he bids us drop the pretension (or the illusion) that the principle established by philosophy is able to specify its own particulars in the region of fact. Therefore, although we know clearly that "reality is rational and righteous," yet we have no right to say *a priori* in what successive phases this righteous reality must find phenomenal embodiment. Hegel ought to have recognised more fully, and stated more clearly than he ever did, that, as a historian, he is simply a diligent inductive worker, who has written intelligent essays on the broader aspects of history, while he happens further to be the author of some remarkable books on metaphysics. The greatness of Hegel as a philosopher does not guarantee his work as a historian. Errors in history, if such are proved, do not really discredit the philosophy.

The assertion is bold and ingenious, but we cannot believe it to be sound. Whether or not the *phrase* "absolute idealism" implies that Hegel is aiming at the construction of an absolute philosophy,¹—Mr. M'Taggart may possibly be right in his minimising interpretation of the epithet "absolute," though we cannot

¹ *Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 69. Compare above, pp. 34, 161.

see that his rendering does it justice,—at any rate, Hegel *is* aiming at that. The whole structure of his philosophy implies the proud claim; and history, like everything else, must become *a priori* if it is to rank as philosophical. But there is still more to be said. Hegel has taught us that philosophical analysis requires us to take the categories or conceptions which interpret the world of reality *in a certain fixed order*. We do not say that such an “irreversible sequence” implies time or implies history. Probably, so far as it is legitimate to put the dilemma, whether the dialectic is *in* or *out of time*, Mr. McTaggart gives the correct answer in affirming that the dialectic is not in time. To Hegel the dialectic is a sequence of terms ideally implying each other. If the terms can be said to have real existence, they *co-exist*; theirs is a succession in rank or in meaning, not in being. But if time succession is not found in the Logic, succession of its own sort is vital to it; and when time appears elsewhere, and the human spirit is watched growing into its possessions by the time series or time succession of history, is it credible that the two sequences—ideal and historical, in thought and in time—should have nothing to do with each other? What else can they be but correspondent? Hegel’s premises necessarily carry that conclusion.

Hegel has indeed one means of evasion; and it again has come under our notice in looking at his treatment of the Philosophy of Nature. It is possible to decline responsibility for the deduction of “accidental” and “contingent” facts. One knows what this means in history. The Peloponnesus is roughly of the shape of a vine leaf; but can the Philosophy of

History be fairly called on to show cause why the peninsula¹ *must* have been of that shape? On the other hand, the particularity of the historical detail is of greater scientific importance than the particularity of a natural fact, which—at least for our knowledge—is simply one of its kind. For nature repeats itself, but history progresses. On many grounds, then, it would be safer to treat historical “contingency” as due to our shortsightedness, than to detect in it an element of unreason somehow involved in the development and fulfilment of reason. No one can say how far the relations of things may penetrate into each other. Doubtless, had the Peloponnesus been of any other shape, human history would have manifested the growth of reason, and Greece would have had her glories; but history would not have been quite what we know it. To *prove* anything *absolutely* contingent, absolutely unimportant, is as far beyond our powers as to deduce the necessity of particular facts. Once again; it is with the elimination (absolute, or practical) of the contingent that science begins. Hegel makes it very plain indeed that in his belief philosophy has to do with *what must be*. If, then, Hegel has reduced or elevated history into a *philosophy* of history, are not the facts which it deigns to notice certified by their presence in the book as non-contingent—significant—essential? And, as we hold Hegel to have been right in believing in metaphysics, wrong only in denying or ignoring its limits, so also here. He was right in aiming at a philosophical treatment of the greater features of his-

¹ To describe any historical *event*—in contrast with the *physical conditions* of history—as “contingent,” would be more difficult. I am not sure that Hegel has ever done that.

tory. He was wrong (as we think) in not marking out the limits under which he worked, or in not frankly admitting their importance.

Another consideration may show us how deeply Mr. M'Taggart's revision of Hegel's legitimate claims would modify the whole view of history associated with Hegel's thinking. Hegel traces development in history—the development of reason; and we may say that he has a far clearer and deeper insight into the meanings of “development” or “evolution” than the average evolutionary theorist of modern times. What develops must be a unity through the whole process of change; in all transformations — no one believes in transformation more heartily than Hegel—there must be an identity manifesting and fulfilling itself by the process. But, according to Mr. M'Taggart, we are thwarted in our study of time-developments by the *manifoldness* of history. The ideal clues furnished by philosophy do not avail in that region. We have not *one* historical development before us; we have always to deal with a number of parallel developments interfering with each other. To put this differently: whatever may be true in metaphysical analysis of content as to the victorious career of the Notion, yet, when we turn to the time-record of humanity, we have no higher category available than reciprocity.¹ There may be a great deal of truth in Mr. M'Taggart's view as a summary of the facts of the case. We, who believe in the limitation of human faculty, are quite prepared to find that man's science of history will very imperfectly fulfil its own

¹ Mr. M'Taggart hopes much, however, from “a treatment of abstract qualities rather than actual facts.” To abstract qualities the Dialectic may—or must—apply.

ideal. We are not surprised if it has ragged edges or difficult frontier problems. But many of Hegel's positions must be given up before such a view can be held. In the first place, Hegel conceives that the solution of knowledge-problems secures the determination of corresponding issues in every region of experience. Wherever mankind rises to the faculty of philosophising, Hegel is pledged to regard the resulting philosophies as the quintessence of all their history. And in regard to the history of philosophy he tells us, without the least disguise or ambiguity, that the sequence of philosophical ideas is the sequence of logical categories.

Then, secondly, Hegel holds that—philosophy being after all the affair of only a few—religion states philosophical truth as nearly as the multitude are able to receive it. It is therefore in the sequence of the great religions that we are to trace the inner movement of the world's life and thought. No doubt Hegel calls the religion of Christian civilisation "revealed" religion,¹ implying thereby chiefly this, that only in Christianity has religion come to itself; the central truth of Christianity (as he deems it)—the truth of the unity of God and man²—being that at which all

¹ "Revelate rather than revealed," Harris, *Hegel's Logic*, p. 103. "The religion that reveals rather than is revealed," *ibid.* p. 104. Of course Hegel often uses the language of belief in revelation. Probably this is only his account of how the unphilosophical must conceive the matter. See next chapter.

² "Unity or union," says Dr. Morris, *Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History*, p. 238. We should say not union but unity. We believe that Hegel's theory as decisively excludes the ["synthetic"] union of God and man in a historical atonement as it affirms their inherent and unalterable unity.

other religions unsuccessfully aim. Christianity therefore proclaims a God who is known to His inmost recesses; other religions, especially the Pantheistic, have an unknown God. The historic sequence of religions appears then to be a prehistory rather than a history proper. It is the embryology of the normal religious consciousness. For the whole civilised world, that historical sequence is concluded and done with.¹ At the same time, Hegel believes that the lower religions evolved themselves by automatic development into the highest religion of all; and thus their series is for him one of the grand processions of reason. In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel called the lower religions Nature Religion and Art Religion; in the *Philosophy of Religion* he says Nature Religion and Religion of Spiritual Individuality—each dividing (at least in the later treatise) into several historical types. The former sees God in nature, the latter in man; Absolute Religion sees God both in nature and in man.² The first group of religions tends to Pantheism and Agnosticism. They are on the lines of the cosmological argument for the Being of God, which—according to Hegelian interpretation; and that interpretation has a great deal to say for itself—does *not* point to a “first cause” outside the universe, but to an Absolute which *is* the universe; or, alternatively, to an absolute of which you can say nothing more than this, that if it is *not* the universe, it is, unlike it, unknown, un-

¹ Mr. McTaggart very aptly observes that Hegel has omitted from the review of historical religion the inconvenient fact of Mohammedanism. Of course it forces an entrance into the *Philosophy of History*.

² This and a few following sentences reproduce Dr. Edward Caird more directly than Hegel.

knowable. The second group of religions tends to Dualism. It corresponds to the Design Argument. There is no doubt that its God or gods have sharp and definite personality; the question is whether they are absolute enough to rank as Divine. The supreme phase, Absolute Religion, corresponds to the Ontological Argument, or to Christianity, with its spiritual, fully self-revealing, all-creating, all-atoning God. Hegel does not so clearly apply the trichotomy to the historical religions. Beginning with magic and fetichism¹ as the lowest form of nature-religion, and therefore the lowest form in which religion is possible—the magician *controls* natural objects, and so initiates the long triumphs of spirit—he goes on to recognise three phases of Pantheism; but he interposes a group of *transitional forms*—three in number, however—between these and the “religions of spiritual individuality,” which again are three—Judaism, Greece, Rome. And as sequel to these—out of Judaism, says Hegel in orthodox enough tones; not as a synthesis of these with Pantheism; if as a synthesis at all, then as a synthesis of “Hebraism and Hellenism”—comes Christianity.² Hegel is still recognised by writers on the History or Science of Religion as the first great Master of that new and difficult study. We must confess what splendid outlines he has drawn, and how suggestive his groupings are. But, while the Christian demurs to accept the world’s religious history as a pure

¹ The phenomena called by this misleading and ambiguous name seem to be in reality a phase of the cultus of spirits, and to indicate degeneration rather than primitive conditions.

² We return to this sequence immediately, in giving a brief outline of Hegel’s view of history in general.

and orderly evolution under normal conditions,¹ the scientific worker may well doubt whether, even at the present day, with all our added knowledge, any systematic construction of the course of the world's religious thought is yet possible. So many different views are plausible; so little can be called certain.

When we come to the Philosophy of History, we have political history to deal with. But Hegel does not allow that this constitutes merely one aspect of reality among others. From its own point of view, it is a totality. There is a development before us—the development of freedom; which for Hegel means pretty much the same thing as the development of reason. At first *one* is free; then a few; finally freedom is extended to all.² This “freedom” is almost the same thing as moral or civic goodness; it is self-development or self-control. External conditions are frankly accepted as affecting and modifying the development, yet not so as to interfere with its essential quality. Evolving freedom may be now helped, now hindered, by geography, climate, etc.; still rational freedom is what evolves. Here as elsewhere Hegel, in comparison with many Hegelians, stands free from schematic formalism.³

Hegel's position towards great men is neither that of the romantic school, who resolve history into a string of biographies, nor that of the empiricist scienti-

¹ The Christian position is further treated in the next chapter.

² The “formal” and “real freedom” doctrine, however, as applied for political purposes, rather hampers this programme. See above, p. 80.

³ Compare, however, the opinion quoted from Dr. Stirling on p. 237.

fic school, who find the great man a mere executive agent of masterful circumstances.¹ To Hegel the great man is indispensable. At the same time he is merely an executive agent, acting *for the Spirit of the Age*. On the other hand, the Spirit of the Age needs a great man before it can act with any effect. The distinctive result of Hegel's point of view is seen in his regarding the great man as essentially the good man—or, to put this differently, in his ranking greatness above goodness. Thus in history as elsewhere we have cause to wonder at the passionate coldness of his intellectualism and at his remorseless optimism.

Taking the three different books together, Hegel's attitude towards history works out somewhat as follows. Our first knowledge of settled governments introduces us to the great unprogressive empires or civilisations of the East.² And, even from the point of view of progress, it is *a priori* expedient that non-progressiveness should be embodied in significant forms. The religion of these lands is Pantheistic and thus still *natural*; consecrating either the traditional civilisation of China, where the Emperor alone is a free man and the Emperor alone worships heaven, or consecrating the iron rigidity of Indian caste, or consecrating (in Buddhism) what Hegel regarded—in accordance with views generally held in his time, but since then greatly modified or wholly abandoned—as an abstract reaction against the abstract

¹ Mr. W. D. Howells very fittingly criticised Seeley's *Napoleon* by saying that analysis seemed to find in Napoleon's career nothing more than what any competent cavalry officer might have done in his place.

² Recent discovery has pushed back much further both in Egypt and in Babylonia. Compared with these past civilisations—to say nothing of the ages of barbarism—the Chinese empire is but modern.

supremacy of the Brahmins and the abstract separation of caste from caste. In admitting next a *transitional* group of religions, Hegel seems to do partial homage to the authority of fact. The religions of Persia (light), of Syria (pain), of Egypt (mystery) are half spiritual or moral or intellectual, but still half natural. The second great group of religions—negation or opposite of the first group—are those properly spiritual or moral or intellectual—Judaism standing for Sublimity, Greece for Art, Rome for Utility. In the *Philosophy of History* the central negative region includes two periods—that of Greece and that of Rome. As Mr. M'Taggart remarks, Hegel "would probably have found no difficulty on his own principles in reducing" these to one; he finds it "significant that Hegel did not think it worth while to do so"—implying that even the Master himself may have been quite half-conscious that his work in history was formally imperfect, and lacked complete scientific authority. At this stage in history, some—an aristocracy—are free, in comparison with the solitary Oriental despot. Some therefore have in this period the opportunity of moral self-fulfilment. In regard to religion, it is made plain for us that this is a negative period interposed dialectically between the two affirmatives. Both the *Phenomenology* and the *Philosophy of History* strongly depict the misery of the age as a precondition—and of course also as promise and potency—of the Christian salvation, which there is accordingly no hesitation in placing under the "Roman world." Once more, the *History of Philosophy* begins in this period, *i.e.*, of course, in Greece; after a brief review—one can hardly say, a too brief review—of

what was then known regarding the Oriental approaches to philosophy.

The last and highest is the Germanic period. When Christianity entered the world, the master secret passed into the possession of mankind; but it was not yet grasped by thought. In fact, having entered the world as a particular truth, known to a particular community, who were surrounded by the inheritors of an inferior civilisation, it creates a new half truth, not to say a new falsehood,—the mediæval dualism of secular and sacred. In history, this was co-ordinated with the barbarian inroads—and with Mohammedanism, which figures oddly enough merely among the “elements” of the “Germanic world.” In philosophy, the effect is to throw within the highest or post-Christian period the period of negation. Hence between the great positive constructions of “Greek” and “German” philosophy there occurs scholasticism, or what may be called unphilosophical philosophy, when authority dictates both form (inherited Aristotelianism) and contents (church dogma),—when reason must work in fetters. But Protestant Christianity, German nationality, and philosophy, culminating in Hegel’s own, are assumed to lead to the final synthesis. “The business of the world, taking it as a whole, is to become reconciled with mind, recognising itself therein; and this business is assigned to the Teutonic world.” The principle of reconciliation stated by Christianity has been grasped in the terms of thought as an all-inclusive spiritual unity. “Philosophy is the true theodicy To this point the World-Spirit has come, and each stage has its own form in the true system of Philosophy; nothing is lost, all principles are preserved, since Philosophy in its final

result is the totality of forms. This concrete idea is the result of the strivings of spirit during almost twenty-five centuries to become objective to itself, to know itself—

Tantæ molis erat, se ipsam cognoscere mentem."

It can hardly be denied that *that* is a carnival of apriorism! Indeed, we are constrained to protest against it at various points. If history means progress, then surely—hard as it may be to know where to begin—it is surely perverse to assume that the unprogressive empires of the East claim a place? Or if, for their greatness, they insist on being noticed, it would be well not to shut out the possibility—is it not almost a certainty?—that Asia must yet awake from the slumber of ages, and transform the whole face of the world. Hegel extends no notice to that conjecture. China and India are written down as non-progressive; that is what they exist for. It is a kind of paradox; for the sake of progress they exist as typical museum specimens of the unprogressive. The other great speculative question in future politics concerns not the stagnating civilisations of the East, but the New World—the United States, the younger communities of colonial birth, and that late-comer, the gigantic infant of the European family, Russia. By his references to the future greatness of Russia and of the United States Hegel escapes the blame of unduly ignoring one question of the politics of the future. He puts the *a priori* prejudice aside in this instance, and pays homage to fact. The contrast with the *History of Philosophy* is sufficiently marked.

The *Philosophy of Right* in contrast with the

Philosophy of History again exhibits exaggerated deference to the actual. Hegel there treats the nation-state as the highest possible social formation; he even—as we have seen—accepts the anarchy of war as the normal solution for international disputes.¹ Not on ideal grounds merely, but partly in the light of facts, we must persist that the manifest goal of history, however far removed from us at present, is “the parliament of man, the federation of the world”; the organisation of all mankind into a real unity, on a platform of real liberty and real equality and fraternity. These are the limits set by nature to the progressive movement of history. If history lasted beyond that point, progress must thenceforth be differently conceived and stated. Or else, in order to protract it in its old form, there must have been an entrance of other rational creatures into the fellowship of human history—perhaps by intercourse with other planets, perhaps by authentic communication with spirits, *e.g.* with the departed: dreamy and shadowy possibilities or impossibilities.

In itself, indeed, there is no reason why the attempt to divine an *a priori* formula for history should lead the interpreter to regard his own position as definitive and beau-ideal. If a man were to place his own time midway upon the curve which he traces out—and all the probabilities point to our being *somewhere* in the middle of an uncompleted evolution—then we could verify his claims. Successful predictions are the most

¹ We have also remarked above on Hegel's *a priori* vindication of monarchy. Philosophy is prostituted when it is thus turned into a partisan. To condemn institutions that are working well, or to acclaim them as eternally valid, is equally beyond the philosopher's province.

satisfactory of all tests for a scientific hypothesis. But it is no doubt easiest to regard one's own standpoint as that of the Final Judge, and to treat all existence as converging upon this sacred moment. It may even be argued that such treatment is the only possible way of writing history in a serious spirit. For a writer like Hegel, that is probably true enough. To him the real is the ideal and the "rational." He is least likely of all great minds to grant that "a man's reach should exceed his grasp," or to admit that "what I aspired to be, and was not, comforts me." He is wholly engrossed in showing the rationality of the actual. To condemn it, even from the point of view of that better future towards which it aims, would seem to him treasonable scepticism.

In the philosophy of religion a Christian can have no objection to saying that the evolutionary process of the world's religions, whatever it was worth, has gone into the past. We should rather say, indeed, that an evolution (more or less) *towards* Christianity has yielded place to an evolution *within* and under the abiding conditions of Christian faith. But it is not easy to combine that assertion, and the corresponding recognition of an "absolute religion," with the universal applicability and competency of the evolution-of-reason formula as covering the facts of religion.

NOTE.

There would be nothing gained by reproducing any of the contents of the *History of Philosophy*. Except in the introduction, the significant triplicity of Hegel's work is mainly lacking; and we have chiefly lists of names, partially classified, under the three great divisions—Greek Philosophy, Philosophy of the Middle Ages, Modern Philosophy. The contents, therefore, afford no help to following out Hegel's gigantic assumptions in that region.

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As mentioned, the *Philosophy of History* divides in four : the Oriental World, the Grecian World, the Roman World, the Germanic World.

Contents of *Philosophy of Religion* are given briefly on pp. 254, 255. Comparing the three schemes, we should arrange as follows :—

History.	Religion.	Philosophy.
	Magic (as the first low beginning).	
The Oriental World.	A. Pantheism.	(Tentative Philosophies.)
	(Transitional forms.)	
The Greek World.	B. Religion of Spiritual	A. Greek Philosophy.
The Roman World.	Individuality.	
	(Despair, as transition.)	
The Germanic World.	C. Absolute Religion.	B. Mediæval Philosophy.
		C. Modern Philosophy.

CHAPTER XV

HEGELIANISM AND CHRISTIANITY

LITERATURE.—*A.* Lectures on the *Philosophy of Religion*.¹

B. Portion of the *Phenomenology* dealing with *Religion*.

C. Dr. J. Caird's *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*; or Sterrett's; Dr. E. Caird's *Evolution of Religion*; Dr. Fairbairn's *Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*—summary and comment—in the Chicago Series; Mr. McTaggart's Essay in *Hegelian Cosmology*; etc.

THE first part of all in the *Philosophy of Religion* is an abstract analysis of the "Conception of Religion." While of course this refers to religion in general, it seems fair to connect it in a peculiar sense with "Absolute Religion," which comes *after* rather than *in* the sequence of the world's faiths ("Definite Religion"). The regular exposition of each of the great religious systems begins with discussing its "conception." We may take it then that the Conception

¹ Abridged contents of the *Philosophy of Religion*—

Introduction; *A.* (I., II., III.), *B. C.* ("Division of the Subject").

Part I. The Conception of Religion, *A.* God, *B.* Religion, *C.* Worship.

Part II. Definite Religion.

First Division. The Religion of Nature.

I. Immediate Religion.

(a) Magic.

(b) (Details).

(c) Cultus.

of Religion is most fully carried out in its highest type—in Absolute Religion; and absolute religion is—at least in some sense—Christianity. Or the “conception” gives the first rough sketch; “definite” religion fills in details from history; and “absolute” religion gathers up the final synthesis. Hegel’s analysis of the conception of religion begins with the objective thought of God. The truth which he finds contained in Pantheism—the assertion of a unity below all differences, of an absolute principle to which every phenomenon is relative—is, he holds, the primary truth in religion. But (*B*) this is only a half-truth. The subjective spirit of man has its rights [or, as Hegel puts this, with one of his questionable translations, *God Himself is knowing Spirit*]. In modern times especially, it would be useless to try to ignore the rights of subjectivity. Hence the modern speaks of religion rather than of God; he prefers to discuss the necessity of religion rather than investigate the proofs which are offered in support of the Being of God. But Hegel’s way of showing the necessity of religion is to re-state the old argument for idealism, with the old difficulties and

II. The Division of Consciousness within itself.

1. [Chinese Religion]; the Religion of Measure.

(a) Its conception.

(b) Its historical existence.

(c) Cultus.

2. [Brahmanism]; the Religion of Imagination;

(a), (b), (c), nearly as in the last.

3. [Buddhism]; the Religion of Being-within-itself; (a), (b), (c).

III. [Transitional Forms—Persia, Syria, Egypt.]

Second Division; the Religion of Spiritual Individuality [Judaism, Greece, Rome].

Part III. Absolute Religion.

the old ambiguities. If all things imply the great unity, it is also true that all things imply thought. (C) Religion (man in the presence of God) implies a sort of double consciousness; worship is the return to unity; worship or cultus represents the consciousness of oneness with the Divine under the limits of religious experience and in the forms which are possible for religion as contrasted with speculative thought. In point of fact, Religion to Hegel is the plain man's organon for the all-importance of thought or for the sense of unity. The complementary truth—the importance of difference: the necessity of *things* to thought—is found developed in the State; religion or the Church cannot grasp it. Therefore the State stands highest; it is the supreme, the absolute realisation of reason. For of course the State does not stand for nature in contrast with spirit—for difference in abstract separation from unity. The State is nature become spiritual; unity in difference. Religion, on the contrary, is only a witness for one aspect of truth—for unity, for the claims of thought.

These positions are not without importance for the subject to which we now turn. Having glanced briefly in the previous chapter at Hegel's treatment of the historical sequence of religions, we are henceforth to confine ourselves to that one religion which Hegel is good enough to term "absolute religion." Such an expression warrants us in giving it separate treatment. And we have further warrant for doing this in the fact that the Philosophy of Spirit introduces "revealed" religion—and it alone—into its system; or, as we have already expressed it, dismisses the world's faiths as prehistoric rather than historic—embryonic and not even childish

Of course in another sense we break decisively with Hegel when we draw such a line between Christianity and the "creeds outworn." It is part of the essence of his thinking that there can be no absolute division, in regard either to origin or quality, between the other faiths of mankind and that faith which dominates the modern world. This postulate of Hegel's is repugnant to ordinary Christian thinking. It will be found stated in the most persuasive and attractive form in Dr. John Caird's *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*. Principal Caird shows plainly that, if we are intelligent in our acceptance of the conception of evolution, we need not fear that *novelty* will be denied to the higher stages when compared with the lower. On the contrary, it is the very essence of an evolution that it involves fresh progress and new advance. Accordingly, on Hegelian premises, Christianity must be conceived not simply as recapitulating but as transcending in worth the earlier faiths of the world. So far as this point is concerned, the way may be clear enough for a friendly alliance between Christian faith and idealist philosophy. But there are other very grave difficulties. Christianity regards the world's religious history as being not a normal evolution, but distorted to an indefinite degree by sin. Christians believe they have evidence in revelation and experience that God has done more for them than merely perfect the world's defective evolution—that God was in Christ more intimately and personally than He was present to other devout and humble minds. To Christians, some particular facts are vital. "If Christ is not risen, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins." To Hegel the idea of Christ is more significant than any questions

regarding the historical Jesus.¹ The Christian and the Hegelian positions are thus separated by a deep gulf; it will not easily be crossed, or even concealed.

An important contribution has been made to the study of the subject in Mr. M'Taggart's characteristically clear and frank chapter on Hegelianism and Christianity. Much of our task may be accomplished by a brief reference to Mr. M'Taggart's summary, though in one or two points we must offer criticisms.

Mr. M'Taggart begins with Hegel's opinions regarding the doctrine of the Trinity and the more elementary doctrine of Divine Personality. His finding in regard to both is the same, namely, that in those "trinds"² which Hegel regards as corresponding to the Christian doctrines in question, the third stage is necessarily higher and more real than the other two. Instead of co-ordinating the three Persons of the Trinity, we should necessarily, he thinks, if we accepted Hegel's guidance in construing Christianity, regard the Holy Spirit alone as personal. Instead of regarding God as eternally a personal Spirit, we must regard God as becoming personal only in the Kingdom of the Spirit (not in that of the Father or in that of the Son, *i.e.* after the earthly life of Jesus, and not before it or during it; or again—Hegel has to pass from the forms of Sabellian Christianity to his own speculative analysis—in the Christian Community as the inner essence of history, and not in mere thought nor yet in mere nature). Interpreting this phrase, and still further defining the Hegelian position, Mr. M'Taggart

¹ Compare the significant quotation given by Mr. M'Taggart at p. 219 (*Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 318; Tr. iii. 110).

² See note on p. 273.

convinces himself that to Hegel personality is the exclusive property of a plurality of brother spirits, bound together in mutual love. That Mr. McTaggart should take such a view of Hegel's drift is characteristic. He translates Hegel's ambiguities, as usual, into a clear and self-consistent content; but—also as usual—he seems to drop much that is important to Hegel. There are of course materials in Hegel for the view that the third stage alone is real; but Hegelianism simply will not hold together unless you allow the Master—logically or illogically—to maintain that *graduated and successive stages* are also concurrently *complementary aspects*; that the lower, which in a sense passes away, in another sense survives and survives independently; that “not substance but subject” may be transformed at pleasure into “not only substance but also subject,” and even into “not only subject but also substance.” It seems, therefore, scarcely fair to refuse the special application to the Trinity of a two-edged suggestiveness which Hegel applies to the whole universe. The most that can be said—so far—is that Hegel's Trinity gives *the highest place* to the Holy Spirit. This is certainly a piece of heterodoxy; possibly an inversion of church teaching.¹

Much the same must be said of Mr. McTaggart's handling of the problem of God's personality in Hegel's system. Hegel preserves a tone of misty ambiguity; Mr. McTaggart drives a straight line through the entanglement, asserting half of what Hegel suggests and denying half. The position of Idealism is excellently put in a *Fragment on Immortality* by T. H.

¹ So far as church orthodoxy permits any difference in rank, the priority is assigned to the “fountain of Godhead,” the Father.

Green. "The 'immortality of the soul,' as = the eternity of thought = the being of God, is the absolute first and the absolute whole. To deny the 'immortality of the soul' in this sense is to maintain the destructibility of thought, and this is a contradiction in terms," etc.¹ Green's pious if undogmatic mind asserted both Divine personality and human immortality, though he made his assertions tremulously and with a morbid shrinking from anything like precision. Mr. M'Taggart feels a difficulty, with which we cannot but sympathise, in letting an argument, which is naturally taken as proving *one or other*, prove *both*. He goes straight for immortality—and Atheism. We might have thought the equities of the case were sufficiently met by saying Pantheism; but Mr. M'Taggart loves the clear expression of clear thought; and there is force in his contention that one who denies a personal God while asserting an impersonal Absolute ought to be said to disbelieve in God. Whether men assert or deny Divine personality, it is well that they should be alive to its importance. We find it difficult to believe that Hegel was so negative as Mr. M'Taggart thinks him, or as Mr. M'Taggart is himself. If Hegel really shared that startling and sharp-cut creed, he has concealed it in a way that does him little credit. But it seems certain that Hegel was willing to represent God as personal—or indeed as tri-personal; though one may hold that his inner mind lacked interest in these positions, and doubted the possibility of vindicating them over-against Pantheism. Mr. M'Taggart definitely rejects all Theistic and Trinitarian representations. He asserts and denies unmistakably. There are no things; there

¹ *Works*, vol. iii. p. 159.

is no personal God; there is a universe of spirits cohering to constitute an impersonal Absolute. We might describe Mr. M'Taggart as reviving Polytheism. The "Divine Syndicate," which Huxley was surprised to miss among modern forms of the religious idea, has found a champion at last. What Hegel, according to Heine, "taught the young men of Berlin," is now being taught to the young men of Cambridge. The human race, it would seem, are not the dependent creatures whom experience would picture us. We are immortal, indestructible beings; we or beings of our class are the only real existences; and we are doomed by the necessity of the nature of things to eternal life and eternal love (or rather to an endless series of discontinuous lives, which in some sense are, or under certain conditions will be, perfected in love). If such beings are not gods, what is a god? They have *life in themselves*; unoriginated, imperishable, they are indeed immortal. Such a view of man's immortality is perhaps worse than unbelief. It is not only not religious, but profoundly irreligious, for it endows man with the highest gifts independently of God (did a supreme God exist) and in spite of fate. We might again describe Mr. M'Taggart's position as an unexpected development of speculative Trinitarianism. He agrees with the view that Godhead logically implies a plurality of personal lives; but *we* are or are included among the persons of this Trinity or rather multiunity. Mr. M'Taggart's evidence is found in his interpretation of Hegel's Dialectic. In its light, he finds the origin or the decay of a personality a thing inconceivable—therefore, personality *had* no origin and cannot pass away. One long thin line of probable reasonings—even Mr.

M'Taggart will hardly claim absolute mathematical demonstrativeness for his corollaries to the Dialectic—is made to bear an extremely heavy weight. Every other consideration is contemptuously flung aside.¹

A more decided reason for believing that Hegel occupied a position altogether aloof from the Church doctrine of the Trinity, is found in some indiscreet passages in the *Phenomenology*. "The pictorial or popular thought" of the Christian Church is not strict conceptual thinking; it has the same contents, but does not represent them in their necessity; instead of necessary logical connexion, it introduces into the region of pure thought the natural relationships of Father and Son." Hence, for lack of *a priori* necessary connexion, the beliefs of the Christian Church rank as "revealed externally by Another; thought does not recognise in these beliefs its own image, the very nature of self-consciousness." . . . "The mere spirit of eternity, the abstract Deity, becomes *an other* along with itself, or passes into existence;² it passes⁴ immediately into immediate existence." In the language of the Christian Church, "God creates a world. *Creation* is a word used by popular and pictorial thought for the absolute process of the notion itself." . . . Next, upon nature there follows Spirit or the mind of man; and "because thought here arises out of immediacy—because the thought which arises is a conditioned type of thought which recognises an *other* standing over-against it, we have the self-antagonised thought of *Good* and *Evil*,"³ and the story of a Fall out of "the idle animal inno-

¹ *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 70. See also below.

² *Das Vorstellen*.

³ *Daseyn*.

⁴ I.e., it is conceived as passing.

⁵ 1.—*Der Gedanke, der das Andersseyn an ihm hat*.

cence" of Paradise. . . . The origin of evil "might indeed be carried farther backwards, before creation, or the existence of reality, into the first kingdom of thought. It may be said that the firstborn son of light fell, and that another was forthwith begotten in his place. But such expressions as 'Fall' and 'Son' are merely pictorial and imaginative," and create confusion when they are mixed with philosophical truths. "No more gain would accrue if the thought of the Eternal Reality's giving rise to the principle of *otherness* were expanded into a multiplicity of others [angelic spirits] to whom the return to unity might then be assigned. This would indeed have one advantage. If instead of *another*, we said *others*, we should have given clearer expression to the principle of Difference. Nay more; we might have expressed it, not as a random multiplicity, but as the origin of definite differences: one part, the Son, standing for God's knowledge of His own reality; the other part, the expression of God's being-for-Himself—angels, who only live to praise the Supreme Divine Reality. Still further, we might assign to these angel throngs the return to unity from the separation of independent being, and the rise of the principle of self in the form of wickedness.¹ By subdividing other-beingness into two parts, we should have had a fuller view of the elements² of mind.³ If we counted these elements, we might speak of a Four-in-oneness⁴ [not Trinity]; or, reckoning the two groups of faithful and fallen angels, a Five-in-oneness.⁵ But to *count* the

¹ ?—*Das Insichgehen des Bösen.*

² *Momenten.*

³ *Geist.*

⁴ *Viereinigkeit.*

⁵ *Fünfeinigkeit.* One is reminded of Walt Whitman's "Square Deific," where "Jehovah" and "Saviour" are followed by "Satan,"

elements is useless; partly because, after all, the idea of otherness or difference is *one* great thought . . . partly because, if we begin to subdivide, we must go a great deal further than three or four . . . and should do best to say, vaguely, *numbers*." . . . Other efforts of the picture-thought of religion to express the importance of difference and evil to the Divine principle of unity itself, are found in the doctrine of the "Humiliation" or Kenosis, when "the Divine being renounces His abstractness and unreality." . . . "Evil, however, is kept by picture-thought far from God, or, at most, by a great—and useless because unphilosophical—expenditure of intellectual energy, is conceived *in* God as *His wrath*."¹

These quotations appear decisive as to Hegel's real mind;² it will be strange if they are not also authoritative as to the real bearing of his philosophy. He is interested in maintaining a *logical plurality in the logical unity*; and he prefers "mysterious" doctrines, with their hint of an esoteric philosophical reading, to those shallower rational views of religion in which common-sense finds itself at home. But plainly, to Hegel, Christian beliefs were only symbols, and symbols not too sacred to be made the occasion of unseemly jests. It is a bold enterprise to try to reclaim such a philosophical creed, and consecrate it to the service of orthodoxy.

The next doctrine discussed by Mr. M'Taggart is the Incarnation. He points out very clearly that with and only fourthly by "Spirita Santa" [*sic*]. What else is this than nature pantheism, wherever it may be found?

¹ *Phenomenology*, pp. 557-562.

² Dr. Harris knows the *Phenomenology* well; was it fair to suppress the evidence it furnishes as to Hegel's religious creed? Whether Dr. Sterrett knows it I am not aware.

Hegel necessarily the primary sense of the Incarnation is an assertion that the Absolute is embodied in the whole Finite process as such. He also quotes from the *Philosophy of Religion* what is perhaps the most careful attempt Hegel makes to get in touch with orthodoxy—a passage so important that it must be reproduced here also. “If Man is to get a consciousness of the unity of Divine and human nature, and of this characteristic of Man as belonging to Man in general; or if this knowledge is to force its way wholly into the consciousness of his finitude as the beam of eternal light which reveals itself to him in the finite, then it must reach him in his character as Man in general, *i.e.* apart from any particular conditions of culture or training; it must come to him as representing Man in his immediate state, and it must be universal for immediate consciousness.

“The consciousness of the absolute Idea, which we have in thought, must therefore not be put forward as belonging to the standpoint of philosophical speculation, of speculative thought, but must, on the contrary, appear in the form of certainty for man in general. This does not mean that they think this consciousness, or perceive and recognise the necessity of this Idea; but what we are concerned to show is rather that the idea becomes for them certain,¹ *i.e.* this idea, namely, the unity of Divine and human nature, attains the stage of certainty, that, so far as they are concerned,² it

¹ *I.e.*, apart from its real philosophical grounds—as an “immediate” conviction.

² *Für sie.* The translator’s rendering is almost a gloss; it gives much more definite emphasis to Hegel’s repudiation of Christianity as fact. Yet probably the gloss is sound enough.

receives the form of immediate sense-perception, of outward existence—in short, that this Idea appears as seen and experienced in the world. This unity must accordingly show itself to consciousness in a purely temporal, absolutely ordinary manifestation of reality, in one particular man, in a definite individual who is at the same time known to be the Divine Idea, not merely a Being of a higher kind in general, but rather the highest, the Absolute Idea, the Son of God.”¹

Here we have a very different tone from the boisterousness of the *Phenomenology*, and a much more serious effort to get into touch with Christian belief. It is true, taken at its highest estimate, it has strange features for a Christian reader. It is, or for the defence of orthodoxy it should be, an account of the reason why Christ the Son of God *must* come into the world by a genuine historical incarnation. And the reason offered is, that nothing else will give *the unphilosophical many* a grasp—in their unphilosophical fashion—of the central truth of religion, the unity of God and man. If the translators of the *Philosophy of Religion* are right, Hegel has given a hint, even in this passage, that we are dealing not with fact or its necessity, but with the necessity of a *belief*—“so far as” the common people “are concerned.” Even if he did not—and assuredly his comfortable position as *Weltphilosoph* depended on such hints not being generally understood—yet his disciples were sure to take the step to *beliefs* from *facts*. Can it be seriously maintained that nothing but the actual historical incarnation of the Son of God

¹ *Phil. of Religion*, ii. 282, 283; Tr. iii. 72, 73; *Cosmology*, 219, 220.

could start the persuasion of man's oneness with God in the unphilosophical world? If Christianity is only the popularising of a metaphysical creed, would not *belief that an Incarnation had taken place* serve all the necessities of the case? Is not the Idea always more important, to Hegel's Idealism, than the fact? Has not the fact soiling dust of contingency upon it? If Hegel was really so simple-minded or so preoccupied as not to draw the distinction in question, he may have been personally an orthodox Christian on this point. When we think of the *Phenomenology*, never cancelled or disowned—when we think what Hegel was—the possibility seems shadowy. He finds significance in Christ (or the Christ-idea) purely for the average man. The man of speculative insight does not need Christianity. Philosophy does him the same service in a better way. And thus religion seems to rank lower, with Hegel, than its partners in the Philosophy of Mind. It stands too dangerously near philosophy. Art is art, and has its great historic forms. No modern reformer will propose, like Plato, that we should suppress art in the interests of abstract truth. Morals are morals; they also have a function absolute within their own sphere, though in their case again we feel that the sceptical side of idealism presses unfairly upon them. Yet *the moral institution* is sure of Hegel's respect; and the importance of the practical side of life is undeniable. But what is religion—except an inferior type of philosophy? Its institution (the Church) is said by Hegel—perhaps truly enough; the visible Church is *a witness to the inner spiritual life*; never its full embodiment—to stand lower than the State. If for the spiritual life we allow Hegel to substitute an ideal scheme of philosophy

stated for vulgar minds, we need not wonder if his patronage of religion and of Christianity has a flavour of contempt about it.

Mr. McTaggart does not dwell upon Hegel's aversion to the Christian doctrine of Atonement. Probably he does not think such conceptions worthy of a philosopher's attention. So Hegel himself might have judged. He respected the orthodox Christology, but scarcely any other doctrine. He sees in the Atonement only a repetition of the one great rhythm of thought—the oneness of God and man; the unbroken essential unity of all things, not merely in spite of differences but through them. Once again the *Phenomenology* states Hegel's views with brusquer frankness than we find in later writings. God is conceived as "self-estranged." Reconciliation must proceed—or be conceived as proceeding—from the side of God; because God, in contrast with the world, is a sort of potentiality [and therefore in deeper need of reconciliation?]. By the death of Christ "the Absolute Being is reconciled with Him [it?] self"; and this death "is" Christ's "resurrection as Spirit." When God "assumes human nature, we have it *expressly admitted* that Divine and human nature are inseparably in potential union—just as in the doctrines of Creation and Fall we have it implied—not expressed of course—that potentially wickedness and reality are akin to God; the absolute Being would only have the *name* of absoluteness, if anything could come into existence that was really strange to Him." Accordingly Christian belief gives in the form of "picture-thought" the truth of "the reconciliation of the Divine Being with the principle of otherness (or, difference), and in particular with its [most distinctive] thought-

conception—wickedness.”¹ It may be said that “good and evil are speculatively identical,” though we ought to add that they are also by definition opposites. [But opposites are identical, and identity divides into opposites; for] “the mistake is, to take *same* and *not same*, *identity* and *non-identity*, for something true, firm, actual, and so to lean upon them. Neither one nor other is true, but simply their process—that simple self-sameness is an abstraction and therefore is the absolute difference; that difference differs from itself and therefore is self-identical. So of the identity of the Divine Being with Nature, and in particular with man.” It is correct, yet incorrect. “We hold fast to *is*, and forget *thought*, whose elements are but also *are not*; or are only the movement, which is [or constitutes] *mind*.”² . . . Christ “the dead Divine man or human God is potentially the universal self-consciousness; He must become that [actually] for this self-consciousness” [*i.e.* in the consciousness of all men] . . . Consciousness of evil is “knowledge of something which can exist; hence to be conscious of evil is to become evil; or rather it is the becoming of the thought of evil, and therefore the first step in reconciliation.” [*Thought* is the reconciling principle; with the consciousness of sin, *thought* is at work.] . . . Christ “loses His natural meaning in His spiritual self-consciousness; He becomes” by death “what He was destined to be; death ceases to mean the non-existence of this indi-

¹ The theology of the *Vorstellung* certainly could never rise so high as this—

“Peace on earth and mercy mild;
God and *sin* are reconciled!”

² *Der Geist*.

vidual, and is transformed into the glorious universality of that Spirit who lives in His Church, daily dying and rising again." . . . "The self-incurred death of the Mediator is the destruction of His objective or particular existence; it has become a universal self-consciousness." Finally, Hegel repudiates a "transaction" of the nature of a "foreign satisfaction," or lets it pass as the lisps of picture-thought.¹ Without attempting here to discuss how far "transactional" views of the Atonement are legitimate, we may point out that Hegelianism is pledged to deny any real act or process of reconciliation. In other words, Hegelianism is pledged to leave out of Christianity what is most distinctive in it.

If in this passage the logical analysis of reality predominates, Hegelianism is no more satisfactory when it tries to construe the Christian faith on moral lines. For in that case it calls upon us to rise out of morals into a higher region. Forgiveness points to the discovery that imputation of guilt or merit is inadequate to the deeper truth of things. Every one is responsible—that is the affirmation of morality, and it is true within limits. No one is responsible—to discover this alleged philosophical truth is to enter upon the franchises of religion; these are the glorious liberties of the children of God. Christians will prefer to adhere to the despised "synthetic" assertion of the real forgiveness of real ill-desert by God and men; they believe that forgiveness is a totally different thing from discovering that there is *nothing to forgive*. Such an attitude as the Hegelian not merely destroys Christian faith but robs Theism of its meaning. Faith

¹ *Phenomenology*, pp. 563-571.

in God is precious because of the hope of moral fellowship with God. If God were a personal Spirit, but one to whom morality had no meaning, we could not have communion with Him; He would be nothing to us. Hence, whether Hegel was Pantheist or Theist is a question of little interest. Moral and Christian Theism were, in any case, impossible to the champion of such a creed.

The last part of Mr. M'Taggart's comparison refers to the doctrines of sin and grace, and to Christian ethics. He points out that there is a certain analogy to Christianity, and a distinct contrast to the older rationalism, in Hegel's view of the profound pervasiveness of sin; but he also frankly points out the non-Christian element in the pantheistical equating of right and wrong. In the doctrine of grace, he again maintains, Hegel stands nearer to Christianity than rationalism, yet no nearer to Christianity than to other mystical creeds. The claim may be granted and the criticism admitted. Hegel rather loves to assert positions which, to the unphilosophical, seem utter mystery; and grace may be styled the mystery of a Divine power flooding over the landmarks which separate personality from personality. But the philosophical background of this doctrine in Hegel's case is the assertion of an eternal and unbroken unity in orderly evolution throughout all history.

Mr. M'Taggart further inquires why Hegel chose to identify the absolute religion of his theory with the very different image presented by Christian belief. He answers that Christianity was the nearest thing to Idealism in all the religions of the past—nearer too than any new growth which the future was likely to

offer. Perhaps he should have more plainly admitted that Hegel the historian was pledged to such an identification. "The real is the rational." The leading Germanic nations having become Christian, philosophy is bound to show that they *had* to become Christian. The Hegelian way of construing history compels the philosopher to identify the highest stage yet reached with the highest of all—*i.e.* (as he conceives them) Christianity with Hegelianism. The task is done, at the cost of whatever transformations. We think Mr. McTaggart unduly imputes to Hegel the very sharply defined conclusions which his disciple and critic has reached. When it came to speaking of results, Hegel loved half lights. Nor must we charge Hegel with deliberately falsifying the content of Christianity. He approached it in all honesty, with the assumption that, like everything else, it was a mode of conceiving the relations of subject and object, individual and universal. That assumption, no less than the circumstances of his time, made Hegel's results inevitable. He treats the intellectualist scheme as the kernel of Christianity; everything else must be husk.

We do not even deny that a distinction between kernel and husk may be necessary. The millenarian beliefs of the first Christians, for example, were natural and beautiful; the same beliefs, when forced into life to-day, are neither beautiful nor natural. Nor can we deny that the educated and the half-educated will differ, not merely in beliefs, but in the importance they attach to *their differences*. Persons of defective culture have difficulty in recognising the same ideas if the language in which they are couched has been changed.

They cling to the familiar language as if it were a lifebuoy, and their only hope of escape from the dark waters. But when all admissions are made, Christianity must hold that the uneducated Christian, if he has real Christian experience, possesses competence in this region,—that the non-Christian, however educated, is incompetent. We must make sure which is the kernel and which is the husk. To Hegel, philosophy is kernel and history—is it not husk? To Hegel, says Mr. McTaggart, Christ could make little appeal, since he was “neither a philosopher nor a statesman.” Is Christ not kernel of the kernel? Does it not lie with the tendencies of Hegelianism as well as with the idiosyncrasies of Hegel, to treat Him—I write the words sorrowfully—as the mere time-shell of a timeless intellectual truth? It may admit of argument whether or not the historical phenomenon of Christianity is “deduced” *a priori* by Hegel. But his intellectualism makes it impossible for him to appreciate the spiritual greatness of God’s gift. If he did “deduce” Christianity, he distorted it. And he has told us plainly that religion in his view can be no more than an imperfect version of philosophy.

To Christians the incapacity of Hegel to do justice to Christ is a decisive argument against accepting his philosophy in full. To non-Christians of course the matter is of less significance, but even they may well ask themselves whether Hegel has not here set himself a great task in which he has failed.

NOTE.

"ABSOLUTE RELIGION"—HEGEL'S DIVISIONS (C).

- I. God in His eternal Idea in-and-for-self ; the Kingdom of the Father.
 1. Determination in the element of thought.
 2. Absolute Disreputation.
 3. Trinity.
- II. The eternal Idea of God in the element of consciousness and ordinary thought, or difference ; the Kingdom of the Son.
 1. Positing of the difference ; 2. the world ; 3. the essential nature of man.
- III. The Idea in the element of the Church or Spiritual Community ; the Kingdom of the Spirit.
 - [1. Its conception ; 2. its realisation ; 3. the spiritual in universal reality.]

CHAPTER XVI

FINAL STATEMENT AND ESTIMATE

At this point it might seem necessary to the completion of our scheme of treatment, that we should state Hegel's views on the nature of Absolute Knowledge or Philosophy. But, in point of fact, that has been our subject throughout. And all we can now attempt is a hurried recapitulation, with a more exact definition of Hegel's position, and some brief criticism.

Kant, among much other material, and amid results of more solid value, summed up his main discussion in the interests of scepticism, affirming that knowledge is constituted by (human) thought, and therefore is false, being vitiated by human subjectivity. Hegel begins by inverting this position. Knowledge is indeed well defined as *what we necessarily think*; but it is not on that account false; rather it is on that account certainly true. Or what other conclusion can *we* come to, whose faculties are not only the accused, but also the defenders and the prosecutors, and more important than all, the *judges*? At the same time Hegel undertakes to prove by argument the necessity of the positions to which the human mind, subjectively and psychologically, feels itself shut up, and concurrently this process of argument constitutes Hegel's substitute

for Kant's critical process. Instead of Kant's attempt to criticise the faculty of knowledge from the outside, "before he will use it," Hegel aims at a philosophy which is, from one point of view, human knowledge criticising itself. Everything is a phase—and each several phenomenon is one phase only—in the evolution of the ideal of knowledge. Knowledge which grasps reality holds the key to all mysteries; *or*, all modes of consciousness are varying fashions of conceiving the relation between subject and object, between thinker and thought. The beliefs of the mind combine in a single series. This series constitutes philosophy as an orderly whole, and is created by the dialectic movement, which first proves the necessity of each member in the series, and then reveals its limitations,—which thus presses the mind onward from category to category, and from one division of philosophy to another. Such a method is in its very nature at once criticism and verification, at once verification and criticism. If at the end we have the mysterious figure of an *absolute knowledge*, that is probably nothing else than the initial stage of the philosophical process—the *Logic*, with its shadowy yet authoritative construction of the nature of reality in the most general terms. The system of Hegel, like eternity, may be symbolised by a serpent whose tail is grasped in its mouth.

"After Last returns the First,
Though a wide compass round be fetched."

How far the *Phenomenology* or the *Histories* are parts of this all-authoritative circle, we cannot again discuss.

This splendid and ambitious programme contains

much that must be unreservedly praised. Its belief in knowledge, and its success in repelling Kant's scepticism, are altogether admirable. Its idea of a systematic unity is but the interpretation in ontological terms of what the conception of knowledge implies, though we may question whether Hegel does not apply his grand idea too boldly, or, perhaps rather, too monotonously. Further, Hegel opens a door of escape from the ordinary and fruitless alternation of dogmatism with scepticism, when he proposes to test and graduate knowledge within the area of knowledge itself, by the exercise of one of the highest and most arduous processes of knowledge; though here again one might prefer a modification; one might wish that Hegel had referred us to knowledge *or experience*. Finally—though more might easily be said—the idea of transformation in evolution, if by no means Hegel's peculiar property, has in him one of its latest and probably the profoundest of all its interpreters. He applies evolution—that is, he applies the idea of transformation—to knowledge. We start from provisional assertions. Our advance is not so much—as with intuitionist common sense—the mechanical work of building on unalterable foundations, but rather the living process by which a mere germ of knowledge becomes transformed into a fully articulated organism.

On the other hand, these great merits and profound insights are associated with correspondingly grave faults. First and foremost, we cannot accept the dialectic method as adequate to the work which Hegel imposes upon it. To the last it remains obscure, slippery, unintelligible; or, so far as it is clearly defined, it is an incredible paradox. But if this

criticism is just, the systematic coherence of Hegel's work, to which he rightly attached so great an importance, is forfeited; he has sketched grandiose outlines, he has uttered suggestive aspirations, but has not produced that close-knit proof which he thought was his. In the second place, the ambiguities of Hegel's system cannot be permanently glossed over. What did it all mean? Is the highest stage exclusively true? Is each stage true in its place? Are both positions affirmed by Hegel? Or is truth nowhere to be found? Or, finally, do we escape from haunting ambiguities by the doctrine of *degrees of reality*?

The first position is found in Dr. Harris.¹ The categories are *not* true "each in its own place." Only the highest is true. Hegel's Logic is therefore understood as a demonstration of the real existence of the highest thinking being—God; while it is held that the significance of the demonstration is confined to the limited intelligence of man. It is our finite mind which is attracted by the lower forms of thought, but which is gradually disillusioned of them all, till it recognises truth at last in the thought of a spiritual God. Analogous positions, amid grave differences, recur in Mr. McTaggart. Although, according to him, all stages of the *Logic* define reality, yet the third and highest stage yields the insight that *only spirits exist*; and the way in which Logic moves forward by a dialectic process testifies to the imperfection of human thought. There is indeed for Mr. McTaggart a systematic unity in all things; but the evidence for it is found by him not at all in the combination of Hegel's successive stages—only in the nature of Hegel's highest

¹ *Hegel's Logic*, see pp. 140, 183, 284, 285.

stage; and this spiritual and absolute unity is not one Spirit, but the impersonal unity in which personal spirits harmonise or commune with each other. These strongly contrasted views are alike in this, that, up to a certain point, they fasten attention upon the same strands of Hegelian thought, while ignoring, precluding, or denying other elements in Hegel's system. As against Dr. Harris, Hegel certainly does mean categories to be "valid each in its sphere," for they are the objective unfolding of absolute thought or truth.¹ And, as against Mr. M'Taggart, Hegel does hold to the reality—however qualified and depotentiated—of the finite and material.

The view that all stages are true, appears rather singularly as the practical outcome of Professor Pringle-Pattison's praise of Hegel for *grading* categories. Or, again, in combination with the view that the *Logic* demonstrates the being of a personal God, this position is part of the contentings of the orthodox Hegelianism of the Right. Taken by itself, it amounts to a transformation of Hegel. To say this is not to condemn Professor Pringle-Pattison. He has not offered this view to us as the whole of Hegel, but as the whole of what he deems valuable in a philosophy which seems to him mixed between truth and error. It is well, however, to remind ourselves how much is left out when we interpret Hegel on these lines. Hegel tries to affirm *both* that all are true in their places, *and* that none is true save the highest. "The fearful power of the negative" disappears if we drop out the last part of the assertion. And that is the power which con-

¹ Dr. Harris admits that they apply to the "processes" of nature, but only there, and even there imperfectly.

stitutes—if perhaps it also undermines—Hegel's entire system.

In saying this we have already affirmed that we regard the third of the positions named above as Hegel's genuine doctrine; and we have also indicated in brief terms why we cannot accept it. Hegel packs his formula so full that it becomes unstable, bursts, and spills its contents in every direction. In other words, we venture to think that Hegel's ambiguity is no accidental or superficial defect in statement, but part of the essence of his thought. He builds upon paradox, and seeks to combine incompatible or unreconciled positions. He says not merely "both high and low are true," but first "all are true," and then "only the highest is true." It is possible that some speculative reconciliation might be found for such an opposition; or it is possible that, to a higher type of consciousness, the opposition might vanish. We cannot accept the mere "dialectical" statement of a paradox as a solution.

When Hegel's construction of the highest is abandoned—when his dialectical or speculative process loses part of its potency, and fails to attain the goal of absolute knowledge—when the "ladder" is fixed nowhere—then the "negative" moment has the last word on every subject, and Hegel's omniscience turns sceptical. The system is in pieces. The string is broken, and the jewels are poured out in a confused heap. This development—a different aberration from the materialistic "Hegelianism of the Left"—is to be witnessed to-day in the later writings of Mr. Bradley and in Mr. Taylor's *Problem of Conduct*. Even in Hegel himself there are suggestions of scepticism. What is he but

sceptical when he lays down the doctrine that *no stage is true, but only the advance from stage to stage?* Or what else can we say of the "Not Being but Becoming" paradox?

Yet another attempt to place a definite ontological meaning upon Hegel's views is suggested by the doctrine of *degrees of reality* worked out—though largely neutralised by the author's scepticism—in Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. We do not think that this was Hegel's own teaching, except in so far as his method of gradation forces him to hold spiritual existence *more* real than material existence, while yet both, as vital elements in knowledge, are for him *real*. Beyond that point, Hegel has rather evaded than solved the problem of reality. Gradation is of the very essence of his *Logic*; but what ontological meaning can be attributed to a discussion which treats "being" as simply one category of thought among many, and the very poorest of them all? Hegel thinks that the public are too anxious for results. They ought to have their attention gently but firmly called to processes, since in philosophy a result is nothing at all apart from the process which justifies and explains it. And this is wholesome teaching; still, we must have results sooner or later, if philosophy is not to be a mere toy. We do not seem to get such results from Hegel. When we ask for an enumeration of realities, Hegel tends to offer us a description of the inner structure of the real. We ask, "What things are real?" Or we grow desperate, and ask, "Is anything real at all?" Hegel steadily answers, "Reality will be found to have such predicates as this; to wit, it is rational; it is ideal, etc." So far as he has a definite

position, he is definitely ambiguous or self-contradictory, forcibly combining alternative possibilities in one statement. Mr. Bradley's proposal is scarcely Hegelian. It does not expose Mr. Bradley to the label he dislikes. His originality is secure. The proposal may, however, be described as an attempt to draw a definite conclusion from premises which he largely holds in common with Hegel. There is much in Hegel that points in this direction. The drawback to this "way out" is the obscurity, not to say unintelligibleness, of the thought of partial and graduated reality. If justified at all, the conception is likely to be justified by some other processes than those of epistemology or abstract ontology. If Lotze's hypothesis of universal sentiency were adopted, we might speak of degrees in reality. But the language would be figurative; and the doctrine is only a hypothesis.

Our second criticism on Hegel—the charge of persistent and inherent ambiguity—might be repeated in different language. (1) Is the the Infinite (alone) real? [No;=the older Pantheism.] (2) Is the Finite alone real? [=Hegelianism of the Left; with affinities in Mr. McTaggart's affirmation of many spirits and denial of a supreme God.] (3) Are both real? [=orthodox Hegelianism of the Right.] (4) Neither—only the process? [=Scepticism.] (5) Real in varying degrees?—Hegel's teaching wavers or alternates between these rival constructions. He holds that we can take up our position at the standpoint of the Infinite (which is *thought*), and construe the finite as its necessary unfolding—inadequate therefore and unreal in detail, *sub specie temporis*, but necessarily adequate and real in the totality of its phases, *sub*

specie eternitatis. Such a view of things might be conceived as possibly true and valid for the Divine mind, but must be characterised as certainly not valid for man.

Or, once again, we might describe the ambiguities of Hegel's position by raising the question, In what sense he inculcates idealism. Does he mean—(1) All is rational? With that he admittedly begins; and if he has not proved that—for he has used the conjuring tricks of the dialectic method—yet he has done us the great service of showing how we may prove it. Or does he mean—(2) Nothing is real except thought? He has allowed himself to use that phrase, and to profit by it; yet he does not really mean it; it represents a form of opinion which no serious thinker will seriously maintain. Or does he mean—(3) Nothing is real except thinkers? Yes—and No. Not at all, so as to make nature simply a phantasmagoria in man's mind; and yet "in the highest sense"¹ spirits alone are real.

In our third criticism of Hegel we have once more in view his use of the formula, "all is thought," or "nothing but thought exists." The temptation to such a formula lies in the narrow intellectualist cast of his system; and we hold such excessive intellectualism to be a great evil. From the sound position, *knowledge is knowledge of reality*, he proceeds—with, however, little serious meaning—to the unsound and extravagant position, *to be real is nothing else than to be known*, or, as Green has put it, *esse is intelligi*. And with all

¹ Plato's doctrine implies . . . "First . . . all that is real is relative to mind"; secondly, "reality in the highest sense only belongs to objects in so far as they are minds, self-conscious beings."—Newspaper report of Dr. E. Caird's Glasgow Gifford Lectures.

seriousness Hegel holds that by analysing knowledge he gains the clue to every reality and every possibility. Now, whatever might be true for a higher consciousness, this cannot be true for us. Language protests against the absurdity of the assertion that a verb in the passive voice can furnish the absolute definition of the real. If *intelligi* is *esse*, why not *intelligere*? Why not *velle*? Why not even *sentire*? Yet this particular paradox is found not only in Hegel but in the British Hegelians, of whom we must now briefly speak.

The return from Hegel to Kant—though of course to a Kant read in the light of Hegel and interpreted constructively—the return to Kant, which we observe in Green, Dr. Edward Caird, and others, implies a partially hinted or an unexpressed distrust of the dialectic method, and a search for surer foundations. The first result is to bring thought back to what we noted above as the elementary lesson which Hegel was able to draw out of Kant. Knowledge is the necessary working of human thought; it is therefore not false, as Kant held, but true. On this basis, the element of *criticism* of our knowledge, connected by Hegel with his dialectic method, disappears; or, so far as it is introduced into British Hegelianism, it constitutes a fresh and independent borrowing from Hegel's stores. The gist of the British Hegelian position is best seen in T. H. Green. There is an analysis of knowledge and there is an analysis of conduct. The results of both are equally true, for they are indeed the opposite sides of one shield. In knowledge, we learn self; in conduct, we realise self. But—says Green—in knowledge we also learn from God, and in conduct serve Him. Moreover, as this to Green is truth, so also it

is the whole actual or possible truth of religious experience.¹

The difficulty in such a position, as many of its critics have pointed out, is that it seems to imply the impossible doctrines of solipsism. It erects its whole ontology upon an analysis of knowledge—including in knowledge the knowledge-implications of conduct. In our triumph, as we drummed out from the field of philosophy that absurd and unknowable ghost of known reality the Kantian thing-in-itself, we have neglected to take guarantees for reality in any shape or form. By a masterful exercise of force, Green indeed draws into his philosophy a God, and men, and a relation between them; but properly philosophy, as he works it out, is merely the abstract image of consciousness or self-consciousness, with scanty ontological implications. Even if we may speak of the *creative* power of thought, the analogy between God's creating and man's knowing is too faint to form the backbone of a philosophy,—and what justification has Green for the contrast between God and man? And yet such a contrast is necessary, and Green draws it.

¹ Mr. M'Taggart's interesting criticisms (*Hegelian Cosmology*, Essays v. and vii.) on the idea of society as an organism, etc., may be admitted to this extent, that actual political society is not the *only* or the *final* fulfilment of the moral ideal—a very important correction of the spirit of *Hegel's* teaching. The supernatural, the immortal, is indeed required by the ideal. The "real" is *not* the "rational" in any sense which would make the British or the German Empire=the Kingdom of God. Yet we may decline to admit Mr. M'Taggart's inference, that actual political society is *in no sense* organic and *in no degree* a fulfilment of the moral ideal. Although abstract justice can never be the sole determinant of state penalties, yet punishment must be just, and publicly acclaimed as just, or it will become an intolerable burden and a source of corruption.

When we turn from God to things, we find that the finite reality is in an equally precarious way. The creative activity of our thought results in the constitution or apprehension of certain relations and distinctions. Hence it is only logical when Green treats a thing as a mere sum of relations.¹ But that is preposterous. Assuredly a thing is nothing apart from its relations, yet as certainly naked relations are nothing at all. We must therefore drop the form of idealism which affirms that "thought determines reality." Or at least we must drop the pretension that *we* from such a position can deduce either the existence of nature, or the great principles of what Hegel calls the Philosophy of Spirit. We must be content with the more modest idealism which affirms that knower and known are kindred elements in one great sphere of reasonable reality.

We incline, therefore, to the conclusion stated by Dr. Pringle-Pattison and Dr. Baillie,² that Hegelianism has given us an epistemology but not a complete ontology. Perhaps the conclusion as these writers conceive it is even more trenchant; but we must be on our guard against impatient movements of reaction. If it is suggested to us that an epistemology can exist without implying any ontological conclusions, we must repudiate such a view. We cannot hold that epistemology is barely the analysis of the consciousness of an individual mind face to face with (an anyhow? alien?) reality. A great deal of metaphysical assumption—which in so far as it is mere assumption must be bad metaphysics

¹ *Works*, ii. p. 190; with which compare Mr. M'Taggart's criticism, *Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 62.

² If I rightly understand the latter's final conclusions.

—may be smuggled in by the use of such a label as “epistemology.” We do not withdraw what we have already said as to the solid and valuable ontological results of Hegelian epistemology—the rationality of the real; its kinship to thought; and—in some sense—its systematic orderliness. But we differ from Hegel in denying that this truth is the whole truth, adequate to the determination of the universe of being. The existence of a world of natural realities in time and space we do not think is genuinely deducible, though, when it is presented in experience, we can see that it is congruous to thought. And—what is still more important—the revelation of reality made in the philosophy of spirit is—to us men at least—something quite different from a set of new phases in the consciousness of an object. We must be in earnest in establishing a distinction between Divine and human consciousness. We must make the difficult assertion of the limitation of human knowledge and human experience.

The foundation is probably best laid in the doctrine of space and time. We must not, indeed, with Kant, condemn them because they are *our* forms, (psychologically) necessary to us. Hegel is never more triumphant than when he insists¹ that phenomena are phenomena not only to us but in themselves—or, that we can form no conception of natural realities except as existing in time and space. On the other hand, Hegel (we believe) has failed to deduce or to show the logical necessity of a consciousness of time and space; and the Kantian antinomies prove that there is a certain symbolical element in such consciousness. We know reality in them, but do not know it absolutely. To say

¹ Wallace's *Logic of Hegel*, ed. 1, p. 79.

this is not to justify scepticism as to reality, but only scepticism as to a philosophy which would explain everything. Nor can we rise out of this element of partial illusion. Our experience, if not our knowledge, is tied to it. In grasping abstract truth, the human mind, it may be said, is always rising out of the flux of matter into the serenity of the ideal and into the apprehension of timeless formulæ. But the philosopher himself lives and dies in that flux; the most "golden" of theorists "must like chimney-sweepers come to dust." Be his insight never so profound, his life is lived here and now, in this finite medium.

But this medium of ours does not merely affect the quality of sense-knowledge. The study of it already brings us face to face with those problems of man's higher life which the philosophy of spirit discusses. Is it not significant in regard to these, that our life is an experience in time—not a mere knowing, but a *being*, under these inexorable sense-conditions? We cannot prove whence these conditions arise, though we may hold with high probability that such limitation is involved in our position as creatures of God or as spiritual beings with a nature basis. On the other hand, this limitation is redeemed from insignificance by its moral and religious possibilities; and these are possibilities for experience, not for merely intellectual knowledge. Even to Green himself, morality is not simply an eternal self-realisation, but a communion with God. That experience of communion has its lessons. At the lowest, a man can only gravely doubt whether right is better than wrong, whether Christ Jesus is a Master who ought to be followed. At the lowest, he cannot rid himself of the haunting suspicion that it may be so.

According to his choice, his knowledge grows or dwindles. To say this is not to affirm intuition or immediacy. We are speaking of mediation; only it is mediation by life and not by the abstract intellect. Such a life assures us that in moral experience we are in contact with a reality greater than ourselves, most sacred, most helpful. It is unthinkable that any intellectual short-cut should make this moral experience needless or unmeaning.

We take our stand, then, midway between the scepticism of Mr. Bradley's position and the intellectual omniscience of Hegelianism. To Mr. Bradley, the recognition of imperfection or symbolical elements in knowledge is sufficient to condemn the whole of our attainments. Men are blind creatures in the presence of an Unknown and Unknowable *It*. This affirmation reveals the same intellectual impatience and arrogance which produced the dogmatism of the Hegelian scheme. Against it we are not afraid to cite the humble witness of the peasants in *Silas Marner*: " 'It's the will of Them above as a many things should be dark to us; but there's some things as I've never felt i' the dark about, and they're mostly what comes i' the day's work. . . . That doesn't hinder their *being* a' right . . . for all it's dark to you and me.' 'No; that doesn't hinder . . . I've had light enough to trusten by, and . . . I think I shall trusten till I die.' " In this pathetic and half-grotesque form, the *clairvoyant* genius of George Eliot, wiser than her overstrained and overtrained intelligence, has given us the very soul of moral wisdom and Christian truth. Beyond our doubts we have an experience that stills and reassures us, an anchor of the soul that cannot be shaken; some-

thing greater than ourselves bowing down to reveal itself to us, and not wholly failing.

Hegelianism, on the contrary, understands all mysteries. It puts the imperfect phases of human knowledge and experience in one series, and claims that in that series God, or the Divine reason which is ours, visibly attains to fulfilment. Having this absolute gnosis at command, Hegelianism is impatient of half lights. One of the most lovable of its disciples, we are told, "spoke almost with contempt of the various halfway houses that have been built between the position of Kant and a thoroughgoing idealism, as also of the many attempts of modern theologians to evade the open field of thought, and to fall back upon some moral or æsthetic or religious form of faith which is not to be explained or criticised by reason. Above all, he distrusted the policy of writers who use the weapons of Idealism to defend the faith, and then attempt to repudiate the aid of Idealism." The former of these sentences characterises to a nicety the standpoint of this little book; the second is directed to another address, and may be answered as best they can by those who still strive to unite complete faith in Hegelian philosophy with complete faith in orthodox theology. In these pages we have looked to Hegelian idealism for very limited contributions; and we have correspondingly asserted or admitted its truth in a very limited degree. Idealists in a sense, we believe that Idealism is the effective reply to scepticism; but, however contemptible the position may seem to a higher soaring reason, we think that this wisdom gives us the half, not the whole. We *know* a love which *passes knowledge*. We know it; the sceptics are wrong, and

Idealism may help us to prove that they are wrong. But it *passes knowledge*. The philosophical dogmatists are no less in the wrong. The very significance of the weary moral discipline of life is that we are learning lessons from experience which mere "reason" on its "open field"—i.e. clever unspiritual intelligence—cannot conceivably master. Knowledge teaches us many short-cuts; but a short-cut which should supersede the significance of life has no charm to dazzle us.

The devotion of Hegelians to their dry and austere intellectual wisdom recalls to us Keats' equally intense and equally one-sided devotion to his own very different spiritual realm.

"A thing of beauty is a joy for ever."

"Beauty is truth, truth beauty—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know."

When one thinks of this, one thinks also of Arnold's comment: "No, it is not all; but it is true, deeply true, and we have deep need to know it." We may repeat these words as our reply to the Hegelian demand for absolute surrender—to the Hegelian claim that what it offers is all we need or can gain: "No, it is not all; but it is true, deeply true, and we have deep need to know it."

The world is a slow learner, but it does every one justice in the end. We believe that it will pass some such verdict, in a candid or a lenient mood, on the teachings of Hegel and Hegelianism.

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